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Contributions to Indian Economic 
Analysis: A Survey 
By JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI AND SUKHAMOY CHAKRAVARTY* 
Any survey of contributions to economic 
analysis in India, even though confined to 
the post-war years and to issues arising 
from domestic economic events and policy, 
runs into exceptional difficulties. Not only 
has practically every conceivable problem 
been raised and discussed by economists, 
in a country where interest in economic 
issues dates back at least to the latter half 
of the 19th century;' but there have also 
been numerous committees and commis- 
sions whose report have led to a volumi- 
nous literature. 
Ruthless selectivity has thus been in- 
evitable. We have generally focussed, in 
this survey, on contributions which meet 
the following criteria: (1) they should have 
analytical interest, either theoretical or 
empirical; (2) they should be made by 
Indian or India-based economists; and 
(3) they should have some bearing on 
Indian economic policy issues, even though 
they cannot necessarily be demonstrated 
to have arisen in consequence thereof or to 
have had any impact on policymaking. 
The Survey thus rules out of consider- 
ation the vast bulk of official literature, 
whose analytical base is frequently largely 
minimal, as also the purely descriptive and 
institutional material from non-official 
sources (such as the Indian Statistical 
Institute) whose utility otherwise is not to 
be minimized. Equally, the Survey does 
not extend to the growing numbers of con- 
tributions to general theoretical economic 
analysis that Indian economists have be- 
gun to make, as is evident from the con- 
tents of reputed journals in the last 
decade.2 
This Survey, therefore, is neither a com- 
prehensive account of the state of econ- 
* The authors are respectively Professor of Eco- 
nomics, M.I.T. and Professor of Mathematical Eco- 
nomics, Delhi University 
This Survey was commissioned by the American Eco- 
nomic Association. We have profited from discussions 
with, or comments on early drafts from, numerous col- 
leagues and friends, including V. K. Ramaswami, Alan 
Manne, K. N. Raj, Dharm Narain, A. N. Khusro, C. H. 
Hanumantha Rao, V. M. Dandekar, Padma Desai, P. 
N. Dhar, Ashok Desai, B. S. Minhas, V. R. Panch- 
mukhi, T. E. Weisskopf, Richard Eckaus, Paul Rosen- 
stein-Rodan, Harry G. Johnson, T. W. Schultz and T. 
N. Srinivasan. We wish to thank K. Sundaram for 
assistance in compiling the bibliography and for making 
valuable suggestions. While the bulk of the detailed 
work in Part I was undertaken by Chakravarty and in 
Parts II and III by Bhagwati, the Survey has been 
planned and also written jointly by both authors. We 
may also add that the Survey was finished essentially by 
May 1968 and, in consequence, we have not been able 
to cover some additional material of interest which has 
become available since. 
I For example, the prominent participants in the In- 
dependence movement paid considerable attention to 
economic issues; and India produced her own brand of 
List-type arguments in favor of departure from free 
trade in India's national interest [118] [128] [141]. The 
Indian Economic Association was founded in 1918 and 
the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics in 1939. 
Among the important centers of economic research to- 
day are the three Centres of Advanced Study in Eco- 
nomics, recognized and financially supported as such by 
the University Grants Commission: Bombay Univer- 
sity, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics 
(Poona), and Delhi School of Economics; and at least 
two other institutions: the Institute of Economic 
Growth (Delhi) and the Indian Statistical Institute 
(New Delhi). 
2 These contributions primarily range over the theory 
of growth and planning (e.g. S. Chakravarty, G. 
Mathur, A. K. Sen and T. N. Srinivasan), international 
trade theory (e.g. P. K. Bardhan, J. Bhagwati, B. S. 
Minhas, V. K. Ramaswami and T. N. Srinivasan), and 
econometric theory (e.g. A. L. Nagar). The trend is 
firmly established and strongly upward. 
2 
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omic research in the country3 nor does it 
pretend to give an exhaustive picture of 
the policy issues that have been discussed 
on the Indian scene since 1947 when India 
gained independence. 
The Survey is broadly divided into 
three areas: (1) planning theory and tech- 
niques; (2) agriculture; and (3) foreign 
trade. The vast majority of India's policy 
issues, and analytical literature, fall within 
one or more of these categories. With her 
programs for economic development, 
initiated through the First Five-Year Plan 
(1951/1956) and continued through two 
successive Five-Year Plans, the question 
of overall Plan formulation, and invest- 
ment criteria in particular, has engaged 
the attention of many economists. Largely 
because agriculture is the overwhelmingly 
important economic activity in the econ- 
omy, and its capacity to act as a significant 
brake on growth via its role as the supplier 
of wage goods to other sectors has been in- 
creasingly appreciated, this sector has also 
attracted considerable economic analysis. 
And finally, the foreign trade sector has 
been the focus of interesting debate. The 
questions raised by foreign aid, foreign in- 
vestment, the import control regime and 
export subsidization have led to insights of 
wider interest. 
Since the overall Plan formulation 
literature inevitably embraces some of the 
questions raised by agricultural and for- 
eign trade policies, our discussion begins 
with the survey of the planning literature 
and only then proceeds to an evaluation of 
the literature that concerns itself with the 
remaining issues in the areas of agricultural 
and trade policies. 
I. Planning Theory and Techniques 
The formulation of the successive Five- 
Year Plans in India has led to a steady 
evolution of economic thinking on ques- 
tions relating to planning theory and 
techniques. As we shall soon argue, how- 
ever, the interplay between Plans and 
economic thinking has often been tenuous. 
At times there may even have been post- 
facto rationalization of investment de- 
cisions taken on political grounds by in- 
genious designing of suitable models. At 
other times, model-building and analysis 
have inevitably gone ahead of the Plans. 
However, it is possible to identify with 
each Plan certain basic model-types which 
have provided the intellectual backbone 
to that Plan and were the object of exten- 
sive economic debate. 
Thus the First Five-Year Plan, which 
was essentially a collection of several proj- 
ects, contained at the same time a 
Harrod-Domar type exercise which sought 
to examine the growth rates that would be 
achieved by specification of the (feasible) 
marginal savings rate and the resulting 
average savings ratio. The Second Five- 
Year Plan, on the other hand, marked a 
distinct departure in favor of the Feld- 
man-Mahalanobis type of structural 
model which emphasises the physical as- 
pect of investment and thus leads, subject 
to certain restrictive assumptions about 
transformation possibilities domestically 
and through foreign trade, to the proposi- 
tion that raising the rate of investment re- 
quires increased domestic manufacture of 
capital goods. This shift from a Keynesian, 
"flow" analysis which emphasised the 
necessity to raise savings (and hence im- 
plicitly assumed that the savings could be 
transformed into required investment) to 
a "structuralist" view which emphasised 
the transformation constraint and the 
supply of capital goods to sustain growing 
investment (while implicitly assuming that 
the system would generate the savings to 
"finance" the growing supply of invest- 
ment goods) was the most dramatic epi- 
sode in the evolution of planning literature 
and debate in India. The formulation of 
Among useful attempts in this direction, with re- 
spect to agricultuire, see Gupta [611 and Dandekar [281. 
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the Third Five-Year Plan, by contrast, 
marked a shift away from these simple 
decision-models: the achievement of inter- 
industrial consistency was attempted in 
some detail this time. As we shall soon see, 
the shift to interindustrial exercises not 
only underlay plan formulation but was al- 
so the characteristic of planning exercises 
undertaken by economists and teams 
associated with the Indian Planning Com- 
mission. These mnuiti-sectoral miodels were 
also characterised by their explicit exten- 
sion to questions of intertemporal choice: 
questions which had been raised as early as 
1955 by Ragnar Frisch when he visited the 
Indian Statistical Institute which was the 
intellectual center for formulation of the 
Second Plan (1956/1961). 
Having identified synoptically the main 
outlines of shift in planning techniques in 
India through the three Plans, we now pro- 
ceed to survey the major ideas and con- 
tributions in this area, considering each of 
the three planning periods in turn. 
The First Five-Year Plan 
The first identifiable planning miodel 
used in India was developed by the authors 
of the First Five-Year Plan document 
which the Government of India placed be- 
fore the country in 195 1. The model was 
not given an explicit analytical form, but 
was implicit in the numerical figures which 
constituted the perspective plan for de- 
veloping the Indian economy [1 79,Chapter 
I]. It was essentially a simple variant of 
the growth model associated with the 
names of Harrod and Domar. The sole 
modification, but a crucial one, was the 
distinction between the average and the 
marginal propensities to save. The capital- 
output ratio was assumed to be the same 
on the margin as on the average. No gesta- 
tion lags were introduced. The model was 
developed for a closed economy (although 
it can naturally be easily extended to deal 
with an open economy, with one part of 
investment being financed by import sur- 
plus). The basic equations underlying the 
growth process were the following: 
(1) [ =-St; 
(2) St = aIt -b; 
(3) It =aKt 
(4) It = Kt 
Here I, stands for investment at 'T', St for 
the corresponding amount of savings, Yt 
stands for income. All the equations ex- 
cepting (2) are the same as in the Harrod- 
Domar model. Equation (2) introduces the 
distinction between marginal and average 
propensities to save. The model leads tothe 
basic differential equation Kt= acxaK-b 
which can be easily solved to give us the 
time profile of capital stock and output. 
We get: 
(5) Kt = (Ko - blaa)Caa, + blaa. 
Notice that unlike the usual Harrod- 
Domar model, the rate of growth here 
rises from period to period (provided of 
course a>So/Yo). Thus an economy which 
decides to save more on the margin than 
on the average can hope to do better and 
better over time in terms of its rate of 
growth. The asymptotic relative rate of 
growth of the system is given by the ex- 
pression aa.5 
Such Harrod-Domar type models have 
been explicitly used, with considerable ad- 
vantage, as the framework for plan formu- 
lation in other countries (e.g. by Jan 
Tinbergen for the first Turkish Plan). 
They are useful in indicating the basic I There had been earlier attempts at putting together 
"plans" for India: e.g., the Bombay Plan [169] in 1944. 
However, no conceptual framework, in terms of an 
explicit or implicit planning model, underlay any of 
these exercises. 
x For any specific t, rt<aa where rt is the relative 
rate of growth of income at time t. 
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macro-economic features that any more 
elaborate construct would equally have to 
satisfy. Further, they have served as 
"simple"' mechanisms for computing the 
external assistance that may be necessary 
for supplementing domestic savings to 
sustain projected growth rates in income.6 
However, such a Harrod-Domar model 
obscures problems of importance. For ex- 
ample, concentration on the flow equilib- 
rium, and the implicit assumption that 
there are no "structural " difficulties in 
transforming savings into (desired forms 
of) investment may ignore real constraints 
in the economy. Further, even within the 
framework of its assumptions, the model 
ignores the fundamental choice problem of 
planning over time, which requires a 
weighing of present versus future gains, by 
assuming a constant marginal propensity 
to save for the economy. 
The connection between the actual First 
Five-Year Plan and the Harrod-Domar 
type model contained in the document was 
left vague by the planners. It appears as 
though the selection of projects for govern- 
mental expenditure reflected essentially 
the "overhead-capital" approach to de- 
velopmental planning and the model was 
largely an intellectual appendage with 
little impact on actual Plan formulation, 
although it did serve to give some kind of 
longrun perspective to the Plan. 
The Second Five-Year Plan 
By contrast, the Second Plan pattern of 
industrial investment, with its marked 
shift in favour of capital goods industries, 
was deeply influenced by the two-sector 
growth model developed by P. C. Mahala- 
lnobis [95].7 This model was independently 
developed by Feldman in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920s and later revived by Domar 
[47] in a considerably improved form. The 
basic model, as stated by Mahalanobis, 
can be described briefly. 
Current investment flow It is divided 
into two parts, MXIk and X,It, where Xk in- 
dicates the proportion going to the capital 
goods sector and Xc the corresponding pro- 
portion for the consumption sector. 
It is clear that 
(7) I - It- = XkflkIt-1 
and 
(8) Ct - Ct1 -XCcft-1. 
Now the first equation implies that 
(9) It = Io(l -t Xkt3k)t- 
Further, Ct-C0 can be written as 
t t 
(10) E (CT - Cr1) E XC CIT 
r=1 r=1 
( 11 ) =AcfcoJ 0 + X *t?11 ? * . + XcfcIt-i 
(12) =- XAc ,o + Xct3c0(1 + Xk/3k). 
+ XOc IO(l + Xklk)'1 
(13) - --( o[1( + Xk3k)t 1 
/kXk 
Since It-Io= Io { (1+Xkfk)t _ }I, we get by 
adding it to Ct-Co in the preceding equa- 
tion: 
6 Suppose the planners are ambitious enough to set a 
target rate of growth in income which implies an in- 
vestment rate in excess of the current savings rate. In 
an open economy, this would not raise any problem so 
long as +he required amount of foreign aid (Fe) is avail- 
able to meet the domestic resource gap. However, if the 
growth process is of the type described in the text 
(where the economny saves more on the margin than on 
the average) then the required amount of foreign aid 
would diminish from year to year, provided the growth 
rate is kept constant. The time I* for which Ft vanishes 
may be defined as the time of attainment of self-sus- 
tained growth. This value for t* may be compared with 
the value t** for which the economy would reach the 
desired growth rate left to itself. The difference between 
t*$ and t* may be used to giv-e one measure of the bene- 
ficial influence of foreign aid on economic growth. Thus, 
the simple growth process described in the text can 
help one to obtain answers to questions relating to the 
volume of external assistance that is necessary. 
7Numerous specific criticisms of the analysis of the 
Mahalanobis model were made at the time, among them 
being Chakravarty [20], Tsuru [1721 and Mitra [1171. 
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(14) Ct - CO = --i0{ (1 + Xkfk)t - 1 
the complete solution for output at time t, 
where 
'X3 + flkXk 
Yt- Yo 1 d- ao l 
_~~~~~0 \ kXk (15) 
{ 1+ NAk) t }I] 
where a0o=lo/Yo, the initial investment- 
income ratio. 
Several things are quite clear from this 
equation. First we note that the relative 
rate of growth of consumption or output is 
changing over time. It is also clear that the 
asymptotic rate of growth of the system is 
given by X4k where Xk is the crucial allo- 
cation ratio which indicates the proportion 
of capital goods output which is devoted to 
the further production of capital goods. 
Thus a higher Xk would always have a 
favourable effect on the asymptotic growth 
rate of the system, irrespective of whether 
it is consumption or output. But what 
about its immediate effect on consump- 
tion? If f3,>I3k, then a higher value of Xk 
would imply a lower immediate increment 
in consumption. Thus, there is implicit in 
the choice of 'Xk' a choice of alternative 
time streams of consumption.8 
It may be further noted that, while the 
implicit assumption underlying the aggre- 
gative model discussed earlier was that the 
savings rate was a reflection of the be- 
havioral characteristics of the decision- 
making units such as the household, the 
corporate sector or the government, 
Mahalanobis effectively made it a rigid 
function of certain "structural" features 
such as the capacity of the domestic 
capital goods industry and capital-output 
ratios of the capital goods sector and the 
consumer goods sector. By making the 
allocation ratio of current investment go- 
ing into investment goods sector the 
policy variable, he showed that a higher 
allocation would mean a higher savingf rate 
on the margin and hence a greater rate of 
growth of output or consumption.9 This 
can be seen readily by noting that XkfOk/ 
(X,f3+XkIk) is none other than the share of 
incremental investment in incremental 
output. Macroeconomic balancing for a 
closed economy would then imply that 
this is also the share of incremental sav- 
ings in incremental income. If Sk= SC, then 
this ratio of incremental savings to incre- 
mental income is exactly equal to Xk. If 
1k Xf3, then Al/A Y is a more general func- 
tion of Xk, 1k, I3 but the fundamental 
qualitative point remains unaltered. 
Despite the fact that the Mahalanobis 
model is a severely rigid construct, it has 
one important virtue. This lies in its rec- 
ognition of the fact that capital equip- 
ment once installed in any specific produc- 
ing sector of the economy may not be 
shiftable.10 An important consequence is 
that changes in the savings rate, and 
hence in the rate of investment, are not 
necessarily feasible and become condi- 
tional upon the composition of the existing 
capital stock; hence, optimal programs of 
8 Mahalanobis did not address himself to the question 
of how to resolve this choice problemn. He, however, 
pointed out that a specification of the horizon over 
which the planning was done was essential if any mean- 
ingful answer is to be given to the choice of Xk. This is 
undoubtedly correct but, as more recent analysis deal- 
ing with this question has shown, specification of a 
planning horizon is onlv one of the many prerequisites 
for choosing an optimal path of development over time. 
We have to make some assumption regarding the na- 
ture of the intertemporal utility function as well as the 
terminal conditions of the problem. We shall deal with 
these questionis to a certain extent when wve come to the 
discussion of the more recent planning models con- 
structed in the Indian context. 
9 In deriving this cental proposition, Mahalanobis 
implicitly ignored the role of foreign trade altogether 
and assumed that the government was in a position to 
control comsumption completely. 
10 Whether, however, the Mahalanobis-assumed non- 
shiftability from consumer goods to investment goods 
capital equipment is greater than that within the former 
group, and how important it is anyway, are matters on 
which evidence is scant and, as we shall soon argue, was 
in any case nlot sought by the Indian planners before 
adopting Mahalanobis' ideas. 
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capital accumulation worked out under the 
assumption of nonshiftability differ cru- 
cially from those derived from models with 
complete shiftability in capital stock 
among alternative uses.'1 
It needs to be stressed, of course, that 
foreign trade also can get the economy out 
of the problems raised by limited trans- 
formation possibilities domestically owing 
to nonshiftability of capital equipment: 
the assumption of a closed economy auto- 
matically rules out this important escape 
route from the problems raised by non- 
shiftability. Of course to escape these 
problems completely, we would have to 
assume the possibility of indefinite trans- 
formation at constant rates-the so- 
called "small country" assumption in trade 
theory. Therefore, the essential problems 
raised by nonshiftability will persist if the 
reciprocal foreign demands facing the 
planning country are less than perfectly 
elastic. 
Mahalanobis, who assumed a closed 
economy and total nonshiftability of the 
capital stock from the consumption goods 
to the investment goods sector, appears to 
have used his model merely to provide the 
rationale for a shift in industrial invest- 
ments towards building up a capital goods 
base. However, the precise choice of the 
proportion of investments in the capital 
goods sector, during the Second Plan and 
possibly, thereafter, appears to have been 
arbitrary-at any rate, if there were 
specific economic considerations under- 
lying it, these were not spelled out. In any 
case, an optimal choice thereof would have 
required, at the minimum, a quantification 
of the transformation constraints (both 
domestic and foreign)-and we know that 
neither was attempted. 
Indeed, it appears quite plausible to 
argue that Mahalanobis (who had just 
then visited the socialist countries and 
with whose economists he had close con- 
tacts) was impressed with Soviet thinking 
on industrialization, with its emphasis on 
the building-up of the capital goods base, 
without full recognition of the fact that 
such a strategy presupposes constraints on 
domestic and foreign transformation which 
need to be empirically verified. Further, it 
seems likely that, being a physicist by 
training and a statistician by practice, he 
directly identified increased investment 
with increased availability of capital 
goods, which in turn he identified with 
domestic production thereof, ignoring for- 
eign trade in particular.'2 It is interesting 
that the Second Plan did not explicitly 
state the rationale of the shift to heavy in- 
dustries in terms of foreign trade con- 
straints, so that the later justification of 
this strategy by alluding to "stagnant 
world demand" for Indian exports comes 
somewhat close to a ex post facto rationali- 
zation. Indeed, the Second Plan's ex- 
amination of export earnings through the 
Plan is so cursory that it is difficult to be- 
lieve that the "stagnant world demand for 
Indian exports" assumption, by virtue of 
which the shift to heavy industries was 
later sought to be justified, was seriously 
made: such a crucial assumption, if made, 
would surely have been examined more in- 
tensively! Further it is important to note 
that the preceding Five-Year Plan's ex- 
perience with the balance of payments and 
exports was comfortable, so that it hardly 
seems likely that the export prospects 
could have been viewed with such pessi- 
mism as has later been imagined.13 
While, therefore, the Mahalanobis two- 
sector model was used to provide the 
rationale for a general shift in investments 
to building up a capital goods base, 
11 Cf. Chakravarty [221 for a detailed treatment of 
the analytical issues raised by planning for optimality 
in the context of models with non-shiftable capital. 
22 This probably accounts for his model [961 in the 
Draft Frame of the Second Plan taking no explicit ac- 
count of savings, whereas economists looking at growth 
inevitably started from the savings end. 
13 These arguments have been developed more fully 
in Bhagwati and Padma Desai [14]. 
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though the actual magnitude of this shift 
was otherwise determined, Mahalanobis 
provided yet another model, a four-sector 
model [96], which broke down total in- 
vestment among three further sectors, in 
addition to the capital goods sector: (1) 
factory production of consumer goods; (2) 
household production of consumer goods, 
including agriculture, and (3) the sector 
providing services such as health, educa- 
tion etc.'4 
Mahalanobis assumed that all four sec- 
tors had independent output-capital and 
labor-output ratios. These were sym- 
bolized by O 132, 0l3, 04 01, 02, 03 and 04 re- 
spectively. He assumed a given total of in- 
vestment. The problem was to allocate 
the total between the sectors in such a way 
that specified increases in income (AY) 
and in employment (AN) were reached. 
The policy variables were the shares of in- 
vestment going to each sector, denoted by 
X1, X2, X3 and 4. 
The model was determined, of course, 
only if one of the three independent X's 
(the policy instruments) was exogenously 
determined, since there were only two ob- 
jectives: AY and AN. With the X for the 
capital goods sector given a pre-assigned 
value (the reason for which was never 
spelled out clearly) the system was solved 
by Mahalanobis to assign investments 
among the three remaining sectors. How- 
ever, as Komiya [78] pointedly noted, the 
Mahalanobis solution was inefficient, in 
that it was situated in the interior of the 
feasibility locus between incremental out- 
put and incremental employment. Thus, 
greater employment and/or output could 
have been obtained by merely reallocating 
the given investments among the three 
sectors, although such a solution would not 
assign a positive fraction of investment to 
every sector. 
The very fact that a simple linear pro- 
gramming exercise by an outsider could 
show the inefficiency of the Mahalanobis 
allocations, in conjunction with the fact 
that Mahalanobis did not use this tech- 
nique even though the planners at his 
Indian Statistical Institute were certainly 
not lacking in knowledge of these elemen- 
tary techniques,"5 indicates that the four- 
sector model was essentially produced to 
impart (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) 
intellectual respectability to investment 
allocations arrived at on other, unspecified 
considerations. This conclusion seems also 
warranted by the fact that the statistical 
source of the parameters (relating to 
labor-output and capital-output ratios) 
was not spelled out. Nor was any attempt 
made to reconcile the model with the real 
facts of the situation, especially the pres- 
ence of foreign trade. 
The very limitations of the Mahalanobis 
two-sector and four-sector models pointed 
to the need for a more extensive, multi- 
sectoral and multi-period model for more 
efficient resolution of the choice problems 
facing the Indian economy. Such models 
were to be constructed during the Third 
Plan period and we shall go on to discuss 
them. However, it is pertinent to mention 
here an alternative approach to Indian 
planning, rival to that of Mahalanobis, 
which was put forward at the time of the 
Second Plan formulation by P. R. 
Brahmanand and C. N. Vakil [19]. 
Their approach constitutes in some 
ways the polar opposite of the position 
taken by Mahalanobis. While the latter's 
whole emphasis was on the role of fixed 
capital, Vakil and Brahmanand's entire 
emphasis was on the role of wage goods as 
14 The entire economy was supposed to be divided into 
these four sectors. 
15 The Indian Statistical Institute is internationally 
renowned for its contributions to mathematical sta- 
tistics and its distinguished Faculty which currently 
includes two Fellows of the Royal Society in this sub- 
ject. Besides, they had the benefit of visits, at the time, 
by Richard Goodwin, Jan Tinbergen, Ragnar Frisch 
and Oskar Lange. 
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capital. This approach was therefore re- 
lated to the Marxian concept of variable 
capital, since in common with Marx they 
assumed that the wages were paid as ad- 
vances in the beginning of the production 
period. However, the operational part of 
this approach was derived from the as- 
sumption that there existed massive over- 
population in agriculture. They did not 
subject the concept of disguised unem- 
ployment in agriculture to any critical 
investigation, nor did they try to measure 
the extent of such disguised unemploy- 
ment in the Indian context. They were 
following the tradition set by P. N. Rosen- 
stein-Rodan and R. Nurkse in taking it as 
obvious that a massive reserve army of 
labor existed in rural areas.16 Further they 
assumed, as Nurkse did, that the dis- 
guised unemployed must possess consider- 
able savings potential since labor could be 
transferred from agriculture without low- 
ering production and kept at work pro- 
ducing real capital goods by the payment 
of wages consisting exclusively of food. 
Several assumptions were made by 
Vakil and Brahmanand to formalize their 
system. First, the wage good was assumed 
to be exclusively food. Second, it was 
assumed that labor could produce capital 
goods without the assistance of other fac- 
tors of production. Thirdly, they assumed 
that a mechanism existed by which aver- 
age consumption on the farm could be kept 
constant subsequent to the transfer of 
labor, and the transferred labor's consump- 
tion on the farm be siphoned off to feed it 
while it was engaged in producing capital 
goods. To be sure, they recognized the 
possibility of leakage in this connection. 
They assumed that the whole of the hy- 
pothetical surplus might not be procurable 
and further that there might be a need to 
provide for slightly higher consumption 
levels than in agriculture to workers en- 
gaged in construction. Thus they derived a 
"multiplier" formula in which the multi- 
plicand was an autonomous increase in the 
stock of wage goods in the hands of the 
planning agency."7 
However, they did not pay any atten- 
tion to the possibility that the production 
process may not be of the simple Austrian 
type that they had assumed: labor-* 
capital goods->consumer goods. If the 
facts of life dictated a circular model of the 
sort analyzed by Marx (in the second 
volume of Das Kapital) and more recently 
by Leontief and others, the mere avail- 
ability of labor alone would not solve the 
problem of greater capital formation. Ex- 
tra capital equipment would be needed and 
would need to be either produced at home 
or imported, hence raising the complex of 
issues raised earlier in connection with the 
Mahalanobis model. As regards the com- 
position of wage goods, if nonfood items 
were necessary and if there were no 
corresponding excess capacity in the do- 
mestic consumer goods industries, then 
once again the creation of extra capacity 
and its synchronization with the deploy- 
ment of extra labor would be involved, 
thus necessitating a more elaborate ap- 
proach. 
18 The early writings of Brahmanand [18i in fact an- 
ticipated the inotion of disguised unemployment, al- 
though the concept was not fully developed. Brahma- 
nand's interest in this question had arisen from a gen- 
eral examination he was undertaking of the applicability 
of the Keynesian theory to the economic situation in 
India. In this connection, V. K. R. V. Rao's [1431 analy- 
sis of the Keynesian multiplier in the Indian situation 
is also of interest. 
17 The Vakil-Brahin anand approach could be readily 
used to provide a rationale for the policy of importing 
food as a means to step up capital formation and gener- 
ate extra employment. It is interesting that these 
authors did not make any effort to link up their analy- 
sis directly with the question of food aid. Although 
such an approach was implicit in the early work of 
Dandekar [271 and others, it was only much later that 
Chakravarty and Rosenstein-Rodan [26] tried to de- 
velop the logic of food aid somewhat more fully in an 
analysis which was considerably influenced by a model 
similar to that provided by an economy with massive 
rural overpopulation. 
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The social welfare function implicit in 
Vakil and Brahmanand's approach to 
planning was novel at the time: they were 
emphasizing the need to minimize the time 
needed to reach full employment. Whether 
such an objective constitutes an adequate 
social welfare function is very doubtful;18 
but that it is an objective which needs very 
careful consideration is beyond doubt. 
Mahalanobis' model, at least in its formal 
aspects, had paid no attention to this. 
Despite its limitations, Vakil and Brah- 
manand's attempts to build an analytical 
scheme which tried to tackle the problem 
posed by disguised unemployment in agri- 
culture deserve emphasis.19 In discussions 
3ubsequent to the formulation of the 
Second Plan, the wage goods approach has 
not figured prominently. Amongst eminent 
economists, Gadgil [55] has been the only 
one to draw pointed attention to the im- 
portance of mobilizing rural labor to build 
social overhead capital, which he did as 
late as 1961. In more attenuated forms, 
however, this aspect of the planning 
problem is still alive. 
The Third Five-Year Plan 
The Third Plan was not entirely pioneer- 
ing in its attempted utilization of multi- 
sector balances to achieve consistency. 
Quite aside from Ragnar Frisch's sugges- 
tions in this respect [54], Jan Sandee [150] 
had actually constructed a simple linear 
programming model during his visit to the 
Indian Statistical Institute during 1957/ 
1958, which was used to maximize aggre- 
gate consumption in a terminal year 
(1970) as an excess of consumption over a 
base year (1960), subject to maintaining 
intersectoral consistency conditions and 
feasibility conditions on the side of the 
balance of payments. 
While the Sandee model was essentially 
a straightforward, static linear program- 
ming exercise, it had one analytically im- 
portant feature which deserves special 
mention. This relates to his treatment of 
investment in the terminal year. If this 
year were taken really to.be the terminal 
year of the Plan, then clearly there is no 
justification for having any investment at 
all in that year (assuming, of course, that 
all investments fructify beyond the one 
year horizon). Since no planner ever takes 
such a myopic point of view, it is necessary 
to elaborate a rationale for introducing in- 
vestment activity in single-period optimi- 
zation models. One can theoretically con- 
ceive of several procedures which can be 
used for this purpose. Sandee's procedure 
was to assume that, over the decade of 
1960-70, investment flows should increase 
linearly every year. We may spell this out. 
Let us denote the year 1960 by '0, and 
the year 1970 by T. Then the cumulated 
investment over the period is given by 
f T 
1 (t)dt. 
Sandee assumed I(t) = a+ bt. Then we have 
rT 
LT(a + bt)dt aT + UbT. 
The proportion of total investment that 
must take place in the T-th year out of the 
total over the entire T year period is given 
by a?bTl/aT ?bT 2. Now applying this 
factor to the investment demand for the 
product of the i-th sector induced by out- 




we get the estimate for investment of the 
i-th type for the year for every i. Hence 
the vector of goods to be delivered on the 
investment account in the terminal year is 
determined. Intersectoral deliveries on the 
18 See Chakravarty [231 on this issue. 
19 On the question whether disguised unemployment 
exists. we survey the Indian literature in Section II. 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.67 on Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:35:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BHAGWATI AND CHAKRAVARTY: INDIAN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 11 
current account, together with the balance 
of payments considerations, must be in- 
cluded. Sandee, then, proceeded to maxi- 
mize consumption in 1970 subject to obey- 
ing a lower limit on total investment 
summed over all the sectors and a few 
other inequality constraints.20 
The work underlying the Third Plan 
was nowhere as explicitly set out as in 
Sandee's exercise, although balances of 
supply and demand at a detailed sectoral 
level were set out. Reddaway [145], who 
was associated with the Perspective Plan- 
ning Division of the Indian Planning Com- 
mission,2' undertook a systematic supply- 
demand balance exercise, for many indus- 
tries, essentially putting together different 
target outputs, imports and demands to 
test for simple consistency for the year 
1965-66, the terminal year of the Third 
Plan. If this exercise were construed as 
constituting simple, ad hoc checks on tar- 
gets supplied to Reddaway by the Per- 
spective Planning Division (PPD) it was 
valuable. But construed as an attempt at 
devising a full-fledged Third Plan, with 
only partial targets of production supplied 
by the PPD, the exercise was less satis- 
factory even within the framework of test- 
ing for consistency (as distinct from opti- 
mality). This was pointed out by Padma 
Desai [42] who, on attempting to formalize 
the Reddaway exercise, found it under- 
determined despite efforts at discovering 
(from Reddaway's work) ways in which 
the model might have been intended to be 
closed.22 The problem clearly arose from 
Reddaway's omission to state his model, 
if any, in formal terms. It therefore throws 
into focus the need for stating carefully the 
model underlying the investment allo- 
cations and related decisions, quite aside 
from the theoretical elegance and scrutiny 
of otherwise vague assumptions that such 
a procedure would entail. 
In fact, during the Third Plan period it- 
self, many economists such as Alan 
Manne, Ashok Rudra, Sukhamoy 
Chakravarty, Richard Eckaus, Louis Lefe- 
ber and Kirit Parikh, turned to precisely 
this kind of work in connection primarily 
with the Fourth Plan: whereas Manne and 
Rudra were to build static, multi-sector 
consistency models, the Chakravarty- 
Eckaus-Lefeber-Parikh exercises were to 
be concerned with explicitly dynamic, 
multi-sector models.23 
Before we discuss either of these two 
developments, both of which marked im- 
provements over the earlier computational 
models of planning, we should note that 
the Third Plan not only marked a shift to 
examination of consistency at the inter- 
sectoral level but also incorporated some 
fresh, though embryonic, analytical think- 
ing. The notion that foreign trade might 
be the bottleneck to increasing the rate of 
investment had come more sharply into 
focus, instead of being the implicit prem- 
ise of a Mahalanobis type of investment 
strategy.24 Thus, significantly more than 
20 It mnay )be noted that, as Sandee assumed that the 
balance of payments in 1970 would be such as to require 
no import surplus, he could pav no attention to any 
parametric variation in foreign aid availability, a ques- 
tion which has been repeatedly posed by many model 
builders in India since then. 
21 Reddaway was on the M.I.T. Center for Inter- 
national Studies Program, under which several dis- 
tinguished economists were associated with the Plan- 
ning Commission's work. P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Max Millikan headed this program, which brought to 
India numerous economists including I. M. D. Little, 
Trevor Swan, Arnold Harberger, Louis Lefeber, J. 
Mirrlees, Richard Eckaus, and Sir Donald MacDougall. 
22 See the interchange between Padma Desai and 
Reddaway [146j on this issue. 
23 As it eventually turned out, the Fourth Plan was 
deferred by three years, largely thanks to the disloca- 
tion of aid flows following the Indo-Pakistani war of 
late 1965 and two unprecedented agricultural droughts 
in 1965-66 and 1966-67 which, in turn, led to a re- 
cession in industrial investments. The planning exer- 
cises, which had not anticipated these inajor distur- 
banices, turned out to be irrelevant to the immediate 
situation. Whether, however, the Fourth Plan should 
have been postponed in consequence is a matter on 
w hich there has been much debate. 
24 This view was, at least partly, a reflection of the 
stagn-ation in India's export earnings during the decade 
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with the Second Plan, the investment de- 
cisions in the Third Plan were taken with 
an explicit attention to the role of foreign 
aid in breaking this bottleneck and the 
possible desirability of "using aid to end 
aid," and reach self-sustained growth at 
some foreseeable future date. To put it 
differently, the Third Plan investments, 
which continued the shift to the heavy 
industrial sector, were taken against the 
notion that foreign aid would enable the 
economy, by permitting these invest- 
ments, to cross over the hump (posed by 
the foreign trade constraints) from a low 
growth rate equilibrium to a high growth 
rate equilibrium. This precise view was to 
be the basis of more fornmal exercises by 
Manne and Bergsman [100] in connection 
with the Fourth Plan work. 
Miodels for the Fourth Plan 
Among the detailed, static exercises 
attempted during the work on the Fourth 
Plan was that by Manne and Rudra [101], 
who were both working in collaboration 
with the PPD (which had put out its own 
"bluebook" of projections based on similar 
thinkinig). 
Although their exercise was of the stan- 
dard type, and related to the consistency of 
the terminal year of the Fourth Plan, 
there were certain interesting features. 
For example, they followed Sandee in 
attempting to give a rationale for invest- 
ment activity in the terminal year. How- 
ever, unlike Sandee, they assumed that in- 
vestment would rise exponential.ly over 
the intervening years and hence the pro- 
portion of investment to be completed in 
the terminal year was given by 
e T r 
6) 
_|r-1 1 - rT 
r 
This proportion "-y" was called by them 
the stock-flow conversion factor. Having 
done this, they took the consumption vec- 
tor to be given and tried to find out the 
gross production vector that would be 
needed if all the end use activities were to 
be satisfied at given levels, subject to the 
assumption of a stipulated stock flow con- 
version factor. Their procedure may be 
summarized as follows. 
Let x stand for the vector of productioin 
levels in 1970 and x? for the vector of pro- 
duction levels in 1960. Then we get 
xti + Mi = E aijtj + Fi 
(17) 
+ y E b ij(j- xj) 
where AI stands for imports, F for final de- 
mand and aij and bij are the standard cur- 
rent input-output and capital coefficients 
respectively. If Ji were written as [mr]x~ 
where [irn] is a diagonal matrix of import 
coefficients, then we may write the solution 
of the above as :25 
(18) = (I m - A - 'y'B)-l [F - yBxO] 
where I is the unit matrix. 
Since Manne and Rudra were concerned 
with constructing a terminal year model 
for the Indian economy, they did not 
specify in a complete way the path the 
economy was to follow from a given initial 
1951-1960, which made the hypothesis of a foreign ex- 
change bottleneck to Indian developnment seem much 
more plausible. Manmohan Singh [1631 was later to 
show that this stagnation was largely a result of do- 
mestic policies, although demand factors would have 
constrained significant expansion of export earnings. 
25 It is clear that the choice of 'y' cannot be com- 
pletely unrestricted. It must satisfy an upper bound 
restriction if (I+ mr-A -yB)- is to be non negative. 
From the theorems on non negative square matrices we 
know that this would be the case provided in were 
sufficiently small so that (A + yB - m) is non negative, 
and 1 >ro where ro is the Frobenius root of the matrix 
(A +IB - M). A sufficient condition for this to hold is 
that maxi <(1i;+a1j+rb1i)<l for any suitable choice 
of units. Hence, given the coefficients of production, 
the capital coefficients and a given pattern of competi- 
tive import demand, -y must have at least an upper 
bound. 
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point to the terminal configuration. Thus 
this model may be said to give a perspec- 
tive rather than a plan. However, the 
construction of a terminal configuration is 
an essential ingredient in any finite horizon 
planning model so that the Manne-Rudra 
model did provide some guidelines for the 
planner, even though it did not specify a 
complete time phased course of action. 
Models which give some guidelines re- 
garding the phasing of investment can be 
usefully divided into two categories.26 One 
of these categories may be described as 
giving us intertemporally consistent plan- 
ning models. The other category, some- 
what more ambitious in scope, deals with 
optimization over time, and has been ex- 
perimented with by Chakravarty, Eckaus, 
Lefeber and Parikh. 
Chakravarty and Eckaus [24] first out- 
lined the logic of an intertemporally con- 
sistent multisectoral planning model and 
pointed out the basic difficulties. They did 
not, however, compute numerical growth 
paths. It is of some analytical interest to 
give a brief summary of their arguments. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore 
temporarily all the non-homogeneous ele- 
ments of a Leontief dynamic system other 
than consumption. Then, we have a dy- 
namic system characterized by the follow- 
ing equation: 
(19) X(t) = A X(t) 4- BX(t) + C(t) 
where X(t) stands for the vector of output 
levels, X(t) for its rate of change, C(t) for 
the vector of final consumption, and A and 
B are the standard Leontief matrices. The 
complete solution of the dynamic system 
assuming C(t) to be growing exponentially 
over time is given,27 using the notation of a 
matrix exponential, by the following ex- 
pression: 
(20) X(t) = 6[B-'(I - A)+j 
+ (I - A - rB)lCert 
where P is a vector of arbitrary constants 
and C represents exogenous levels of con- 
sumption to be determined through policy 
considerations. The advantage of using 
this matrix exponential notation is that it 
shows the analogy with the ordinary scalar 
case involving one variable quite explic- 
itly. 
The above equation holds provided B 
has an inverse, a condition which is often 
not satisfied. The solution for more general 
time paths of C(t) may also be worked out, 
either in an analytical form or through 
numerical approximations. 
Now if X(O) and X(T) are both given, 
in the first case from history and in the 
second case from the planner's specifica- 
tions, then we have 2n equations to deter- 
mine the unknown P and C's. This is the 
logic of the consistency models. However, 
difficulty arises in so far as the matrix 
26i The Mahalanobis model, through possibilities of 
variation in the choice of Xk, was also in principle capa- 
ble of generating alternative time phased programs. 
The Mahalanohis model was further elaborated, by dis- 
aggregation with respect to intermediate goods (where 
the Mahalanobis model had been vertically integrated) 
and via the explicit assumption that capital goods pro- 
ducing the consumer (and intermediate) goods could 
not be shifted to producing capital goods (which in any 
case was implicit in the Mahalanobis model and indeed 
provided its basic economic rationale). This was done 
by Raj and Sen [140]. They produced a number of 
illustrative time paths whose value consisted in re- 
emphasizing that an intertemporal choice had to be 
made, although no attempt was made by them to indi- 
cate how this might be done. Besides their model, while 
set in the context of an open economy, ignored the 
possibilities of trade offs between domestic production 
and imports for supplying any given bundle of goods at 
a point of time, as pointed out by Bhagwati [6]. For 
other comments, see Prasad [129]. 
Mention should also be made of a more novel, ex- 
ploratory paper by P. N. Mathur [109] which gave a 
computational, time-phased solution to investment al- 
location decisions. Mathur, writing in 1962, explored the 
consequences of transforming an initial technological 
matrix for the Indian economy into technology of the 
U. S. type within a specified planning horizon. He used 
a linear programming formulation to discriminate be- 
tween alternative transformation paths. 
27 See the article by S. Chakravarty and R. S. Eckaus 
[241. 
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B-1(I-A) may not be well behaved: thus 
there is no guarantee that the dynamic 
system which is governed by the matrix 
will ensure nonnegativity of the relevant 
variables over time. Hence, one cannot be 
sure that consistency necessarily implies 
viability. On the other hand, one could also 
work recursively backwards from an as- 
sumed terminal condition by using the 
finite difference version of Leontief's struc- 
tural equations. The advantage of this 
procedure is that it would not require the 
B-matrix to be invertible. However, in all 
probability, we would fail to tally exactly 
with the initial conditions. If the magni- 
tude of the difference between the his- 
torically given initial situation and the de- 
sired initial situation (thus worked out) 
was not large, then one could argue that 
the model provided some sort of a time- 
phased plan. But there is no a priori 
guarantee that the difference would not be 
significant; nor can we assume that the 
deviations would be found only in the sec- 
tors producing 'tradeables,' and hence be 
remediable by international trade. 
Unlike the procedure discussed by 
Chakravarty and Eckaus, Manne and 
Bergsman [100] used a different method 
which gave what they called an "almost 
consistent model." In working out this al- 
most consistent model, they did not rely 
on the complete solution of the non- 
homogeneous dynamic Leontief system. 
They computed a set of terminal output 
levels of X(T) based on the need to reach 
specified levels of final consumption in the 
year T and to sustain growth in gross out- 
put at specified levels beyond the horizon 
T. This part of the exercise was therefore 
based on different assumptions from those 
underlying the determination of terminal 
investment levels used by the other 
models. Once X(T) was determined, Bergs- 
man and Manne obtained the timepath of 
X(t) starting from X(0), by log linear in- 
terpolation. Hence they had a unique 
planned output trajectory X(t). As for the 
demand side, the timepath of final demand 
for year 0 to T was assumed to be given 
exogenously. But induced investment in 
both fixed capital and inventories was de- 
termined by planned output increases. 
Now, if we denote the planned require- 
ments trajectories over time by D(t), 
clearly X(t) Fz8D(t) for every t (and for 
every industry). Such differences were to 
be met by so-called "shock absorbers." 
These shock absorbers were either imports 
of producer's goods, or changes in pro- 
jected consumption of food and fabrics and 
the domestic output of service sectors. 
Since construction, which was treated as a 
domestic service, turned out to be too 
severe a bottleneck for the initial year, 
they called their model an almost-con- 
sistent model. 
The planning model first developed by 
Chakravarty, Eckaus, Lefeber and Parikh 
and later extended by Eckaus and Parikh 
[51], and hereafter described as the 
"CELP model," was formally the most de- 
tailed of all the models so far developed in 
the context of Indian planning.28 This is 
not to suggest that it was completely ade- 
quate for the purpose of generating de- 
velopment plans for the Indian economy. 
But within the limitation of a linear model, 
the structure had sufficient flexibility to 
handle a number of important planning 
questions. 
The model constructed by the above 
authors is best described as a finite hori- 
zon, linear optimization model involving 
explicit intersectoral and intertemporal re- 
lationships, which satisfies boundary con- 
ditions relating to the initial year as well 
as to the terminal year of the plan. This 
description indicates that the CELP mod- 
el formally subsumed the structural fea- 
tures of the preceding models. In addition 
it provided an intertemporally optimal 
path of development which brought the 
economy from the initial situation to the 
28 This model has been described and discussed by 
Eckaus [491 and by Chakravarty and Lefeber [251. 
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desired terminal situation. It also dis- 
tinguished between investment starts, in- 
vestment in execution and completed in- 
vestment. 
The linear maximand used in the CELP 
model was the discounted sum of consump- 
tion over a five year period. The relative 
rate of discount over time was assumed to 
be constant to avoid 'regret' phenomena of 
the type discussed in the theoretical liter- 
ature by Robert Strotz [167]. Consump- 
tion in each period was assumed to be of 
constant composition. In other words, 
there was no substitution allowed between 
the different items of consumption in one 
single period. This is an assumption of the 
Leontief variety on the side of consump- 
tion. These assumptions could be formally 
stated as follows: 
T 
(21) Maximize W(t)C(I) 
t=1 
where W(t)= (t+r)-t and [c] C(t) <F(t) 
where [c] is a diagonal matrix of propor- 
tional consumption coefficients with 
ci= 1. Clearly, r is the social rate of 
time discount whereas F(t) is the vector of 
sectoral outputs designated for consump- 
tion. The authors expressed their unhappi- 
ness over their extremely rigid assumption 
with respect to consumption but justified 
their procedure on the ground that, for an 
economy such as India, the low level of per 
capita income did lend some credibility to 
the assumption of a fixed composition 
consumption basket.29 
To make sure that consumption did not 
fluctuate from period to period, a linear 
model such as this required an explicit 
monotonicity constraint: G(t+l) > C(t) 
(l+n) where 'n' is a predetermined 
growth rate. Further, consumption in 
year 1, denoted by C(1), was assumed to 
be greater than C(1), a predetermined 
amount. On the side of the structural re- 
lations, the CELP model specified inter- 
industry relationships both on the current 
and on the capital account. The model 
differed from the traditional treatment on 
the side of capital formation by introduc- 
ing a gestation lag of 3 years coupled with 
the assumption of an exogenous pattern of 
investment buildup. The model permitted 
the authors to assume that the pattern of 
buildup in investment was either uniform 
or different between sectors. These re- 
strictions on the structure of the economy 
were described by the following set of re- 
lationships: 
(22) AX(t) + F(t) + iVT() + H1(1) + G(t) 
+ E(t) - M(t) - X(t) ? 0. 
F(t), N(t), H(t), G(t) were vectors of con- 
sumption, capital accumulation, inven- 
tory accumulation and governmental ex- 
penditure respectively. E(t) was the vector 
of export levels and M(t) was the vector of 
import levels. 
With regard to capital formation the 
CELP model used the following set of re- 
lationships: 
bX(t) - K(i) < 0, 
(23) where [b] - b2 
a diagonal matrix of sectoral capital- 
output ratios. 
(24) KQ)-K(t-1) -Z(t) 
+ R(t - 1) ? 0 
qkZ(t) -1(t -k); 
(25) Eqk = 1 k =1, 2, 3. 
k 
k t+k Z piiJT (t) -Vij(t) 0; 
(26) E lYk (26) ~~~~ 
Ni(t) = Ni~(t). 
29 Clearly the assumption of a fixed-consumption 
pattern, in turn, implies the CELP model assumed iden- 
tical, constant returns to scale tastes for each individual, 
thus ruling out explicit consideration of the question of 
the effects of changes in income distribution on con- 
sumption patterns. 
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Equation (23) states that total demand for 
fixed capital must be less than the capital 
stock currently available. Equation (24) 
states the balance relationship for net 
capital formation. Z(t) is gross new capac- 
ity available in 't' and R(t- 1) shows the re- 
placement requirements computed on any 
reasonable basis. Equations (25) and 
(26) describe certain structural aspects of 
the process of capacity creation. These 
consist of the assumption that additions to 
capacity consist of the blending of different 
sectoral outputs according to given pro- 
portions and at given moments of time. In 
other words, capacity additions are pro- 
duced by outputs devoted to capital for- 
mation with a distributed lag structure. A 
well defined part of the intended capacity 
increase must be comnpleted at t-3, I-2, 
t- 1 periods in order to have the desired 
capacity increase available at period i. 
If qk denotes the proportion of total 
capacity increase that must be completed 
k periods in advance (k= 1, 2, 3), then in 
order to have a unit of capacity increase 
in t, It(t-k) must represent that part of 
Z(t) that has to be completed in period 
(t- k). This is shown by the equation (25) 
qkZ(t) = t(t -k); E qk =1, k =1, 2, 3. 
k 
The lagged investment componentslt(1 - k) 
have their fixed coefficient production 
functions, one for each lagged period. In 
any one time period t, a given sector is go- 
ing to contribute inputs for producing 
'jt+l(,) Ij+2(t) and I/+3(t). These inputs 
at timne 'T1 are additive whether or not they 
are provided for capacity intended for 1+ 1, 
1+2 or t+3. When summed, they make up 
the sector's contribution to gross invest- 
ment in t. This is described in equation 
(26) where pij, is the fixed production 
coefficient. Thus, 
(27) k pkj?Yc(t) t, 1) 0O 
(28) N iT>(t) = Ni(t). 
In addition to capacity formation, there is 
also the equation for inventory accumula- 
tion, which is indicated by the following 
equation: 
(29) H(Q) = S[X(t + 1) - X(t)] 
where S= [Si] is the diagonal matrix of 
inventory requirements. 
Foreign trade problems were introduced 
in the model in a "complete" way, but not 
necessarily in a very satisfactory way. Ex- 
port demand levels were assumed to be 
given exogenously. Hence no optimization 
was introduced there. Imports were di- 
vided into two categories: competitive im- 
ports and noncompetitive imports. Non- 
competitive imports were related to sec- 
toral production levels by fixed propor- 
tions. Competitive imports were related to 
the sectoral production levels through the 
device of import ceilings. Formally the 
competitive imports of the i-th type of 
commodity were given by the following 
inequality: 
M2(t) 
(30) < m2[FA(t) + , Ei(t)-E MX(t)l 
where Mi2(t) was competitive import of 
the i-th type at time 't', FA (t) was the 
foreign aid availability at 't', Ei(t) was ex- 
ports of the i-th commodity at time 't', 
Mil(t) was noncompetitive import into the 
i-th sector, rni2 was an import ceiling. This 
meant that, after deducting from the total 
amount of foreign exchange earned at 
time (t) the total bill of noncompetitive 
imports, no more than Mni2 times the re- 
sidual could be allocated for competitive 
imports of the i-th type. This device of 
handling competitive imports through in- 
troducing boundary relationships was im- 
portant in avoiding a pattern of complete 
specialization to which a linear model 
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would otherwise gravitate. Hence, despite 
the awkwardness of the procedure, it 
served an important purpose in view of the 
procedure of linear maximization adopted 
in the CELP model on the assumption 
that ,m 2> 1. 
The manner in which the investment 
figures for the terminal year were derived 
in the CELP model was different from 
that employed by Sandee, or Manne and 
Rudra.30 The CELP model brought the 
post plan future into focus in terms of in- 
vestment in the terminal year. This had 
some conceptual advantage over the con- 
verse procedure used by the earlier authors 
in as much as the growth rates were 
applied to the terminal year consumption 
component directly rather than to invest- 
ment figures. This is readily seen as fol- 
lows. From the purely mathematical point 
of view, the terminal configuration is 
merely the sum of the particular solutions 
corresponding to the nonhomogeneous ele- 
ments of an open dynamic Leontief model. 
If we write the sectoral balance equations 
in the compact vector matrix form, as 
(31) X=AX+BXY +C+E+G-M 
where X is the vector of gross output level, 
C the vector of consumption, E the vector 
of exports, M the vector of imports and G 
the vector of government expenditure, 
then the sum of the particular solutions 
corresponding to C, E, M and G gives the 
terminal configuration. Investment is 
treated here completely endogenously, 
since we assume I= BX. The complete 
solution to the nonhomogeneous part of 
the above differential equation is given by 
X = (I- A rB)-lCer 
(32) 
+ (I 
(I - A -gB)-'GeAt 
-(I- - A B - v B f . 
Here r, X, A, v are the growth rates of C, E, 
G and M respectively. 
XVe should note that since the CELP 
model assumed a fixed consumption bas- 
ket, only the scale of consumption of the 
composite good was left to be determined 
by the logic of the optimizing mechanism. 
The items for the terminal year such as 
exports, government expenditure and im- 
ports were exogenously determined. Given 
these exogenous items, K(T), which stands 
for the terminal vector of capital stocks, 
was expressed in this model as a function 
f(r; T) where f is a vector function of the 
vector of the post Plan growth rates 'r' and 
the length of the horizon T; 'f' was deter- 
mined implicitly by the solution of the 
optimizing mechanism. 
Given the information on post terminal 
growth rates, the length of the planning 
horizon, the initial conditions, the struc- 
tural equations, and the inequalities on 
the side of competitive imports, the model 
could work out a complete time path for 
all the variables such as production, con- 
sumption, and investment levels. (The 
model can, of course, be analyzed from the 
dual angle, e.g., in terms of the shadow 
prices of the relevant scarce factors. These 
shadow prices are the optimal rentals of 
different types of equipment as well as the 
price of foreign exchange. It is interesting 
to note that the shadow price of foreign 
exchange was always positive in this 
model since imports could always be used 
to increase the value of the maximand.) 
The model as developed by the above 
authors was the subject of a critical 
appraisal by Srinivasan [165]. Many of 
Srinivasan's criticisms3" were directed at 
the degree of weight to be placed on the 
numerical solutions thrownl up by the 
model in some preliminary runs as well as 
30 This procedure has been used independently by 
Manne. Also see Frisch [53]. 
3' For these comments, which are of considerable 
relevance to an evaluation of the Third Plan targets, 
Srinivasan [165] should be consulted. We turn to these 
questions shortly. 
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on the comparability of the solution to the 
model with the actual Third Five-Year 
Plan figures. Srinivasan, however, raised a 
conceptual question of general importance. 
This question related to the way in which 
the terminal conditions were specified in 
the CELP model. This model had en- 
visaged terminal conditions as a way of 
sustaining post terminal rates of growth of 
consumption, where the composition of 
consumption was given exogenously but 
the scale was left to be determined by the 
optimizing mechanism. There are two 
limitations to this procedure. In a model 
involving an infinity of time, no indefi- 
nitely sustainable growth rate can exceed 
the growth rate of the labor force. Fur- 
ther, the composition of consumption, 
which in this model was pegged till 
eternity, could be expected to change if, as 
planned, income levels were going up year 
by year. Srinivasan, therefore, expressed a 
preference for setting terminal conditions 
in a way which would maximize indefi- 
nitely sustainable consumption per capita. 
This, of course, is none other than the dis- 
aggregated version of the so-called golden 
rule of accumulation. The terminal capac- 
ity vector in this case would be a function 
of the rate of growth of the labor force, 
and the production relationships of the 
system. Coupled with the assumption of 
full employment and a given time horizon, 
this would give the planner a vector of ab- 
solute levels of capacity needed at the end 
of the plannirng period. The method of 
setting terminal conditions along the lines 
suggested by Srinivasan has both con- 
ceptual and policy determination merits, 
especially in the context of a country like 
India with a massive and rapidly growing 
population. 
Since the original form of the above 
model was published, moreover, Eckaus 
and Parikh [51] have done further work 
within the framework of the CELP model. 
While the conceptual structure of the 
model used by Eckaus and Parikh is 
essentially the same as that of the CELP 
model, the introduction of longer time 
horizons and also of new techniques in the 
agricultural sector by Eckaus and Parikh 
constitute important improvements. 
Having stated the formal properties of 
the CELP model, and argued for its 
superiority over earlier efforts at oper- 
ational planning models in the country, 
we now proceed to comment further on the 
analysis of the CELP model, indicating 
the areas in which further research is 
necessary and thereby highlighting some 
additional limitations of the CELP ap- 
proach. We then conclude our survey of 
Indian planning models and techniques by 
discussing the precise manner in which the 
experiments with the CELP model were 
actually designed to throw light upon the 
important policy questions which Indian 
planners were concerned with at the time. 
Possibilities of Further Improvement in 
Model-Making. The first important im- 
provement in designing computable plan- 
ning models would be to relax the assump- 
tion of linearity by introducing a nonlinear 
maximand. This is because linear max- 
imization problems over time are known to 
display the so-called "flip-flop" behavior 
in consumption and investment levels, 
which is certainly very awkward for realis- 
tic planning models. If this "flip-flop" be- 
havior is then sought to be corrected 
through the imposition of additional con- 
straints, the constraints become more im- 
portant than the optimization procedure, 
and hence the problem is not really solved. 
In the context of a multisector, inter- 
temporal maximand, it is necessary to dis- 
tinguish between two types of nonlinear- 
ity. First, there is the possible nonlinearity 
of a one-period utility function involving 
different types of consumer goods. Such a 
utility function would be an improvement 
upon the fixed coefficients approach. Sec- 
ondly, the aggregate utility function over 
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time could be nonlinear bringing in con- 
siderations relating to the diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption- as the 
consumption vector rises over time. Max- 
imization of a nonlinear maximand how- 
ever would raise many problems of a com- 
putational nature which may yet take 
time to solve but, with a Leontief type 
technology, the problem does not seem to 
be by any means hopeless. 
Secondly, the foreign trade problem re- 
quires a more satisfactory treatment. 
Changing comparative advantage posi- 
tions with respect to different commodities 
should be reflected more adequately in the 
structure of the model. On this point also, 
progress would require solving intricate 
questions of nonlinearity in somewhat the 
same way as in connection with the pre- 
ceding objective.32 However, in one re- 
spect, the nonlinearities relevant to an 
open economy would be somewhat more 
intractable to handle. These nonlinearities 
would arise when some learning phenom- 
enon is operative or some other form of 
economies of scale is relevant, rendering 
the classical convexity property of the 
feasibility surface inapplicable. The pro- 
gramming problem in this context would 
then have a mixed integer form, for which 
no very suitable algorithm yet exists. 
In addition to all these questions, we 
should also note that the structure of con- 
sumption and the techniques of production 
in the model are quite rigid and that this 
certainly restricts its empirical relevance. 
Further it may be valuable to introduce 
an explicit savings constraint, as political 
factors may impose a ceiling on the capac- 
ity to raise savings. 
An additional feature which planning 
models devised specifically in the Indian 
context ought to take into account is the 
phenomenon of massive unemployment, 
disguised and open. No formal planning 
model developed in the Indian context 
fully takes into account the problem posed 
by such unemployment. The only way un- 
employment is reflected in these models is 
through the assumption that labor is free, 
thus enabling one to focus attention. on 
scarce resources such as capital and foreign 
exchange. Since the clear implication of 
these models is that full employment can 
be reached only over a relatively long pe- 
riod of time, important questions arise re- 
garding the way unemployment is to be 
handled in the intervening period. This not 
only raises problems of distributive jus- 
tice, which are very considerable, but may 
also raise serious problems relating to 
economic efficiency if one remembers that, 
given suitable organizational efforts, un- 
employed labor may be put to creating 
extra social overhead capital, which would 
largely involve redistribution of aggregate 
consumption. We have noticed that this 
aspect of planning received considerable 
emphasis in the work of Vakil and Brah- 
manand which we discussed earlier. But 
we have also seen that the linkage between 
the deployment of labor in such labor 
intensive rural construction activities is 
not entirely independent of the decisions 
taken elsewhere in the economy with re- 
spect to the use of scarce resources includ- 
ing wage goods. This is because we do not 
have many cases in real life where labor 
can produce capital goods unassisted by 
capital goods, and further, there is no 
automatic mechanism through which po- 
tential savings of the agriculturists could 
be transferred into consumption of labor 
working on construction projects. Thus, 
there is always some linkage between 
labor used on social overhead projects and 
the pattern of industrial development that 
is envisaged. Thus, what is necessary is an 
32 On the problem of planning India's trade pattern 
within the context of linear one-period maximization 
models, one can refer to the thorough work done re- 
cently by T. E. Weisskopf. Weisskopf [1751 does not 
consider the choice of export levels; instead he asstimes 
these to be given. 
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explicit analysis of a planning model which 
would incorporate this important struc- 
tural feature of the Indian economy and 
explore fully its implications. The models 
which have been developed so far, while 
they range considerably in their sophisti- 
cation from simple to very elaborate con- 
structs, have, however, been essentially 
concerned with the implications of the 
shortage of capital and foreign exchange, 
rather than with a full analysis of the 
abundance of one important factor of pro- 
duction, e.g. unskilled human labor. 
Empirical A pplications of the CELP 
Model. Despite these limitations, and 
essentially on an experimental basis, the 
CELP model was utilized to analyze cer- 
tain important, policy questions. 
Two essentially important problems 
were explored with the aid of the CELP 
model, which appeared contemporane- 
ously with the execution of the Third Plan. 
(1) Suppose that the Third Plan terminal 
year (1965/66) capacity targets were 
accepted, and the initial conditions and 
structural coefficients also accepted as 
implicit in the Third Plan, was there a 
feasible timepath from the latter to the 
former? Further, aside from feasibility, 
was the implicit timephasing in the Third 
Plan "optimal" if the preference function 
involved a discounted sum of consumption 
over the five year period (1961/1966)? (2) 
Moreover, the CELP model was also used 
to generate an optimal timepath of in- 
vestments and outputs, while replacing the 
exogenous terminal year capacity targets 
of the Third Plan and instead allowing 
endogenous determination of these targets 
via specification of the rates of post- 
terminal growth in different items of final 
demand. This latter trial run, therefore, 
raised the question of the optimality of the 
actual Third Plan in a more comprehen- 
sive manner. 
The first set of questions was analyzed 
on the assumption that an annual aid flow 
of Rs.5000 million would be available 
through the Third Plan-an assumption 
shared by the actual Third Plan. Further, 
the targeted rate of growth of consumption 
was specified alternatively at 2a% and 5% 
per annum; the rate of time discount was 
set at 10%. With these specifications and 
the structural coefficients assumed to be 
those implicit in the Third Plan, the actual 
Third Plan turned out to be feasible. How- 
ever, it turned out that the optimal time- 
path solution for going from the initial to 
the terminal year capacity levels, under 
either assumption with respect to the 
growth of consumption,33 required a lower- 
ing of consumption in the first year of the 
Third Plan as compared with the actual 
consumption that obtained in the year 
1960/61 which preceded the Third Plan. 
Thus the crucial question on the feasibility 
side, if one were considering an optimal 
transition path from initial to terminal 
capacity levels (as defined in the Third 
Plan), was whether the planners were 
willing to be very austere in the beginning 
of the Third Plan. The optimal timephas- 
ing of the Third Plan therefore, was not 
merely at variance with that implicit in the 
Plan itself34 but, furthermore, it seemed 
unlikely to be feasible in practice.35 Fur- 
thermore, quite aside from optimality, if 
the capital coefficients matrix used by 
CELP was indicative of the structural re- 
lationships in the Indian economy, then 
the investment figures in the Third Plan 
represented a serious underestimate. 
The optimality exercise which allowed 
the terminal year targets to be endoge- 
nously determined, however (and which 
3The difference between the two alternative growth 
rates with respect to consumption showed itself more 
in the derived figures for the first year consumption 
levels than in the maximum value achieved by the ob- 
jective function over the planning period. 
3 Since the possibility of such a reduction in con- 
sumption in the first year was certainly not envisaged 
in the Plan document. 
35 It should be noted that varying the discount rate 
from 10% to 20% hardly changed the solution, espe- 
cially with respect to the reduction in first year consump- 
tion 
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therefore envisaged the possibility of an 
investment allocation different from that 
in the Third Plan itself), threw up a solu- 
tion which was considerably different from 
the official Third Plan. First, the total dis- 
counted sum of consumption was con- 
siderably higher. The average annual rate 
of growth of consumption was considerably 
higher than the figure officially assumed 
for the Third Plan. Furthermore, the 
major constraining factors in this modified 
growth process turned out to be the con- 
sumption goods sectors rather than the 
sectors producing capital goods. Such a 
striking dissimilarity between the opti- 
mizing planning model and the official 
Third Plan was the subject of extensive 
comments by CELP [25] and by Sriniva- 
san [165]. Clearly several important fac- 
tors were responsible for this difference. 
One was the assumption of a fixed-com- 
position consumption basket which was 
heavily weighted in favor of food, the 
chief consumer good. Secondly, agricul- 
ture was treated in the model as some sort 
of a "bargain" sector with highly favorable 
capital-output ratios and relatively small 
requirements for flow inputs of industrial 
raw materials. Furthermore, the length of 
the gestation lag of three years, which in- 
volved a substantial amount of invest- 
ment in the pipe line so far as the capital 
goods sectors were concerned, together 
with a horizon length of five years, also 
affected the numerical results substan- 
tially. In the subsequent exercises done by 
Eckaus and Parikh [51], most of these 
assumptions were modified; the revised re- 
sults showed a narrowing of the difference 
between the CELP results and the official 
Third Plan allocations, although the differ- 
ence continued.36 We might note here that 
the CELP results, pointing to a shift in in- 
vestment allocations away from the capi- 
tal goods sectors to the consumer goods 
sectors (primarily agriculture) became 
available at the same time as the new 
Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, was expressing views to the same 
effect and recommending publicly a shift 
in investments and policy attention to the 
agricultural sector. In view of the practical 
importance, therefore, of the issues raised 
by the CELP work, there ensued a lively 
debate. As it happened, the shift towards 
the agricultural sector was to come largely 
as a result of two successive droughts dur- 
ing 1965/66 and 1966/67,37 which under- 
lined the inadequate growth of agricultural 
output in relation to the growth of popu- 
lation and income, the consequent reliance 
of the economy on P. L. 480 imports and 
the necessity to push more systematically 
on the agricultural front. Further, the 
relative investments in the capital goods 
sector were to slacken off during this period 
(and until the moment of writing this 
Survey) owing to the significant decline in 
the availability of project aid for fresh 
projects and the slow completion of those 
in execution, and also the fact that the 
governmental investments were con- 
strained by the shortage of wage goods 
owing to the two successive droughts. 
Having discussed the general area of 
planning theory and techniques,38 and 
analyzed the interplay between planning 
models and actual planning within the 
country, we now proceed to two related 
"For further points on this difference, including the 
possibility that the official Third Plan might have had 
a different objective function implicit in its targeted 
allocations (even though no evidence of explicit and 
coherent argument on this question could be found in 
the Plan document) and that the Third Plan might 
after all make sense in terms thereof, see the original 
papers by Chakravarty and Lefeber [251 and Srinivasan 
[1651. 
37 The resulting economic difficulties were to be ac- 
centuated by the Indo-Pakistani war of late 1965 and 
the concurrent stoppage of aid. 
"I By way of completion, we may also refer to the 
very recent work of Alan Manne and T. Weisskopf 
[1021 which represents a dynamic, intersectoral model 
for India, 1967-1975, and is an extension of the CELP 
type research. Also, we should refer to two papers of 
interest, by A. Ghosh [581 and K. N. Raj [134}, which 
survey the literature on Indian input-output res-arch 
and planning models from different points of vkw. 
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questions that have led to extended dis- 
cussion in India and have produced ideas 
of interest. These relate to (1) the choice of 
techniques and evaluation of investment 
projects, and (2) the issues of "financial" 
versus "physical" planning, "Keynesian" 
versus "quantity theory" approaches to 
planning without inflation, short term 
planning and spatial planning. 
Choice of Techniques and Investment Cri- 
teria 
The question of the choice of appropri- 
ate technology has been extensively dis- 
cussed in India. The debate grew out of 
the preoccupation of Gandhians with the 
protection of traditional modes of produc- 
tion such as handweaving and home 
spinning in the cotton textiles industry 
(from elimination by competition in the 
market from modern techniques).3 Much 
of the debate on this issue occurred con- 
currently with the formulation of the 
Second Plan. With its emphasis on the 
buildup of the capital goods sector, and 
also its concession to the demands for pro- 
tecting the traditional forms of produc- 
tion, the Second Plan represented a cur- 
ious blend of Soviet and Gandhian eco- 
nomic philosophies-consistent with the 
reputed Indian genius for reconciling the 
irreconcilables! 
The economic discussion of the issue 
was largely centered around comparisons 
among three alternative techniques of 
weaving, representing different degrees of 
mechanization.40 Raj [130, 131] whose 
pioneering discussion of this question was 
to prove fruitful, attempted to show that 
the rate of return on capital invested in 
any technique, if the capitalist rules of 
the game were followed, might not give a 
'true' indication of the social rate of return 
on capital. He obviously had in mind the 
argument, earlier raised by Tinbergen 
[170] and others outside India, regarding 
the possible differences between 'account- 
ing prices' and market prices in many 
underdeveloped economies. Raj also 
wanted to take into account the dole to be 
paid to the unemployed as a part of the 
cost of using the more mechanized tech- 
nique, and to include the cost of social 
overhead involved in setting up highly 
mechanized new units, which could be 
largely avoided by sticking to more 
traditional techniques. 
Raj's paper, which was published in the 
Economic Weekly,41 generated an extensive 
debate in that journal, with both Indian 
and foreign economists participating there- 
in.42 The main thrust of the controversy 
that followed related to the question of 
how labor cost should be evaluated from 
a social point of view. The answer to this 
question turned, quite naturally, on how 
the social objective before the planner was 
defined. If, as Sen [153] noted, the objec- 
tive was to maximize current output, 
"surplus" labor was "free" in terms of 
opportunity cost. If, however, the objec- 
tive was to maximize the rate of growth of 
output, then the wage bill represented a 
30 Indeed, economic policy was to be deeply influenced 
by such political thinking, supported at times by eco- 
nomic argument. See Manmohan Singh (1631 on this 
question, in the context of its impact on India's export 
performance in cotton textiles. As we will note later in 
the text, the Indian economic discussions ignored the 
effects on foreign trade, via quality effects, although 
tlhese appear to have been empirically quite significant. 
40 We mav also note here the interesting work of Dhar 
and Lydall [45] and Lakdawala and Sandesara [881 on 
the economics of small scale industries, which explored 
the problem of choice of technique, in this context, in a 
systematic manner. 
41 The Economic Weekly, now continuing as The Eco- 
nomicr and Political Weekly, has occupied a unique place 
in Tndian economic journalism. Founded and eclited by 
Sachin Chaudhari, it has served as an outlet for tenta- 
tive, economic ideas for many economists in the coun- 
try, and with its semi-academic nature, it has helped to 
focus attention on many of the interesting problems 
facing the country. Among its contributors can be 
counted practically all the major economists, sociolo- 
gists and political scientists in the country. 
42 Among the Indian econoinists in the debate were 
Ashok Rudra [1491, Ajit Biswas [16, 171 anrd A. K. Sen 
[155]; the foreign economists were Joan Robinson [147], 
Charles Bettelheim [31 and Jan Tinbergen [1711. There 
were also several other contributors: [59]. 
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social cost-provided we could assume 
that wages would be spent and would thus 
represent incremental consumption.43 
However, the following comments on 
this position are warranted. (1) The con- 
flict between current output and the rate 
of growth of output arises from the implic- 
it assumption that the rate of savings is a 
function of the choice of technique and 
cannot be varied by fiscal policy to de- 
sired levels.44 (2) Furthermore, from a 
policy point of view, we would have to 
assume that the government has adequate 
control machinery for fully regulating the 
choice of technique but not for varying the 
savings rate to any desired extent. (3) The 
argument that the wage bill represents the 
social cost of consumption must also be 
modified, as Raj had already noted, by the 
saving in consumption, if any, in the sector 
from which the labor "emerged." (4) Also, 
the formulation of the two objectives, 
maximization of current income and max- 
imization of the rate of growth, involves 
juxtaposing two extreme forms of social 
preferences. The problem could instead be 
posed, following Ramsey, as one involving 
the evaluation of the entire streams of 
consumption associated with the choice of 
alternative techniques. This is, in fact, how 
Sen [156] proceeded later to look at the 
problem although his formal analysis 
emphasized the possibility of alternative 
timepaths and the necessity to choose 
therefrom, rather than formal optimiza- 
tion procedures.45 
Furthermore, in the attempted applica- 
tion of these ideas to empirical problems 
such as the choice of technique in weaving, 
two major defects were evident. (1) The 
fact that alternative techniques may have 
different impacts on quality, and hence 
also on export performance, was not 
seriously considered. (2) Moreover, while 
computations of "reinvestable" surplus 
were made for each technique, it was for- 
gotten that similar computations would 
have to be made all the way "backwards" 
to get a complete answer: the reinvestable 
surplus may be higher in technique A than 
in technique B if we take only the final 
stage of production into consideration, but 
the ranking may reverse if both direct and 
indirect reinvestable surpluses were taken 
into account.46 
Finally, if we are to evaluate the entire 
debate as conducted at the time, it is in- 
deed surprising that while the "true cost" 
of labor came in for a good deal of dis- 
cussion, the associated concept of the 
"true cost" of capital did not figure much 
in the Indian discussion. It was, of course, 
mentioned from time to time that the 
market rate of interest did not reflect the 
true scarcity of 'capital' but it was not 
quite clear what was meant by such an 
expression. Some people argued that the 
current rate of return on capital invested 
by the companies for which balance sheet 
data were available constituted the index 
of scarcity of capital. But there were two 
difficulties in this case, one due to the un- 
reliability of the estimate of capital as 
measured by the information given on 
bookvalues, and the other due to the 
difference that would normally exist be- 
tween the average return and the marginal 
return. However, the question remains as 
to the relevance of the return on the capi- 
tal even when one is referring to the mar- 
ginal return.47 Such a marginal rate of re- 
43 Little 1931, writing independently later, formalized 
the arguments relating to the "real cost" of labor in the 
context of well defined models. 
4' This point was strikingly made in the early paper 
by F. Bator [21 on the subject of choice of techniques. 
4 Sen indicated however the resol.tion of this choice 
by maximizing the sum of consumption over a finite 
planning horizon: this would, however, amount to as- 
suming implcitily a constant marginal utility of con- 
sumption. Subsequent attempts at dealing with this 
class of questions have recently been made by Dixit 
[46] and Marglin [1041 
46 The fallacy consisted in carrying over an argument, 
worked out at the macro level, to the evaluation of a 
micro industry. 
47 For an empirical attempt at estimating such a 
marginal return, see Eckaus and Lefeber [501. 
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turn would be an appropriate interest rate 
for discounting future benefits only inso- 
far as we could assume that the capital 
market was perfect and hence society was 
equating the marginal rate of return on 
cost (in the Fisherian sense) with the 
marginal rate of substitution between con- 
sumption at two consecutive time points. 
In the absence of such assumptions being 
satisfied, the appropriate social rate of dis- 
count would diverge from the marginal 
rate of return, the degree of divergence de- 
pending upon what time profile of con- 
sumption is regarded as optimal by so- 
ciety.48 
From the foregoing survey, it is clear 
that the Indian discussion of the choice of 
techniques was concerned primarily with 
the selection of an appropriate social rate 
of return on a unit of invested capital.49 
This problem came to be directly con- 
fronted eventually in connection with the 
cost/benefit analysis of the multi-purpose 
river valley projects, to which many 
economists turned their attention. 
It would be tedious to attempt a de- 
tailed survey of all the studies; besides, 
their conceptual framework is largely 
identical. Hence we concentrate on three 
major analyses of investment projects, to 
illustrate the full range of methodological 
issues that were raised in the Indian con- 
text. These were the work of K. N. Raj 
[133] who dealt with some aspects of the 
Bhakra-Nangal project in the Panjab, of 
N. V. Sovani and N. Rath [164] who ex- 
amined the economics of the Hirakud dam, 
and of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan [148] who 
analyzed the economic worthwhileness of 
nuclear prower production in India.50 
Rosenstein-Rodan's analysis differed from 
that of Raj and Sovani-Rath, in having 
preceded, rather than followed, the execu- 
tion of a project.5' 
Raj's analysis was particularly acute in 
its discussion of the employment aspects 
of the project, and of its spillover effects in 
the form of indirect demands for consump- 
tion. Among the interesting conclusions he 
reached was that labor could not be drawn 
away in unlimited amounts at a given real 
wage rate: more labor could be had only 
by incurring higher costs to secure the mi- 
gration of labor from more distant areas. 
Raj also found that the marginal propen- 
sities to consume of labor which migrated 
to the project site and of labor which came 
daily from rural households were different, 
the former having shifted to superior 
grains. He further noted several areas 
where the project design had ignored possi- 
bilities of substituting labor for capital, 
thus resulting in unduly high capital and 
import intensity. The design of the power 
project also suffered from not taking into 
account the time and the location pattern 
of the demand for power which was likely 
to arise: as a result, substantial investment 
in transmission lines, among other things, 
was made which could have been saved by 
building cheaper sources of power supply. 
While, however, the analysis made by 
Raj clearly indicated that the time factor 
48 In fact, the social rate of discount, the "true cost" 
of labor and the optimal rate of consumption are all 
interdependent elements in a single, intertemporal opti- 
mizing problem. Hence, it would be inappropriate also 
to go about setting up numerical values for these mag- 
nitudes in an unconnected fashion, as is sometimes done. 
In this connection see the recent work of Dixit [461 
and Marglin [1041. 
49 The notion that the shadow foreign exchange rate 
may be higher than the parity also became more preva- 
lent in the later stages of the discussion, although it had 
been obscured or omitted from many early analyses, 
both theoretical and empirical. 
60 Rosenstein-Rodan's analysis was essentially a 
critique of an earlier memorandum, advocating nuclear 
power production in India, by Homi J Bhabha, the late 
Director of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. 
1 Indeed, one of the major deficiencies in Indian 
planning has been an inadequate appreciation of the 
need to analyze critically the economics of major in- 
vestment projects prior to their approval and execu- 
tion; there are indications, however, of forthcoming 
change in this respect. There is also considerable in- 
terest now among economists in conducting such stud- 
ies of industrial plants and projects. 
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was crucial in evaluating an investment 
project like the Bhakra Nangal, which 
locked up an enormous amount of re- 
sources over a very long future, he did not 
make any attempt to compute the present- 
value estimates of benefits or costs asso- 
ciated with the project. Raj's reluctance 
on this point was understandable in view 
of our inability to say anything numer- 
ically very firm as to the social rate of dis- 
count which could be used to convert bene- 
fits and costs accruing at different points 
of time to commensurable units. But even 
the use of alternative sets of notional esti- 
mates would have been worthwhile to in- 
dicate the different margins of choice 
which existed in designing and implement- 
ing the project. 
The analysis of Sovani and Rath cor- 
responded to the usual type of cost/benefit 
analysis. Instead of computing an overall 
present value, however, they computed an 
annual cost/benefit ratio on the assump- 
tion of a given constant interest rate and a 
given depreciation flow every year. The 
interest rate was assumed to be 10%, on 
grounds which were not spelled out. The 
relative abundance of labor as a factor in 
the project design was not discussed; nor 
were the indirect effects of the project ex- 
amined. Instead the authors concentrated 
on computing intensively what they con- 
sidered to be the direct benefits associated 
with greater irrigated facilities and greater 
availability of hydroelectric power. While 
the use of the apparatus of cost/benefit 
analysis was a welcome feature of their 
exercise, the assumptions made with re- 
gard to the estimation of benefits and costs 
were somewhat drastic and could be 
questioned. 
The substantive issues raised by Rosen- 
stein-Rodan, by contrast with the exercise 
of Raj and Sovani-Rath, included the 
question of the suitable rate of discount. 
His calculations, based on data partly sup- 
plied to him by Ian Little, showed that the 
estimated unit cost of electricity genera- 
tion was highly sensitive to the choice of 
the discount rate, because the capital costs 
of setting up nuclear power plants are 
extremely high. Further, Rosenstein-Ro- 
dan raised an interesting question with 
respect to the social, as distinct from the 
market, cost of inputs such as coal, which 
is an exhaustible asset with a highly un- 
even geographical distribution in India 
(implying significant transportation costs). 
Moreover, if a nuclear power plant were 
to be built, it would have necessitated 
heavy imports in the early stages. Thus 
the scarcity value of foreign exchange had 
to be guessed if the official exchange rate 
could not be regarded as an index of "true" 
scarcity. 
Aside from all these considerations, 
there were uncertainties regarding tech- 
nological progress, which might reduce the 
costs significantly in the future: the ques- 
tion of the optimal timing of the project 
was therefore equally important in this 
case and the possible postponability of the 
project was an additional factor to be con- 
sidered. Even leaving out uncertainty, 
however, any answer relating to timing 
would require both an explicit assumption 
relating to the future demand and specifi- 
cation of the discount rate, even when the 
cost profile is known accurately: however, 
such an analysis was not undertaken by 
any of the participants in the debate.62 
52 In a nonstochastic context, this question of the 
optimal timing of a project has been analyzed by Mar- 
glin [103] [1051. He shows that the optimal time for con- 
struction occurs when the marginal loss in benefits from 
further postponement just equals the marginal savings 
in interest costs. Since this rule is too general, Marglin 
shows that under certain additional assumptions, the 
above rule could reduce to a simpler rule which says if 
we assume that the immediate benefit rate from a pro- 
ject will continue over its finite lifetime (whatever 
that may be), then the optimum time for construction 
is when the present value of benefits is not less than the 
cost of the project for the first time. Unfortunately, this 
simple rule, as Marglin is well aware, cannot be applied 
to situations involving increasing returns to scale. Since 
the argument for the nuclear power station was partly 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.67 on Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:35:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
Thus, while the discussion on invest- 
ment projects which took place in India 
raised a number of important questions, no 
specific study of any investment projects 
undertaken so far can be said to have pro- 
vided anything like a complete analysis in 
terms of the social cost-benefit calculus. 
Other Issues Pertaining to Planning 
Among the interesting debates in India, 
relating to planning, has been that associ- 
ated with the notion of "physical" plan- 
ning as contrasted with "financial" plan- 
ning. 
The phrase "physical" planning, attrib- 
uted to Mahalanobis, was put forth as a 
counter to those who wished to opt for a 
smaller level of financial outlay on the 
ground that larger outlays would lead to 
inflation. The argument of the physical 
planners at the time was that if a set of in- 
vestment targets was internally consis- 
tent and feasible in the sense that enough 
capacity and labor were available to pro- 
duce it and the draft on foreign exchange 
did not exceed export earnings plus com- 
mitted foreign aid, then there should not 
be any problem in generating enough 
"financial" resources to undertake the acts 
of investment. 
But this contention, if taken at its face 
value, was spurious (despite the fact that 
it played a major role in getting policy- 
makers converted to larger outlays on in- 
vestment). At its essence, the argument 
presupposes that if, "structurally" or 
"physically," we can raise the proportion 
of investment in national income, the 
necessary ex ante savings can be found to 
make the program "feasible" without in- 
flationary effects. While this is a tautology 
at one level, its implication that policy- 
makers can therefore raise as much savings 
as are necessary to support the planned in- 
vestments is clearly untenable.53 There is 
no escape from having to investigate sep- 
arately the problem of generating enough 
savings to support the projected invest- 
ment, if inflation is to be avoided. Direct 
measures controlling the level and compo- 
sition of co'nsumption may be sometimes 
called for if the physical planning targets 
are to be implemented, a fact which was 
not fully emphasized by the 'physical 
planners'. 
A related fallacy was the tendency, at 
the time, to argue that if India went in for 
capital goods production, it would not 
merely be possible to raise the savings- 
investment rate (by getting over the post- 
ulated transformation constraints) but 
that this would also ensure that the savings 
-investment rate would automatically be 
stepped up. The basis for this assertion was 
that "no one can consume capital goods so 
the only choice would be to have the 
higher savings-investment rate." It was 
forgotten that the effect could well be, for 
example, excess capacity in the capital 
goods sector or cutting into exports of 
(traditional) consumer goods (which could 
reduce imports of capital goods) unless 
fiscal policy was used to raise the savings 
rate to match the projected increment in 
the rate of investment. 
While the notion of "physical" planning 
was used by the "big planners" (who 
favored larger investment outlays) against 
the more cautious "small planners," the 
actual fixation of the overall investment 
targets appears to have been more in the 
nature of a compromise between these 
based on increasing returns through time, one could not 
therefore discuss its timing on the basis of the Marglin 
theorem. The resolution of the question requires an 
explicit intertemporal analysis of the particular invest- 
ment projects in question, which was not undertaken by 
those engaged in this controversy. 
"In a corn economy, for example, it may be possible 
to put all corn back into the ground and raise the ratio 
of investment to national income to 100%; but it would 
be patently absurd to argue then that, because this is 
technically or "physically" feasible, the necessary "fi- 
nancial" resources (i.e. savings) can therefore be found I 
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rival groups.54 It has further been alleged 
by some critics that the savings-invest- 
ment balance worked out in the Plans 
suffered from an inherent inflationary bias 
even when the numerical projections 
looked quite safe on paper. These biases 
arose from (1) exaggeration of productiv- 
ity estimates (especially in agriculture), 
(2) liberal guesses at the 'safe' limits to 
deficit financing, (3) underestimation of 
investments in private agriculture and 
small industry (which generally were 'cut' 
by the big planners to reduce the total in- 
vestments, in full knowledge that no re- 
duction would actually follow as these were 
mere estimates and fairly beyond policy 
control), and (4) failure to make allow- 
ance for additions to inventories, not to 
mention (5) the 'uncovered gap' in the re- 
source balance exercise which was actually 
published in the Second Plan document.55 
In this context of fiscal policy program- 
ing, which examines whether ex ante sav- 
ings would match the projected invest- 
ments, we may note that the "Keynesian" 
approach has now come to stay in India. 
It has become customary for the Plan 
documents to present fiscal policy in the 
context of an overall savings and invest- 
ment exercise, rather than purely in bud- 
getary terms. This has been the case de- 
spite a tendency toward thinking in 
quantity-theoretic terms on the part of 
some economists in India.56 
The question of fiscal policy also raises 
the entire question of short-term (or an- 
nual) planning in India. There is little 
doubt that short-term planning, which 
takes a narrower horizon than the Five 
Year Plans, is essential in a country such 
as India where (i) agriculture plays an im- 
portant role (in exports, industrial produc- 
tion and consumption) but is subject to 
wide fluctuations in performance-as was 
brought home to Indians during the two 
successive and serious droughts during 
1965/66 and 1966/67; and (ii) foreign aid 
also is crucial (in project investments and 
utilization of industrial capacity). The 
need to adapt planned expenditures, and 
economic policies in general, in the light of 
fundamental revisions relating to critical 
assumptions, is certainly obvious."7 
Unfortunately, there has been no serious 
attempt so far at building a relevant 
short-term model for the Indian economy, 
which would permit the policymakers to 
take informed decisions-a lacuna which 
became only too obvious when the recent 
54 The cautious groups have belonged to the Finance 
Ministry whereas the big planners have been associated 
with the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning 
Commission. 
6 Pointing to these factors which build into the Plans 
a systematic tendency towards price inflation, despite 
the apparent balancing of ex ante savings and invest- 
ment, Bhagwati [101 has observed that such "over- 
extended" planning is likely to have led to too many 
starts and too few completions of projects, thereby 
leading to a serious decline in the overall level of 
productivity. He has also argued that the protagonists 
of such a strategy may have thought that, "getting 
exaggerated Plan targets accepted by the Government 
would push it into the extra effort (via domestic taxa- 
tion) which otherwise would not be forthcoming. This 
strategy presumably relied on the built-in creation of a 
mildly inflationary situation to put pressure on the 
Finance Ministry to tax; even more than its Plan com- 
mitments, quite ignoring the fact that the resulting un- 
rest in the urban areas could possibly prevent the Fi- 
nance Ministry from taxing even as much as they would 
have (if the inflation had not been deliberately built in) 
and thus reducing the resultant level of real investments 
as also their efficiency." 
" On this issue, see Little [921, Chakravarty [211 and 
Padma Desai [431. Further, Little's [941 systemratic 
work on taxation for the Third Plan, for the PPD, was 
one of the first attempts at conducting the overall sav- 
ings-investment exercise in some detail, although the 
Second Plan did contain the rudiments of essentially 
the same type of exercise. Coming from the side of the 
big planners, Little's work appears to have had an in- 
fluential role in the favorable outcome for the big 
planners. 
57 In this connection, it is interesting that there has 
been no extended discussion of suggestions such as the 
"rolling plans" discussed in the Swedish literature. 
However, the questionl has led to demands such as, for 
example, having a "core" of "basic" projects and ex- 
penditures which would be carried through in any case, 
with more being done if aid comnes through. However, 
there has been no systematic exploring of these issues. 
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industrial recession, in 1967, left the 
policymakers in a position where action 
had to be taken without any systematic 
knowledge of key relationships (such as 
the effect of corporate taxes on savings, 
pricing policies of corporations etc.).58 We 
should note here, however, an interesting, 
early attempt towards building an econo- 
metric model for India, by Narasimhan 
[122]. Narasimhan constructed ani econo- 
metric model roughly on the same lines as 
Tinbergen's pioneering model for the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
Narasimhan's model had 18 equations, of 
which 7 were definitional, one was in- 
stitutional and the remaining were be- 
havior equations. While Narasimhan's was 
a pioneering attempt, he appears to have 
paid insufficient attention to adaptinlg the 
Tinbergenesque models to the very differ- 
ent structural features of the Indian 
economy. These would relate, for example, 
to the distinction between urban and rural 
propensities to save, the elasticity of the 
marketable surplus in agriculture, the dis- 
tinction between factory employed labor 
and self employment, and so on. In view 
of these limitations, therefore, Narasim- 
han's exercise is best regarded as an ex- 
ploration of the question of building a 
suitable, short-term econometric model 
for India, rather than as a realistic and 
usable model.59 
Finally, it is interesting to note that, 
while Indian planning models have be- 
come fairly sophisticated in relation to 
intertemporal phasing and perspective 
planning, there has been no comparable 
extension of analysis to questions of spatial 
planning. This is somewhat surprising in a 
country with a federal setup and where the 
constituent States have come to follow in- 
creasingly inward looking policies.60 An 
important consequence of the lack of 
spatial planning of industrial targets has 
been the tendency for the targeted in- 
dustrial capacities in each industry to be 
competed for by numerous claimant 
States, thus resulting in the allocation of 
plants with uneconomic scale to as many 
States as politically necessary.8' While it 
would certainly be naive to expect that 
efficient allocation of industrial targets 
among different States, consistent with 
the satisfaction of constraints with respect 
to aggregate levels of industrial invest- 
ments in each State on political grounds, 
would necessarily be accepted as a politi- 
cally satisfactory method of spatial plan- 
ning, it is nonetheless true that few econo- 
mists gave serious attention in India to 
this question. An important, recent de- 
parture in this respect is the work of 
Srinivasan and Manne [99] which has 
brought original analysis to bear upon the 
policy question of optimal location, size 
68 We may record, however, that in this area as well, 
more systematic work is beginning to emerge. An ex- 
ample is the detailed study of inventory holdings in the 
large scale, manufacutring sector by Krishnamurty and 
Shastri [851 which illumirnates an otherwise obscure 
area of the Indian economy. 
59 In this connection, we may also refer to a short- 
term policy model built by Padma Desai [411 for India, 
which was of an illustrative nature. Her model was 
based on a (3X3) input-output table which was closed 
with respect to consumption. The exercise was interest- 
ing because of the way in which she determined con- 
sumption endogenouslv via the assumption that the 
propensities to consume of workers in different indus- 
tries were different. The model could thus predict the 
effect of changes in exogenous items of final use on 
sectoral output levels miore completely than the input- 
output models discussed earlier in the text. However, 
the model did not specify how the instrument variables 
at the command of the government were related to the 
exogenous variables in the input-output sense, so that 
it was not sufficient for generating a shortterm plan in 
a complete way. 
60 We take up this question again in the next section, 
w hen we discuss the food zones that have operated in 
India. 
61 This process has been noted, and the lacuna in In- 
dian planning techniques criticized by several eco- 
nomists: see Bhagwati [9] and HIanson [62], in particular. 
Bhagwati [9] has also emphasized that the uneconomic 
scale plants may well be economically justified if the 
spatial distribution of demand and transport costs, for 
example, make centralized production uneconomic, and 
that it is the lack of economic analysis of this issue, 
rather than the actual solutions implemented, which is 
unsatisfactory. 
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and expansion of industrial capacities.62 
Having then discussed the principal 
issues and models which have emerged in 
relation to Indian planning, we now pro- 
ceed to the Indian analyses that bear on 
questions of agricultural policy. 
II. Agricullure 
Indian agricultural policy discussion has 
taken place against the background of a 
trend rise in agricultural production, 
especially of foodgrains, which has fallen 
sufficiently short of the growth in demand 
arising from income and population growth 
to require continual and significant im- 
port of foodgrains under the P.L. 480 pro- 
gram. In consequence, economic analysis 
has largely been concerned with questions 
relating to agricultural price and distribu- 
tion policy, and also the economic effi- 
ciency of alternative forms of land tenure 
and agrarian organization.63 
In turn, these questions have led to 
analytical work on a whole range of prob- 
lems with a direct bearing upon policy de- 
cisions.64 Prominent among these studies 
have been the analysis of (1) the economic 
"rationality" of farmers, (2) the response 
of marketed surplus and production to 
price changes, (3) the relationship of land 
tenure systems and agrarian organization 
to the efficiency of factor use and to the 
elasticity of marketed surplus, production 
and investment to price change, and (4) 
the question of the existence and measure- 
ment of disguised unemployment. 
Furthermore, Indian economists have 
also turned increasingly to efficiency ques- 
tions relating to public agricultural invest- 
ments. Economic analysis has been in- 
creasingly deployed, principally by Minhas 
[114] and Minhas-Srinivasan [115] to 
examine problems such as the efficient 
allocation of irrigation water and fertil- 
izers,65 although the choice between alter- 
native ways in which farm output may be 
raised (e.g. land reclamation versus inten- 
sive cultivation) has not yet been fruit- 
fully explored at an empirical level. 
Agricultural Performance 
At the outset, we may note that the pro- 
duction performance of Indian agriculture 
has been the subject of lively debate.66 
Pointing to India's continued reliance on 
P.L. 480 imports, economists such as 
Dandekar [33] have tended to dismiss 
India's agricultural performance as dis- 
mal. On the other hand, Raj [135] and 
Dantwala [34], while conceding the in- 
adequacy of this performance, have 
attempted to put it into perspective by 
noting that the annual, compound rate of 
growth of production of foodgrains at 2.98 
per cent and all commodities at 3.19 per 
62 For general work on "regional" models in India, 
the survey by Ghosh [58J, which we have referred to 
earlier, is a valuable reference. Aside from the many 
references there, work on transportation and regional 
planning models has been done in India by several other 
economists, including M. Datta-Chaudhuri [391 and 
K. Sundaram [1681. 
63 With respect to agrarian organization, the social 
aspects of alternative policies have also claimed equal 
attention in the Indian discussions. Cf. Dantwala [351: 
"It may be pertinent to enquire as to what has provided 
the main inspiration for the proposal to impose a ceiling 
on individual ownership of land: the urge for distribu- 
tive iustice or the necessity of a more rational use of the 
land surface? The impromptu answer would perhaps 
be: both. But it would be honest to admit that the 
prime motivation is distributive justice. In the context 
of the acute land hunger and millions of dwarf farms, 
ownership of large areas of cultivated land by a few is 
considered highly inequitable, justifying the imposition 
of an upper limit to individual ownership." 
64 The Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, cur- 
rently in its 22nd volume, is an excellent guide to the full 
range of problems that Indian agricultural economists 
have considered from time to time. As already noted 
earlier, our survey is necessarily selective. 
65 We may also recall here the cost-benefit analysis of 
Sovani and Rath [164] and Raj [1331 which we have 
surveyed in Part I. See also the excellent review of the 
literature on application of economic theory to Indian 
agricultural policy discussion by Khusro [76]. 
66 We may note here the important work of Minhas 
and Vaidyanathan [116] in measuiring the rate of growth 
of Indian agriculture, by 268 districts, for the aggregate 
output of 28 major crops for 1951-54 to 1958-61. For 
their method of measurement, including their decompo- 
sition of this growth into crop pattern change, produc- 
tivity and acreage "effects," as also a valuable survey 
of other work in this area, see Minhas [1.13]. Parikh's 
work [1271 in this area is also noteworthy. 
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cent for 1949-50 to 1964-65 does not com- 
pare unfavorably with performances in 
most other countries including those in 
South East Asia.67 Moreover, Dantwala 
[34] has also noted that, contrary to gen- 
eral belief, productivity has also increased 
through this period, with acreage under 
all commodities increasing by 8 per cent 
but production by 34.8 per cent.68 
Whether one regards the agricultural 
performance, however, as dismal or just 
inadequate for India's developmental 
needs, the pertinent questions are whether 
(1) governmental policies (especially con- 
cerning prices) could have improved it, and 
(2) governmental policies (especially with 
respect to internal procurement, in-ports, 
private trade and public distribution), 
were efficient, given the agricultural per- 
formance. Before we discuss these two 
principal policy questions at some length, 
we survey the Indian analysis of the 
empirical relationships, pertaining chiefly 
to the marketed surplus and production of 
foodgrains and overall agricultural produc- 
tion, that have a direct relevance to these 
questions and have indeed entered inito the 
controversies surrounding these questions. 
Economic Rationality in Agriculture 
We begin with the literature on the 
"economic rationality" of the agricultural 
sector. Whether agricultural and rural 
people and institutions respond to econom- 
ic motivation or are impervious to it is 
a general question, of which the possible 
response of marketed surplus and produc- 
tion to price changes (which we discuss in 
the ensuing sections) are only the most 
obvious examples. The Indian literature on 
the broader question of economic ration- 
ality in this sector divides itself into em- 
pirical analysis aimed at (1) examining the 
efficiency of factor use within the existing 
institutional framework, and (2) demon- 
strating that the institutional framework 
itself adapts to the profit motive. 
(1) Among the principal contributions 
to the former class of questions is Hopper's 
[70] analysis of the efficiency of Indian 
farmers in the allocation of resources. 
Hopper's method is to estimate production 
functions for his selected crops69 and 
demonstrate that the factors used indeed 
earn the value of their estimated marginal 
products. However, as Nowshirwani [123] 
has correctly pointed out, Hopper's single 
equation estimation of his production 
functions leads to estimates that are 
neither unbiased nor consistent (in a 
statistical sense) so that 1-lopper's results 
must be treated with some scepticism. 
Furthermore we must note a different 
approach by D. K. Desai [40] to the prob- 
lem of efficiency of factor use, which aims 
at discovering the optimal utilization of 
existing resources on individual farms and 
contrasting the resulting utilization pat- 
tern and returns with the actuals. Desai 
uses linear programing methods for this 
purpose, utilizing data collected for the 
Farm Management Studies in two districts 
of Maharashtra during 1954-55 to 1956-57 
and examining forty indivtdual farms. This 
pioneering work has reached the conclu- 
sion, at variance with Hopper's, that there 
is often a significant gap between possible 
and actual returns to farming, indicating 
economic inefficiency. However, as Hanu- 
67 Dandekar [33] has noted that if the two (drotught) 
years 1965-66 and 1966-67 are included, the perfor- 
mance looks even less satisfactory; however, Dantwvala 
[37] has pointedly replied that the 1967-68 crop, which 
is at a bumiper level, would bear out hnis notion of the 
trend. In this context, we may also note that Rai's 
[1381 comparison of the agricultural growth rates in 
India and Pakistan is a useful corrective to Mason's 
[106] adverse, comparattive view of India's agricultural 
performance. 
68 However, the performance through the entire 
period conceals a serious deceleration which sets into the 
overall growth performance as also in the arowth of 
average productivity, with the Third Plan. Hence, the 
agricultural performance may have been not merely 
inadequate but also steadily becoming worse. The 1967- 
68 crop, however, has been a bumper crop. 
69 The data relate to one Indian village and to the 
expected output from invested resources of its farmers 
in a single agricultural season. 
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mantha Rao has pointed out to us, the 
gross inefficiencies which Desai's analysis 
indicates are probably to be attributed to 
the fact that the results are derived by 
references to single period, ex post price 
vectors. If expected, rather than ex post, 
prices were considered, the results might 
be significantly different. A similar doubt 
attaches to Desai's use of given production 
relationships, which again may lead to in- 
efficiency in the design of the test for op- 
timality: expectations with respect to 
weather, for example, may significantly 
alter the crop pattern that may be adopted 
on efficiency grounds. Apropos of this dis- 
cussion, it is also pertinent to remember 
the important distinction that Lipton 
[91] has drawn between farmers' produc- 
tion response to price change (which we 
discuss later) and profit maximizatioln. For 
example, producers responding to prices in 
a cobweb model may not be maximizing 
profits in the long run.70 
(2) The analyses which seek to establish 
that the rural institutions change in re- 
sponse to economic motivation are of equal 
interest. While a sociologist such as 
Scarlett Epstein [52] has attempted cross- 
section analysis to show this, by contrast- 
ing two villages which differ only in terms 
of the recent availability of irrigated 
water, Raj [139] has noted that the 
"sacred cow" is not so sacred after all and 
manages to get slaughtered even in Hindu- 
intensive areas if ecological and price fac- 
tors make it economically advantageous to 
do so.7' 
Hanumantha Rao's [67] analysis of 
share cropping is also of considerable im- 
portance in this context. Rao shows in an 
ingenious fashion that share cropping ob- 
tains generally in those areas, and for 
those crops (such as rice and wheat), where 
the element of innovative management 
and entrepreneurship is minimized be- 
cause of lack of significant substitution 
possibilities among rival crops and factors, 
and the element of uncertainty is thus re- 
duced to negligible levels: "crop-sharing 
arrangements are extensive under relative 
economic certainty and fixed contractual 
payments where the degree of uncertainty 
is high." 
A few comments on this novel idea are 
in order. (1) Rao's hypothesis, which 
seems consistent with the cross-sectional 
facts of the Indian situation as of any one 
period, would lead to the further refutable 
hypothesis that, as technological possibil- 
ities for application of new inputs such as 
better seeds and fertilizers are introduced, 
share cropping would give way to other 
forms of tenurial relationships. With the 
introduction of these new techniques in 
India during the last few years, such an 
elupirical test should be feasible.72 (2) 
Further, even if Rao's explanation of the 
"rationality" (in the sense of its consis- 
tency with profit maximization) of share 
cropping is valid, how are we to interpret 
its effect on efficiency of the utilization of 
available resources? An alternative formu- 
lation of the rationality of share cropping, 
in the spirit of Rao's argument, provides a 
clue to the optimality of share cropping as 
an institution. If we focus on the stability 
(or stationariness) of the agricultural tech- 
niques and acreage allocation possibilities, 
it is possible to argue that share cropping 
is consistent with optimality because the 
shares would come to approximate the 
level where factors tend to earn the value 
of their (stable, long-run) marginal pro- 
duct. Share cropping would then yield, on 
the average, the same results as capitalist 
70 Lipton [911 provocatively entitles his review of 
Dharm Narain's work: "Should Reasoiiable Farmers 
Respond to Price Changes?". 
71 Raj's cross-section investigation of this question is 
of further interest because he considers the important, 
related question of how the cattle stock should be evalu- 
ated from an economic point of view. 
Rao explicitly notes that: "Crop-sharing may cease 
to be a beneficial arrangement as modern profitable in- 
puts assume siginificance. The incentives for increased 
investments as well as for capturing the returns on such 
investnmenit may lead to the preference for fixed con- 
tractual payments." 
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methods in a situation of long-run stability 
characterized by stagnant technological 
possibilities. A possible test of this hypoth- 
esis would be to examine share cropped 
farms, over a period characterized by such 
stability, for efficiency of factor-use in the 
sense in which Hopper [70] has done for 
his v-illage.73 Clearly, in any case, Rao's 
analysis opens up a fruitful area for further 
empirical investigation. 
Behavior of AMarketed Surplus 
Indian economic analysis has concerned 
itself with two principal questions relating 
to the marketed surplus of agricultural 
foodgrains: (1) does this surplus vary 
directly with the relative price of these 
goods or does it behave "perversely"; and 
(2) what is the share of holdings of differ- 
ent sizes in the supply of marketed food- 
grains? The former question has direct and 
obvious relevance to the issue of agricul- 
tural price and tax policy whereas the 
latter bears on the important question of 
the ecoinomic effects of land reform which 
involves regrouping of landholdings into 
different sizes, whether towards smaller 
holdings via measures such as landholdings 
ceiling,s or towards larger holdings via 
measures such as legislation preventing 
further fragmentation. Further, the two 
questions have, in turn, been linked in the 
analytical discussion by economists who 
argue that the price response of the small 
and large holdings with respect to mar- 
keted surplus is not similar. 
Response to Price Change: Essentially, 
the question at issue, in analyzing the re- 
sponse of marketed surplus to price 
change, relates to the elasticity of the 
Marshallian offer curve of the sector sup- 
plying the surplus. And this is indeed how 
Raj Krishna [80] and T. N. Krishnan [86] 
have explicitly formulated their analysis 
of this question. Furthermore such a for- 
mulation of the problem directly indicates 
that positive and negative price responses 
are both "normal": the offer curve may 
readily have a backward bending stretch 
where the elasticity of supply of the (food- 
grain) surplus with respect to price change 
is negative. 
Nonetheless, the Indian debate on this 
issue has elicited arguments, mainly by 
Khatkhate [711 and Khusro [75], which 
aim at establishing a priori the "normalcy" 
or the inevitability of a positive or a nega- 
tive elasticity. More interesting, however, 
have been the analyses, principally by 
Mathur and Ezekiel [110], which have 
attempted to explore the issue a prori 
within a framework which differentiates 
between different size-classes of holdings. 
At the same time, Raj Krishna [80] and 
Krishnan [86] have made perhaps the only 
systematic attempts at indicating what the 
likely elasticity of the offer curve for food- 
grains might be in the Indian context. 
Khusro's [75] analysis reaches the 
"strong" result that farmers will retain 
more and hence market less, out of given 
foodgrain production, if the market price 
is lowered. This is the consequence of his 
method of analysis which implicitly puts 
restrictions on the shape of the offer curve. 
Taking a box diagram as in Figure 1, 
where AZ is the given output of foodgrains, 
Khusro draws in PR' as the curve showing 
diminishing marginal utility of produce 
retained for consumption and SS' as the 
schedule representing diminishing margin- 
al utility of sales. Then, equilibrium is at 
D where the amount of marketed surplus 
is EZ. With a lower price for foodgrains, 
Khusro shifts the curve SS' down to ss', 
when G becomes the new equilibrium 
point and the marketed surplus has de- 
creased to FZ. This conclusion, however, is 
the result of two highly restrictive assump- 
tions: (i) separable (and hence cardinal) 
utility, explicitly noted by Khusro; and 
(ii) sufficient restrictions on the rate at 
73 In this connection, it is suggestive that Hanu- 
mantha Rao's comparison of the share cropping rental 
w-+-ith the output per acre on "capitalist" farms [67, 
Table 61 shows a similar intensity of cultivation, per 
acre, on both sets of farms. 
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which the marginal utility of nonfood- 
grains falls vis-a-vis the price difference in 
the two situations, to ensure that the SS' 
and ss' curves do not intersect.74 If either 
of these assumptions is relaxed, the possi- 
bility of a negative elasticity of marketed 
surplus will reemerge.75 
As with Khusro's attempt, other econ- 
omists have attempted to argue exactly 
the opposite proposition on a priori 
grounds. Thus, for example, Khatkhate 
[71] has argued that the (small scale) 
Indian farmer will increase his marketed 
surplus when price falls "in order to main- 
tain the same level of money income." 
Mathur and Ezekiel [110] have similarly 
argued that the subsistence farmers have 
an inelastic demand for cash and hence 
"if prices rise, the sale of a smaller 
amount of foodgrains provides the neces- 
sary cash and vice versa. Thus prices and 
marketable surplus tend to move in oppo- 
site directions." The fixed cash needs 
which these authors have in mind are debt 
obligations, rent, land revenune and a 
Ricardian-type bundle of nonagricultural 
subsistence goods. However, this argument 
seems tenuous. It implies that, at sub- 
sistence level, there is zero income elasticity 
of demand for commodities other than 
the foodgrains (produced on the farm) and 
also a zero substitution effect: neither as- 
sumption would appear to be logically or 
empirically inevitable at a "subsistence" 
level of farming and income, no matter 
how subsistence is defined.76 
Dandekar [311, in examining the Ma- 
thur-Ezekiel thesis, has argued that a 
74Khusro [75, page 2781 outlines the second condition 
as well, though not quite fully. While he mentions that 
the rate of diminishing marginal utility of sales receipts 
should be "small," he omits reference to the fact that 
the price change may be "large" and may outweigh the 
"smallness" of the diminishing marginal utility, result- 
ing in the interesection of the two schedules and the 
reversal of his proposition. 
7b Of course, the entire argument relates only to the 
sign of the consumption effect as price changes. If pro- 
duction were also allowed to vary in Khusro's exercise, 
and if it was positively price elastic, then the price 
elasticity of marketed surplus could well be positive 
despite the consumption effect being positive. 
76 Also note that the Mathur-Ezekiel assumption of 
"fixed cash needs" is overly sufficient for deriving a nega- 
tive elasticity of marketed surplus. Further, as Now- 
shirvani 1125] has noted, the negative unitary price 
elasticity for marketed surplus is implausible on dynam- 
mic stability grounds, since it would require the urban 
elasticity of food demand to exceed unity, which is an 
implausible assumption. 
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negative price elasticity of marketed sur- 
plus would characterize the farms which 
are not too close to subsistence and hence 
are large enough to supply marketed sur- 
plus and therewith earn cash income and 
which are at the same time not large and 
prosperous enough to show a "normal," 
positive price elasticity of marketed sur- 
plus. Dandekar argues that, for this size- 
class of holdings, the negative price- 
elasticity is readily explained, not by 
reference to a "fixed cash needs" hypoth- 
esis, but "as normal consumer behavior 
in the face of changing income. When the 
price of the crop which they produce 
changes relative to other prices, the real 
income of the farmers in effect changes. 
With lower relative prices for what they 
produce, their real incomes are in effect 
lower and as consumers they are worse off. 
Under the circumstances, they behave like 
other consumers at their income level 
would do. They must consume a little less 
of everything, food and non-food alike 
even if they happen to be producers of 
food. This is what they do. They consume 
a little less of their own produce and con- 
sequently sell more of it on the market." 
Dandekar reaches this apparently obvious 
conclusion by either ignoring the substitu- 
tion effect or by implicitly assuming that 
the income effect will dominate the out- 
come. 
Dandekar's analysis of the elasticity of 
price response by other size-classes of 
farmers is also not persuasive. With re- 
spect to the farmers at the bottom end of 
the scale, he argues that the absence of 
marketed surplus of foodgrains and the de- 
pendence "mainly on other means such as 
sale of other crops or wages earned from 
farm and off-farm employment or even 
remittances received from family members 
working in cities" implies that the ques- 
tion of the elasticity of marketed surplus 
does not apply to them. However, this 
argument rules out the possibility of a 
marketed surplus arising in response to 
price rise, for example, via shift in resource 
allocation toward foodgrains and/or cur- 
tailment in own consumption if the sub- 
stitution effect is large. Dandekar's further 
contention that, in many cases, the far- 
mers in this size-class of landholdings 
actually buy foodgrains on a net basis, is 
also inconclusive in this respect: these far- 
mers can still turn into net suppliers if the 
price change is favorable enough and the 
consumption effect has a negative sign. 
Moreover, even on an empirical level, 
Dandekar's citation of the data for sale 
and purchase of Jawar by the small land- 
holdings in the Akola and Amraoti dis- 
tricts of Madhya Pradesh for 1955-56 is 
not conclusive. The fact that these farmers 
purchase jawar on a net basis does not 
necessarily rule out their selling other food- 
grains (such as wheat, which is also pro- 
duced and sold in these districts), sothat 
the net position on overall foodgrains sup- 
ply may be different from that on the sup- 
ply of only jawar. More systematic em- 
pirical analysis of this question is clearly 
necessary. 
Similarly, it is hasty to conclude that the 
"large" holdings will necessarily have a 
positive elasticity of marketed surplus, 
thanks to a "well behaved," negative con- 
sumption effect. It is easy enough to im- 
agine, for example, a lower price of wheat 
leading to greater supply of marketed sur- 
plus thereof as the farmer shifts to in- 
creased consumption of the inferior cereal, 
jawar. 
Despite these qualifications, it is clear 
that empirical analysis of the price re- 
sponse of marketed surplus, which differ- 
entiates between different size-classes of 
landholdings, is likely to be more insight- 
ful than an aggregative analysis.77 Un- 
fortunately, however, the only serious 
attempts at empirical analysis of the 
77 Since foodgrains also represent a complex of differ- 
ent cereals, the analysis would have to contend also 
with (1) their price substitution in production and con- 
suniption; and (2) the possibility that some of them may 
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problem in India have been at an aggrega- 
tive level. 
Using Rural Credit Survey data on 
the market surplus of foodgrains, Krish- 
nan [86] has estimated the constant 
elasticity demand function: rQ= AP- 
(QP)fl where j is the total output of food- 
grains in the short-run, P is the price of 
foodgrains, ;OP is the income of the farmers 
and r is the proportion of output consumed 
by the farmers themselves. He estimates 
the elasticity of marketed surplus to be 
-0.3030 for the period 1959-60 to 1962- 
63. Note, however, that if the price elastic- 
ity of production response, which has been 
estimated to be positive in other studies 
surveyed elsewhere by us, were to be ad- 
mitted into this exercise, and the assump- 
tion of a constant output thus relaxed, the 
price elasticity of marketed surplus could 
well become positive. 
Raj Krishna [80], in fact, has experi- 
mented with different ranges of price 
elasticities of output and consumption to 
establish that, in the Indian context, the 
price elasticity of marketed surplus of a 
single subsistence crop (as distinct from 
Krishnan's estimate for all foodgrains) is 
indeed likely to be positive. Starting with 
the simple identity: 
dM dQ dC 
(33)___ dP dP dP 
where M is the marketed surplus, Q is pro- 
duction, C is self-consumption and P is the 
price, Raj Krishna further decomposes the 
consumption term into income and sub- 
stitution effects and then proceeds to put 
hypothetical ranges of values on each of 
the parameters in the derived expression 
for the elasticity of marketed surplus.78 
Unfortunately, however, his decomposi- 
tion of the consumption term omits the 
income effect which follows from the 
change in the value of the initial consump- 
tion as price changes. Nowshirvani [124], 
who spotted this error, has reworked Raj 
Krishna's analysis and, on using the same 
empirical ranges of values for the para- 
meters relating to production and con- 
sumption response, finds that it is not 
possible to rule out negativity in the price 
elasticity of the marketed supply of food- 
grains in the Indian context.79 
Distribution of Marketed Surplus by 
Size-Classes of Landholdings: Indian anal- 
ysis has also extended to the question of 
the shares of different size-classes of hold- 
ings in the marketed surplus of foodgrains 
and agricultural produce in general. Un- 
like with the question of the price elasti- 
city of marketed surplus, however, this 
problem has attracted mainly empirical 
analysis. Among the contributions to this 
area of research, Mathur's [107] findings 
on the marketed output of jawar in Akola 
and Amraoti for 1955-56 and Dharm 
Narain's [120] patient compilation and 
processiing of the relevant information for 
the marketed surplus of agricultural pro- 
duce for India in 1950-51 are of interest. 
Raj Krishna's [82] attempt at cross- 
section analysis of the marketed surplus, 
by size of farm output, for rice and wheat 
for selected markets has also attracted 
considerable controversy in this context. 
While these studies agree on the pro- 
position that the supply of marketed sur- 
plus is not a characteristic of only the 
"large" landholdings, they differ on several 
other points of substance. While Dharm 
Narain finds, for example, that even 
landholdings in the size-class 0-5 acres 
contribute as much as 20.7% of the value 
of their output as marketed surplus (Table 
1), Mathur's study shows that the sale of 
be inferior goods in consumption. In consequence, a 
sharp distinction would also have to be drawn between 
the price elasticity of the marketed surplus of a single 
foodgrain and more. 
78 These values are not entirely hypothetical but are 
derived by him from several studies, including his own 
study of the production response to price change in the 
Panjab [81]. 
79We may emphasize however that the negativity of 
price elasticity does not imply the unitary elasticity 
assumption of Mathur and Ezekiel. 
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TABLE. 1-DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETED SURPLUS BY 
SIzE-GROUPS OF HOLDING 
I II 
SiZe Of Marketed (1) as (1) as Marketed (4) as (4) 
as 
Size of Marketed (1) as %of Srls % o /o%of holding SuRpls. valu of Total SuRplu %au of Toa (acres) (ros. Value Of Marketed crPe1vS ofp Marketed CrOreS) outpuat SPS r ) Surplus Surplus 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0-5 266.7 20.7 24.9 564.0 33.6 26.0 
5-10 175.8 14.1 16.4 444.8 27.4 20.5 
10-15 54.7 9.7 5.1 170.1 23.1 7.9 
15-20 80.1 18.2 7.5 172.8 30.1 8.0 
20-25 54.0 20.4 5.0 111.0 32.2 5.1 
25-30 65.4 28.8 6.1 116.8 39.7 5.4 
30-40 80.5 29.9 7.5 139.6 39.8 6.4 
40-50 67.8 38.0 6.3 107.8 46.4 5.0 
50 and 
above 228.0 44.8 21.2 339.9 51.4 15.7 
Total 1073.0 21.5 2166.8 33.4 
Source: Dharm Narain [120, 35]. 
jawar by landholdings in the size-class 
0-5 acres is practically nil. While this 
discrepancy in the results may arise from 
differences in the concept of the marketed 
surplus and also in the period and area 
covered, it arises undoubtedly also from 
the fact that Mathur's findings refer to a 
single crop, jawar, whereas Dharm Narain 
refers to agricultural produce in general. 
As Dandekar [31] has noted, the All-India 
Rural Credit Survey has shown that this 
size-class of farmers are typically net pur- 
chasers of foodgrains, while earning cash 
income by "sale of other crops or wages 
earned from farm and off-farm employ- 
ment or even remittances received from 
family members working in cities."80 
Another difference of considerably great- 
er policy relevance relates to Dharm 
Narain's finding that the proportion of 
output marketed falls until the size-class 
10-15 acres is reached and rises rapidly 
thereafter. An important consequence of 
this finding, if statistically valid despite 
the numerous "adjustments" that have 
gone into its derivation, would be that 
land ceilings resulting in breakup of the 
larger holdings could increase, rather than 
diminish, the marketed surplus of agri- 
cultural produce-ignoring, of course, the 
derivative effect of any resulting shifts in 
production itself.8" Since in Dharm Na- 
rain's findings, the distribution of mar- 
keted surplus by size of holdings is 
bi-modal, this would imply that the effect 
of redistribution and changes in the num- 
ber of landholdings on the proportion of 
marketed surplus would be ambiguous in 
general. On the other hand, Raj Krishna's 
80 Italics have been inserted by us. 
81 We deal with this question separately, when we 
analyze the response of production to shifts in param- 
eters such as prices and size-class of the landholdings. 
We may also note here that a satisfactory investigation 
of the question of the effect of land ceilings and a con- 
sequent break up of larger into smaller farms requires 
a general equilibriun analysis, even within a compara- 
tive static framework, which would also take into ac- 
count resulting shifts in the labor force, consumption 
patterns and relative prices between agricultural and 
nonagricultural commodities. 
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[82] analysis of market arrivals of rice and 
wheat for certain markets, by size-classes 
of farm output, reaches the conflicting con- 
clusion that, except for the "very poor, and 
the very rich" areas, the marketable sur- 
plus (M) is linearly related to the level of 
garm output (Q) by the relation: M= 
a+bQ (where the estimated 'a' involves a 
negative intercept). This conclusion natu- 
rally implies that shifting output between 
farms of different size-classes will not affect 
the volume of the marketed surplus if the 
number of landholdings is not changed; 
however, if the number is increased via 
land ceilings, for example, the marketed 
surplus would necessarily diminish (since 
'a' <0). 
Raj Krishna's startling finding, how- 
ever, may be largely due to the fact that, 
as he had himself noted and Hanumantha 
Rao [65] has emphasized, he is dealing 
with a single crop and not with the overall 
marketing of agricultural produce by 
different farms. Indeed, it would appear 
that his data must come from farms which 
produce more than a single crop, or al- 
ternatively have income from different 
sources. As Majumdar [97] has pointed 
out, Raj Krishna's results imply that the 
output elasticity of consumption on the 
farm increases as output, and hence farm 
income, increases: a proposition which cer- 
tainly is empirically untenable for India at 
all farm income levels.82 Thus, it is only if 
these samples farms have income from 
other sources that increment in output of 
the foodgrain crop (rice or wheat) would 
not imply increment in overall farm income 
and hence would make Raj Krishna's re- 
sults appear tenable. 
But if then Raj Krishna's results for a 
single crop are to be considered to have 
come from diversified farms, it is not sur- 
prising that they are not consistent with 
Dharm Narain's results which relate to the 
entire agricultural produce from all land- 
holdings by size-classes. If we were to 
assume that Raj Krishna's statistical re- 
sults have validity over a wider range of 
foodgrains and area within the country, 
despite his careful caveat that they apply 
only to his extremely limited sample, there 
would clearly be important economic im- 
plications: for, from certain economic 
points of view, the supply of the marketed 
surplus of direct wage-goods such as food- 
grains may be crucial but the supply of the 
surplus of overall agricultural produce may 
not be. 
Apropos of this distinction between 
foodgrains and agricultural produce, we 
may also note that the precise definition of 
the marketed surplus is also relevant and 
would have to be adapted to the policy 
problem being considered. Thus, for ex- 
ample, Dharm Narain carefully states 
that his definition relates to the quantities 
that the cultivating families directly mar- 
ket. Thus, insofar as these families may 
themselves buy agricultural produce from 
the market or make payment of rent or 
wages in kind which, in turn, seeps into the 
market, the measured surplus will differ 
from the surplus that becomes available 
for nonfarm use. An important conse- 
quence is that, insofar as we are interested 
in the availability of agricultural produce 
for nonfarm consumption, Dharm Narain's 
definition will understate the marketed 
surplus ensuing from the larger farms 
which make wage payments in kind and 
whose purchase of agricultural produce is 
likely to be proportionately lower in rela- 
tion to their output. 
We may also remark that the Indian 
discussion of the marketed surplus, while 
it has taken different size-classes of hold- 
ings into account as a relevant variable, 
has not considered the possibility that al- 
S2 (Af/Q)EMQ= l-(C/Q)EcQ, where EmQ and EcQ are 
the output elasticities of marketed produce and of con- 
sumption respectively and C is the consumption. Thus 
if EMQ decreases with output, as a linear relation be- 
tween MI and Q (31 =a+bQ) with a negative intercept 
'a' would imply, then E cQ must rise with output 1971. 
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ternative forms of land tenure may also 
affect the overall level of the marketed 
surplus and its price elasticity. This may 
be via the efficiency and/or the price re- 
sponse of production varying under alter- 
native forms of tenure (such as share crop- 
ping and peasant proprietorship). It could 
also result from differences in consumption 
patterns, for any given level of farm out- 
put, that may arise from differences in the 
distribution of the farm income among 
rents, wages and imputed self-incomes 
under alternative tenure systems. Where 
the tenure systems, in turn, overlap with 
size-classes (as, for example, when "small" 
farms are characterized by peasant pro- 
prietorship and the "large" farms by 
tenancy), the causal explanations may 
also overlap. 
Behavior of Production 
In contrast to the analysis of the mar- 
keted surplus problem, the Indian analysis 
of agricultural production has been em- 
pirically more systematic and analy- 
tically more interesting. As with marketed 
surplus, two of the major problems an- 
alyzed have been (1) the elasticity of price 
response and (2) the relationship of farm 
size to productivity. At the same time, 
however, the efficiency of production and 
investment has been discussed in the con- 
text of alternative tenure systems such as 
share cropping and of agrarian organiza- 
tions such as cooperative farming. 
(A) Price Elasticity of Production: There 
is an important, empirical distinction be- 
tween the elasticity of price response of 
total agricultural production and of single 
crops or subgroups thereof. Furthermore, 
the elasticity of response to change in the 
relative price of outputs needs to be dis- 
tinguished from the elasticity of response 
to change in the relative price of inputs to 
output. Each of these behavioral relation- 
ships has a bearing upon the Indian policy 
discussion, although it is only recently that 
careful distinction among these alternative 
concepts has begun to emerge in the 
policy debates. 
Furthermore, practically the bulk of the 
systematic, empirical literature in this 
area has been confined to the estimation of 
production, or rather acreage, response of 
specific crops to changes in the relative 
price of outputs. Recently however Minhas 
and Srinivasan [115] have investigated the 
interesting question of farmers' potential 
response to fertilizer availability at speci- 
fied prices, using crop-cutting experi- 
mental data on fertilizer productivity and 
assuming profit maximization; their work 
is thus aimed at predicting product re- 
sponse to alternative fertilizer prices but 
does not estimate it from observed data.83 
We should however note that the fertilizer 
response functions used by Minhas and 
Srinivasan cannot be necessarily general- 
ized to Indian agriculture as a whole since 
they were obtained from experimentation 
done by the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research and there is no reason to treat 
these as "typical" response functions. 
Hence the accuracy of predictions based 
on the Minhaso-Srinivasan exercise is 
likely to be limited, despite its value in 
providing a systematic analytical frame- 
work for doing so. 
Among the empirical examinations of 
the responsiveness of production to change 
in relative output price are: Raj Krishna's 
[81] estimation of acreage response func- 
tions for several crops in the Panjab for 
the pre-Partition period; Dharm Narain's 
[121] analysis, stopping short of econo- 
metric estimation, of shift in acreage under 
different crops in response to price change 
during 1900-39; and Venkataramanan's 
[1731 estimation of jute areas elasticity, 
with respect to the relative price of jute 
with rice for 1911-1938. Among the other 
" Minhas and Srinivasan also investigate the effect of 
share cropping on fertilizer absorption. We turn to this 
question later in the present section. 
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attempts in this direction, we should also 
note: Rath and Patwardhan's [144] esti- 
mation of acreage response functions for 
wheat for 1950-51 to 1961-62, in connec- 
tion with their analysis of the impact of 
P.L. 480 imports on the domestic produc- 
tion of wheat; and Jai Krishna and Rao's 
[79] estimation of alternative acreage allo- 
cation functions for wheat in Uttar 
Pradesh for 1950-51 to 1962-63. 
Other contributions of interest in this 
area, which depart from the focus on 
acreage response to price change, are (1) by 
Mann [98] who has estimated the price 
elasticity of supply (as distinct from acre- 
age) of cereals (as distinct from a single 
crop) at 0.275 during 1952-63 in the 
framework of a simultaneous equations 
model designed to study the impact of 
P.L. 480 imports of wheat on domestic 
foodgrains production; and (2) by Hanu- 
mantha Rao [64] who has analysed the 
Farm Management Studies data on crop 
patterns in the States of Madhya Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, 
Panjab and Bombay to find correspon- 
dence between the relative profitabilities 
of crops (defined in terms of income per 
acre) and their relative shares in the gross 
cropped area :84 an empirical relationship 
that is compatible with, but does not 
necessarily follow from, the assumption 
that farmers respond to profit incentives.85 
Quite apart from the differences in the 
period, area and crops examined, the 
acreage response studies by Raj Krishna, 
Dharm Narain and others vary in (i) their 
methods of estimation, (ii) the specifica- 
tion of the relevant price of the crop, and 
(iii) the selection of the relevant, relative 
price. On the method of estimation, for 
example, Raj Krishna as also Jai Krishna 
and Rao have used Nerlove-type "adjust- 
ment" models which permit separate com- 
putation of the short-run and long-run 
elasticities of response. The other contrib- 
utors, on the other hand, have used simple, 
lagged regressions of acreage upon price. 
As for the specification of the relevant 
(absolute) price of the crop, different pos- 
sibilities have been experimented with Jai 
Krishna and Rao who have tried several 
alternative prices-preceding year's post- 
harvest mean and modal prices, three 
month pre-sowing prices and average of 
three month pre-sowing and lagged three 
month post-harvest prices-find, for ex- 
ample, that their best results are with the 
three year averages of the pre-sowing 
price of wheat and consider this to be more 
appropriate in forming the farmers' price 
expectation than the post-harvest prices 
(used by Raj Krishna and by Rath and 
Patvardhan) or annual average prices. 
However, in choosing the most appro- 
priate relative price deflator, the general 
practice has been to take weighted aver- 
ages of relevant "substitute" crops. The 
majority of the analyses further dis- 
tinguish between irrigated and unirrigated 
acreage, as the substitution possibilities 
are different for them. Further, many of 
them introduce overall crop acreage, rain- 
fall and relative yields of the different 
rival crops as additional explanatory vari- 
ables. 
Among the principal conclusions to 
emerge from these studies is that Indian 
farmers vary their acreage under most 
crops when relative prices change. But can 
we really claim, with Dharm Narain, that 
the response is more obvious, and elastic, 
for pure cash crops than for cereals? The 
evidence on this issue does not appear to 
be at all clear. The elasticities of response 
are certainly large on some of the pure 
cash crops such as cotton, though not as 
94Rao's analysis also differentiates between land- 
holdings by size-class of holdings. 
86 Thus, consistent with profit maximization, it is 
easy to imagine production functions for rival crops 
which imply that, in equilibrium at any stated com- 
modity price vector, the shares of these crops in total 
acreage are inversely (rather than positively) related to 
income per acre. 
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large on others such as jute and sugar cane. 
Further, on cereals such as rice and wheat, 
the elasticities estimated by these authors 
seem to diverge. 
Raj Krishna's estimates, for example, 
are at 0.08 and 0.14 for irrigated acreage 
for wheat, for short-run and long-run 
periods respectively. In this result, he is 
supported by Dharm Narain's finding 
that, in the four major areas producing 
wheat in India during 1900-1939, no 
significant relationship could be discovered 
between acreage under wheat and its rela- 
tive price.86 The work of Jai Krishna and 
Rao, for the more recent period 1950-51 
to 1962-63 for Uttar Pradesh, however, 
has produced long-run elasticities for 
wheat acreage which range up to 0.72. 
Similarly, for rice, in Panjab, Raj Krish- 
na's estimates of the short-run and long- 
run elasticities are 0.31 and 0.59 respec- 
tively, indicating again a fair degree of re- 
sponse, whereas Dharm Narain fails to 
discover significant price-induced shifts in 
rice acreage for Bengal, Bihar, Madras 
and Orissa. 
The divergent estimates for cereals seem 
to imply that empirically there is no reason 
to believe that the acreage response for 
movements into and out of cereals will be 
any less than that for the pure cash crops. 
Nor, indeed, does there seem to be any 
theoretical reason for such an asymmetry. 
Indeed, the technological constraints on 
shiftability of land seem to be the relevant 
factors in determining the magnitude of 
the acreage response to price change quite 
irrespective of the classification of the pro- 
duced crops as cereals or pure cash crops. 
Thus, for example, Dharm Narain did find 
that for the Aus rice in Bengal, which di- 
rectly competes with jute for acreage, 
acreage was indeed responsive to relative 
price change; and Venkataramanan has 
estimated the elasticity of jute acreage at 
0.46. 
We may further observe that if our pri- 
mary interest is in the elasticity of supply 
or production response, the acreage re- 
sponse is only an incomplete guide to the 
total picture. The elasticity of supply re- 
sponse is the sum of the elasticity of 
acreage and productivity-per-acre re- 
sponses to price change. Thus the elasticity 
of supply response is certain to be under- 
stated by the acreage elasticity for those 
crops which have no "substitute" crops 
landwise but where production can be 
increased via application of more inputs. 
Moreover, even if we were to consider a 
completely neoclassical model with factors 
(including land) freely adaptable to al- 
ternative crop production, a shift to a 
more profitable crop will generally raise 
its land productivity if it is intensive in the 
use of nonland factors and these factors are 
not in perfectly elastic supply to all crops 
taken together. 
(B) Production and Size-Class of Hold- 
ings: The focus on production response to 
prices in the Indian literature has been 
nearly matched by the economic analysis 
which has resulted from the finding of the 
Farm Management Studies (for Uttar 
Pradesh, Madras, West Bengal, Bombay, 
Panjab, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra, 
during mid-1950's) that an inverse rela- 
tionship obtains between farm size and 
productivity per acrea. This relationship, 
which has an obvious bearing upon the 
policy issues pertaining to land ceilings87 
86 Since Dharm Narain has not undertaken statistical 
estimation, and his analysis proceeds on the basis of 
graphical methods, comparison of his work with the 
econometric results of other authors can only be tenu- 
ous. Further, phrases such as "significant relationship" 
must be construed in a nonstatistical sense when we are 
referring to Dharm Narain's work. For pertinent criti- 
cism of Dharm Narain's omission of statistical tech- 
niques, and the dangers of having failed to avoid false 
conclusions thanks to the presence of serial correlation 
and an inability to face up to the identification prob- 
lem, see Lipton's [91] interesting review. 
87 We may also refer to a rather different type of 
analytical treatment of the question of land ceilings by 
Khusro [76] who has ingeniously attempted to examine 
the efficacy of such a measure in terms of the theory of 
rationing. 
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and land grouping under cooperative 
farming and other forms of agrarian organ- 
ization, has led to attempted explanations 
by Khusro [74], Mazumdar [111] and 
Sen [157] and further empirical work by 
Hanumantha Rao [66] and A.P. Rao 
[142], among others. 
We may note at the outset that much of 
the important statistical evidence that is 
available points rather strongly towards 
the existence of an inverse relationship 
between farm size and productivity. The 
Farm Management Studies indeed yield 
this relationship, whether grouped by size- 
classes or taken on an individual farm 
basis as Hanumantha Rao [66] has done 
for Bombay. Independent survey for 
Andhra by Rao has also yielded similar 
results.88 
Assuming that the results of the Farm 
Management Studies are statistically valid, 
what are the possible explanations? For, 
the implications for policy would gen- 
erally vary with the explanation accepted. 
Whether higher productivity per acre also 
goes with greater economic efficiency of the 
smaller farms will depend critically on the 
explanation of the phenomenon of higher 
productivity. 
(1) The explanation offered by Sen 
[157] of an inverse relationship is based on 
the argument that the smaller farms are 
characterized by peasant family cultiva- 
tion and the larger farms by capitalist 
cultivation. Cultivation is thus carried on 
the small farms right up to the point where 
the marginal product is zero (or at least 
below the ruling market wage) and stops 
on the capitalist farms at the point where 
the marginal product equals the market 
wage. Hence the small farms have higher 
productivity per acre and are more effi- 
cient in the economic sense.89 
This argument, however, raises concep- 
tual difficulties and is also empirically un- 
tenable. If the two agrarian systems co- 
exist, one may ask whether the opportu- 
nity cost of peasant family labor is not the 
wage that the market offers for employ- 
ment by atomistic capitalist farmers. 
Thus, if the family is taking a decision on 
overall income derived from input of work- 
hours by the family as such, then will not 
the opportunity cost of work on both types 
of farms be equalized and the inverse re- 
lationship therefore not explained? The 
inverse relationship therefore will hold 
only insofar as we explicitly postulate that 
the peasant family labor cannot neces- 
sarily find alternative employment at the 
given wage, which is not further flexible 
downwards, on the capitalist farms and 
that the probability attached therefore to 
finding such an alternative employment is 
less than unity thus making its opportu- 
nity cost less than the wage on the capital- 
ist farms. Mere coexistence of the two 
agrarian systems is not sufficient therefore 
for the explanation of the inverse relation- 
ship. 
Furthermore, Sen's argument runs into 
empirical difficulties on two grounds. 
Several studies show that the small farms, 
not far from the bottom of the scale, 
88 On the other hand, we should note here that a few 
village studies, in depth, seem to throw up results which 
are at variance with these. Thus A. P. Rao's [142] study 
of data for six villages in Uttar Pradesh and Panjab 
shows for example that, if adjustment is made for the 
fallow lands and the availability of irrigation, output 
per acre tends to be constant by size-class of holdings. 
Further, C H. Shah's [161] study of the small farmers in 
Kodinar Taluka for 1952-53 shows that, for the princi- 
pal crops: "yields per acre for the small farmers were, 
in the year under survey, 12.3 per cent lower compared 
to that of big farmers. Compared to that of medium 
farmers they were 7.2 per cent lower. In other words, 
lands in possession of small farmers were less intensively 
utilized to that extent." Shah does not explicitly state 
that this ranking would hold for all output and there- 
fore it is not certain, although quite plausible in view of 
these crops covering nearly 75 per cent of the cropped 
area on farms in each category, that his results are con- 
trary to the findings of the Farm Management Studies. 
89 The asymmetrical nature of these two agrarian 
systems, with respect to effects on the efficiency of pro- 
duction, is well known in the trade theoretic literature 
on domestic distortions and was earlier noted by Bhag- 
wati [8], among others. 
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themselves hire labor at the margin90 and 
even derive income from employment of 
family members in other occupations,9' so 
that the opportunity cost of labor on the 
small farm is likely to be very real and 
cannot be dismissed. Moreover, Hanu- 
mantha Rao's work shows that the inverse 
relationship holds even when the larger 
(presumably capitalist) farms are ranked, 
so that Sen's suggested explanation is at 
best incomplete. 
(2) Khusro [74] has noted, in particular, 
that the decline in productivity per acre is 
reduced significantly when the acreage is 
"standardized" on the basis of land reve- 
nue ratings (which are presumably related 
principally to soil fertility). Thus, one of 
the major explanations advanced for the 
inverse relationship is that the fertility of 
the soil is lower on the larger farms. 
This argument, if accepted, raises the 
question whether this fertility difference is 
exogenous or manmade and hence, in turn, 
to be explained by the fact that the small 
farms are more efficient economically. If 
the fertility factor is exogenous, it could be 
explained by the hypothesis that the 
larger farms are put together by purchase 
of land undergoing "distress sale" and that 
the poorer lands are sold and the better 
lands retained: thus making the larger 
farms less fertile on the average than the 
smaller farms. Further, if the large farms 
contain an element of conspicuous con- 
sumption, the possession of land itself 
(regardless of quality within a range) con- 
ferring status and psychic satisfaction on 
these large landowners, then it could also 
be economically profitable for them to 
purchase lower quality land from the mar- 
ket. An implausible hypothesis is that his- 
torically the fertile, large farms may have 
broken down into smaller farms owing to a 
more rapid population growth. Sen, who 
has put forth this last hypothesis, how- 
ever, forgets that this argument conceals 
an important indeterminacy which arises 
from the fact that the size of the family 
itself may vary by farms owing to migra- 
tion or other endogenous factors and, if so, 
the equilibrium pattern of fertility by 
size-classes may not be characterized by 
an inverse relationship between farm size 
and productivity. 
(3) Two other explanations related to 
the hypothesis of "distress sales" of land 
resulting in the buildup of larger farms, 
can be advanced. On the one hand, the 
enlargement of farms by acquisition of 
plots of land from such sales could well 
lead to the larger landholdings being char- 
acterized by fragmentation of the culti- 
vated area and its being scattered over 
large distances, thus adversely affecting 
average productivity per acre and lower- 
ing that of the larger farms.92 On the other 
hand, the possibility that the smaller 
farms are in distress could lead to their 
being more efficient in their use of re- 
sources, especially labor and management 
(the alternative being ruination) whereas, 
as Hanumantha Rao [631 has suggested, 
the larger farms are less efficient from the 
viewpoint of production, as they trade off 
marginal profitability against leisure. 
(4) Another hypothesis, put forth by 
Khusro, is that "If there are tenurial dis- 
incentives resulting in lower input and out- 
put per acre among the tenanted holdings 
and if the proportion of area leased in in- 
creases with size, then the decline in out- 
put per acre with size could be partly ex- 
plained by the operation of tenurial is- 
incentives" [66]. However, as Hanumad- 
tha Rao notes, the evidence on this issue 
is conflicting: while Khusro has found 
evidence in support of this hypothesis to 
90 This is shown by the Farm Management Sttudies. 
See Hanumantha Rao [66] and Khusro [741. 
91 This is shown by the All-India Rural Credit Sur- 
veys. For details, see Dandekar [31]. 
92 This hypothesis could be readily tested through 
village studies designed to estimate the fragmentatiQn 
of the farms by size-class of landholdings! 
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the extent that the proportion of land 
taken on lease rises as the farm size in- 
creases, the findings are just the opposite 
in the Farm Management Studies. 
(5) A possible explanation, similar in 
spirit to the tenancy explanation of 
Khusro's, is that the larger farms are char- 
acterized by absentee landlordship, which 
results in reduced efficiency through in- 
adequate exercise of managerial and entre- 
preneurial functions. While this explana- 
tion will not explain the findings of the 
Farm Management Studies, which relate 
to owner-cultivators in residence, it may 
well explain the inverse relationship in 
other samples. 
Since many of the new hypotheses that 
we have suggested have not yet been 
tested whereas none of the traditional 
explanations we have surveyed appear to 
fit entirely any of the empirical data 
(wherever tests have been attempted), it is 
difficult not to be sceptical about the pre- 
cise policy implications of this area of 
analysis."3 At an a priori level, however, 
we may reiterate that the question is of 
considerable relevance to the problem of 
the optimal agrarian structure. In this con- 
text, we may note that Dandekar [30] has 
drawn upon Ceorgescu-Roegen's earlier 
work [57] to argue that, for India where 
there is (according to him) overpopulation 
in the sense that the shadow rental of labor 
falls below the subsistence (and hence the 
market) wage, the capitalist form of wage- 
labor organization will lead to inefficient 
aggregate output and the peasant family 
system implied by individual peasant pro- 
prietorship would be superior. Ideally, this 
argument would lead to an agrarian struc- 
ture based on peasant families owning 
land in the same ratio as the overall 
family-land ratio. Such a view however 
rules out possible indivisibilities, relating 
to inputs, which may make cooperation 
desirable.9 Further, as a policy prescrip- 
tion, it is inadequate as it does not take 
into consideration the economic problems 
of the transition from one system to the 
other. We may further observe that, while 
such an agrarian structure can be demon- 
strated to be statically efficient, its effect 
on long-run growth may be deleterious if 
induced savings are adversely affected and 
there are political limits to the govern- 
mental ability to tax (as there certainly is 
in India, especially with respect to the 
agricultural sector). This may happen via 
savings in agriculture being directly af- 
fected through shift in the internal dis- 
tribution of income within agriculture or 
via income distributional changes between 
agriculture and other sectors as the terms 
of trade between them change in response 
to the primary improvement in agricul- 
tural output and the possible change in the 
consumption pattern that may be asso- 
ciated with the changed distribution of 
income within agriculture under the new 
agrarian structure.95 
(C) Tenancy, Share Cropping and 
Efficiency of Production: We have already 
seen how the literature on farm size and 
productivity has led Indian economists to 
focus on the relative efficiency of alterna- 
93 Further, we should emphasize that the ranking by 
private and social profitability of the farms by size- 
classes may diverge from their ranking by acreage pro- 
ductivity. Also the static efficiency of the smnaller farms, 
if demonstrated, may be consistent with their dynamic 
inefficiency from the viewpoint of savings, investment 
and innovation. 
14 Dandekar notes, however, that if the cooperative 
societies act in a capitalistic manner, they will make the 
systerm revert to the inefficiency of the capitalist, agrar- 
ian system. 
06 Again, therefore, if we are interested in the related 
question of what would happen to agricultural output 
when we have a shift in agrarian structure, we should 
ideally consider the problem in a general equilibriunz 
framework (even if we are considering comparative 
static analysis). Thus, for example, a primary improve- 
ment in agricultural output due to agricultural effi- 
ciency could be overcompensated by the secondary re- 
duiction in outpult brought about by an agricultural 
price reduction induced by a consumption shift away 
from agriculture, thus leaving us with a net reduction 
of agricultural output in the new equilibrium. 
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tive forms of owner-cultivation: the peas- 
ant family system and the capitalist em- 
ployment-for-wage system. Indian analy- 
sis of agrarian organization has also been 
addressed, however, to the question of the 
effects of tenancy, including certain im- 
portant forms of it such as share cropping, 
on the efficiency of production.96 
In fact, tenancy legislation has been 
extensively enacted in different States in 
India, reflecting and in turn stimulating 
the literature that we presently survey. 
Indeed, as Dandekar [29] has noted, the 
Indian planners have increasingly shifted 
their policy proposals away from the First 
Plan emphasis on restructuring of land 
holdings into efficient sized units backed 
by cooperative organization where scale 
effects make it desirable (with tenurial, 
land reform undertaken largely as a tran- 
sitional means towards this reform of the 
agrarian structure), towards the TIhird 
Plan's exclusive attention to tenurial re- 
form, inclusive of tenanicy legislation. 
The Indian analytical literature on 
tenancy has considered, among others, two 
principal questions of some interest: (i) 
where the tenant is subject to insecurity of 
tenure as a result of the threat of possible 
eviction, does the grant of permanence of 
tenure by legislation improve efficiency via 
investment in capital inputs; and (ii) are 
certain forms of tenancy, particularly 
share cropping, suboptimal from the view- 
point of efficient factor use? 
Among the empirical studies aimed at 
examining whether the legislative grant of 
security of tenure to the tenants, where 
effectively implemented, improves the 
efficiency of factor use via investments 
which would otherwise not be undertaken 
by the tenant, Khusro's [72] investigation 
of such land reform in Hyderabad during 
the period 1948-49 to 1953-54 is note- 
worthy.97 He hypothesizes, among other 
effects, that the land reform legislation 
would lead to a narrowing of the gap in the 
productivity per acre between the owner- 
cultivator and the tenancy groups of land- 
holdings, presumably as the latter group 
improved its efficiency via increased in- 
vestments induced by the tenancy reform. 
Khusro indeed observes that such a nar- 
rowing of the gap had occurred by 1953- 
54. However, the real test is whether the 
tenancy group had improved its produc- 
tivity and it turns out that, as Dandekar 
[28] has noticed, the narrowing of the gap 
has occurred through a decline in the pro- 
ductivity of the owner-cultivator farmers 
instead. Insofar as the latter phenomenon 
is due to factors applicable only to the 
owner-cultivator group (as would be the 
case, for example, if other provisions re- 
lating to the tenancy legislation may have 
depressed the incentive to invest by this 
group of farmers) ,98 then the observed 
narrowing of the gap would not support 
the hypothesis being tested. Furthermore 
Dandekar lhas pointed to the wide varia- 
tions in the acreage productivity of the 
two groups through the period, thus mak- 
96 There is also a considerable amount of literature on 
the problems of (1) rural indebtedness and (2) land 
revenue administration, which we have not considered 
in this surve-. Land reform discussion in India has 
embraced both these problems. For a reference to the 
major studies of the latter problem, in the light of the 
legislation enacted by different States such as Andhra 
Pradesh and Gujarat to abolish these intermediaries, 
Dandekar's [281 critical survey is an excellent source. 
97 Dandekar [281 has critically surveyed Khusro's 
study and three other similar studies, sponsored by the 
Research Programmes Committee of the Indian Plan- 
ning Commission, to investigate the working of land 
reform legislation. 
98 Khusro [72, pp. 61-163] himself offers a different 
type of reason, also specific to the owner-cultivator 
group, which is of some interest: "It is well known ... 
that land reforms had led to a good deal of resumption 
of land by owners partly because they wanted to culti- 
vate the extra land and largely owing to expectations 
and psychological attitudes which this reform had led 
to. If the land so resumed had in fact been resumed with 
the intention of cultivation with at least the same stan- 
dards as already existed in owner-cultivated tracts, the 
productivity of the owner-cultivators would have re- 
mained at least constant.... On the contrary it is 
resumed for institutional and legal reasons to safeguard 
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ing it unreliable to base any conclusions on 
a two-year comparison. On the other hand, 
we should note that Khusro's alternative 
hypothesis that the increased security of 
tenure would lead to a shift in the composi- 
tion of the tenant-cultivators' investments 
towards investments maturing over a 
longer period seems to be consistent with 
the developments over the period.99 
Khusro's study and other similar inves- 
tigations are thus indicative but not en- 
tirely decisive in providing evidence con- 
sistent with the hypothesis relating effi- 
ciency on the tenant-farm to security of 
tenure and further empirical work seems 
called for in this area. Furthermore, we 
may note that the theoretical basis for this 
hypothesis, plausible as it seems, may be 
weak insofar as it is possible to argue at a 
purely a priori level that the implicit 
assumption that the cash lease tenant 
must finance the investments while the 
landlord may evict him from the lands on 
which he has carried out improvements 
may be partially or entirely invalidated by 
either (1) institutional arrangements for 
compensation to the tenant for these im- 
provements, or (2) financing of these im- 
provements by the landlord himself, with 
the return to the tenant's inputs being 
determined by the marginal productivity 
thereof. This could happen as the net 
payoff ensuing from such arrangements 
ought to induce their acceptance; and the 
probability of such acceptance may be 
high as there would be only two, readily 
identifiable negotiating parties involved. 
Whether in fact such arrangements tend to 
exist in practice and, if so, whether they 
are extensive is of course an empirical 
matter on which systematic evidence does 
not appear to have been collected over a 
long period and covering much of the 
country. 
A similar theoretical objection applies to 
the traditional view that share cropping is 
an inefficient tenurial system, even when 
the tenancy is fully secure. We have al- 
ready noted Hanumantha Rao's [67] in- 
genious defense of the "rationality" of 
share cropping when the technological 
possibilities of factor and product substi- 
tution are insignificant; and we have al- 
ready seen how a recasting of such an ex- 
planation can reconcile the share cropping 
system with optimality of factor use. 
However, even if we were to revert to the 
traditional frame of analysis, we should 
not rule out the possibility of suitable ar- 
rangements being worked out by the 
negotiating parties if there is a net pay off 
to an otherwise blocked act of investment. 
At an empirical level, in any case, no 
systematic attempts appear to have been 
undertaken so far in India to test for the 
alleged inefficiency of share cropping. The 
work of Minhas and Srinivasan [115] 
which we have already noted, instead tries 
to predict whether, on the assumption of 
profit maximization and specified techno- 
logical relationships and prices of output 
and inputs, the share croppers (with ob- 
served shares) will have incentive to ab- 
sorb fertilizers.100 In undertaking this 
analysis, they are careful to note that the 
uncertainty of the outcome from fertilizer 
inputs, owing to exogenous reasons (such 
as weather failure or shortfalls in related 
inputs such as public sector irrigation) or 
against future encroachments by tenants. Thus the re- 
sumer has no intention of making any investment on the 
land immediately or growing crops on it with the same 
efficiency with which he has been cultivating his other 
tracts. The result is to push up owner-cultivated acre- 
age without simultaneously pushing up the production 
of this class." However, Dandekar has shown that this 
argument is not supported by Khusro's data, which 
register no significant change in the acreage cultivated 
by the owner-cultivators. 
99 This may also account partly for the fact that while 
the investment per acre does show a perceptible increase 
on the tenant-cultivated farms, their productivity per 
acre remained stagnant over the short period of the 
operation of the land reform. 
100 This inquiry was prompted by the shift in India's 
agricultural strategy, with the end of the Third Plan, 
towards fertilizer-intensive agricultural growth. 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.67 on Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:35:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
46 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
inaccurate application of the implied new 
technique, would have to be allowed for in 
predicting the fertilizer absorption levels 
at the assumed prices. This is important 
particularly since the application of fertil- 
izers may lead to higher average output 
but greater variance of output. They also 
assume perfectly elastic supply of credit at 
a common interest rate for everybody: 
hence, credit is not related to farm size and 
status, as is probably the case in practice. 
Further, in making their prediction, they 
assume (with other analysts of this prob- 
lem) that the tenant will be making the 
investments, so that the higher the crop 
share accruing to him the greater the 
fertilizer absorption. However this as- 
sumption, often made by the proponents of 
land reform who recommend higher crop 
shares for the tenant, may be empirically 
invalid. If the investment decisions are 
made, and financed, by the landlords- 
and politically they may have control over 
the governmental lending institutions in 
the rural areas, for example-then higher 
shares for the landlord, ceteris paribus, 
would lead to greater, rather than lower, 
fertilizer absorption. This issue is an em- 
pirical one and does not appear to have 
been treated systematically in the litera- 
ture.101 
The literature on behavioral relation- 
ships in Indian agriculture that we have 
surveyed so far has had direct relevance to 
the lively policy debate on the appropriate- 
ness of the governmental policies relating 
to pricing, procurement, imports and dis- 
tribution of food in India. This debate has 
raised questions, and led to analysis, of 
considerable interest. It is to these ques- 
tions that we now turn. 
Price Policy and Production 
With respect to the effects of agricul- 
tural price policy on production, two dif- 
ferent questions can be distinguished in 
the Indian debate. On the one hand, the 
question of agricultural prices, as such, has 
been discussed, largely in relation to their 
stability and impact thereof on investment. 
On the other hand, the question of the 
relative terms of trade between agriculture 
and other sectors and own-inputs has also 
received attention. We consider each ques- 
tion in turn. 
(A) The desirability of having "guar- 
anteed, minimum prices," announced prior 
to the sowing season, has been widely em- 
phasised in the Indian literature.102 Legis- 
lative and executive action in this area has, 
however, only recently begun: with the 
announcement since 1966 of minimum 
support prices for several major agricul- 
tural commodities such as paddy, jawar, 
wheat and maize, and the setting up in 
January 1965 of an Agricultural Prices 
Commission to assist in formulating these 
prices and the Food Corporation of India in 
making the necessary purchases to make 
these prices effective where necessary.103 
The underlying theoretical basis for the 
guaranteed minimum price approach seems 
to have had numerous elements. (1) 
Dantwala [34], among others, has referred 
to the "insurance" aspect of such a policy 
and its resulting elimination, via the pro- 
vision of a floor price, of that aspect of un- 
certainty which might deter investment. 
Whether, however, open market opera- 
tions in the agricultural market, designed 
101 Some of the land reform studies, however, have 
distinguished between investments made by the tenants 
and by the landlords. See, for exainple, the examination 
of the working of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948, by 
Dandekar and Khudanpur, surveyed in Dandekar [281. 
102 Cf. Dantwala [34], the Report of the A.gricultural 
Prices Commission on Price Policy for Kharif Cereals 
for 1965-66 Season [1761 and the Report of the 1966, 
[Venkatappiahi Foodgra.ins Policy Committee [1771. 
103 As happens with many such bodies, the Food 
Corporation of India has managed to multiply its ac- 
tivities well beyond this area and has even involved 
itself in fertilizer distribution. Cf. the Foodgrains 
Policy Committee Report [177]. 
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to mop up supplies when the price tends to 
sag below the floor price, is a preferable 
alternative to an insurance scheme which, 
among other differences, does not involve 
direct State trade in agriculture has not 
been debated in the Indian literature. (2) 
The notion that the minimum guaranteed 
price, on the other hand, is part of a stabili- 
zation policy aimed at evening out fluctua- 
tions has also been explicitly developed by 
other economists, including Dandekar 
[32]. However, th.e distinction between 
price and income stabilization for agricul- 
ture or foodgrains has been made all too 
rarely.'04 Nor has the problem raised for 
buffer stock operations (on which the pro- 
posed stabilization measures must rely) by 
the trend rise in agricultural prices been 
discussed.'05 In turn, the critical question 
as to whether private speculation itself 
tends to be stabilizing or destabilizing in 
the field of agriculture in general, and 
specific foodgrains in particular, has not 
received the attention it deserves. The 
view that private trade is destabilizing 
(in some sense) and inefficient (in eliminat- 
ing spatial price differentials, among other 
things) seems to have been widely ac- 
cepted as obvious. In this connection, at 
least two empirical investigations are of 
interest. Venkataramanan [174], who has 
examined the data on spot and futures 
price quotations at the East India Cotton 
Exchange, which of course represents a 
fairly developed market, and stocks of 
cotton in Bombay, has found that the 
Keynes-Hicks theory of "normal back- 
wardation" is consistent with the ob- 
served facts. Moreover Uma Lele [90], who 
has studied the sorghum trade in Ma- 
harashtra State, for five primary markets 
in Sholapur district and two terminal mar- 
kets, has found that much of the regional 
price differentials (where not illusory and 
accountable by differences in grain qual- 
ity) can be accounted for by factors such 
as transportation bottlenecks, freight costs 
and governmental restrictions and bans on 
movements. (3) Finally, nearly all econo- 
mists writing in this area [32] [34] have 
expressed the view that, in addition to the 
"insurance" element, the guaranteed min- 
imum prices should include a margin in- 
tended to "help in assuring the progressive 
farmer that additional effort and expen- 
diture for the purpose of increasing output 
will bring him an adequate return." [177, 
54]. This view amounts to arguing, ceteris 
paribus for improved terms of trade be- 
tween agriculture and other sectors,106 
which would permit the (relative) influx of 
resources into agriculture. What would be 
the optimal policy for bringing about a 
shift in the agricultural terms of trade and 
what would be their optimal level are is- 
sues which this line of policy analysis 
opens up. These are also the issues which 
belong to the second class of questions, re- 
lating to relative agricultural prices, to 
which we now turn. 
(B) Much of the Indian literature and 
debate has inevitably dealt with this class 
of problems, although the discussion has 
104 Dandekar [32, 271 notes the difference but opts for 
a rather strange solution which aims at both price and 
income stabilization for foodgrains, without considering 
any alternatives: '..., in the interest of the pro- 
ducers, any measures of stabilization of prices such as 
through operating support and ceiling prices, should be 
accompanied by measures of income stabilization 
through appropriate credit and insurance policies." 
105 In deciding on the optimal level of the buffer stock, 
it would be necessary also to consider the possibility of 
holding free foreign exchange reserves, with pipelines 
set up for activating imports when necessary, since in- 
stability is likely to arise in respect of commodities other 
than foodgrains as well. A decision to hold buffer stocks 
for each item (including agricultural produce and food- 
grains) where instability will arise may be suboptimal 
and the holding of foreign exchange reserves instead, 
or some combination of the two measures, may be supe- 
rior. This question has been neither posed nor explored 
in the Indian literature. 
106 This should include improvement in the relative 
price of agricultural output vis-a-vis agricultural in- 
puts. 
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been confined to the question of whether 
Indian agriculture has been subjected, over 
the first three Plans, to a trend situation of 
price disincentives. Much of this debate 
has centered on the behavior of the agri- 
cultural terms of trade in general, although 
the foodgrains terms of trade have been 
distinguished. Furthermore the question 
of input prices and the net burden of taxa- 
tion on the agricultural sector vis-a-vis 
other sectors has also been raised. 
Dantwala [34], in an important contri- 
bution which surveys the entire range of 
governmental policies over the period of 
the three Plans, has critically examined the 
prevailing view that agricultural prices 
have had a strong disincentive element. 
He finds this view inconsistent with the 
facts insofar as the recorded time series of 
the agricultural terms of trade fail to 
register a deterioration over the period.107 
In fact, relative stability over the period, 
with the exception of a sharp dip in 1955- 
56 (which led to a rather slow stepping up 
of public sector investments), seems to 
have characterized the terms of trade be- 
tween agricultural and nonagricultural 
commodities. On the other hand, if we 
examine the terms of trade between food- 
grains and nonagricultural commodities, 
or between foodgrains and the overall in- 
dex of wholesale prices, there is certainly 
evidence of a more distinct deterioration 
during the first Plan period which is elimi- 
nated towards the end of the period. 
While these facts are interesting in 
themselves, they beg the more relevant 
question as to whicha level of the terms of 
trade, whether between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy or between food- 
grains and other commodities, should be 
considered optimal and whether, in rela- 
tion thereto, the recorded terms of trade 
for agriculture or foodgrains were "un- 
favorable." Dantwala raises this issue 
tangentially when he argues that, in rela- 
tion to 1939 prices, the cereals index was 
already 444 (with 1939= 100) and the 
general price index only 380.6 in 1952-53, 
the baseyear of the new price indices. 
Hence, in relation to the 1939 terms of trade, 
the evidence over 1951-1966 indicates 
"favourable terms of trade for agricul- 
ture."'08 Similarly, Dandekar's [32] con- 
tention that the terms of trade for cereals 
show distinct improvement during the 
Third Plan largely in the drought years at 
the end is also implicitly raising the same 
unanswered question as to the optimal 
level of the terms of trade. 
It is interesting however that the par- 
ticipants in this debate have not come to 
direct grips with the fundamental question 
of determining the optimal level of agricul- 
tural prices vis-a-vis other prices. Thus, 
for example, there has been no attempt at 
determining how these internal terms of 
trade compare with the international rates 
of exchange between agricultural and other 
commodities and whether exchange rate 
and trade policies conferred an excessive, 
in the sense of suboptimal, incentive for 
resources to flow into the nonagricultural 
sector. 
At the empirical level, however, greater 
sophistication has been introduced into 
the discussion by examination of the rela- 
tionship between agricultural output and 
input prices and the net burden of taxation 
on agriculture relative to other sectors. 
Dantwala [34], after making the valid 
point that little empirical evidence is 107 Dantwala [34] makes the important observation 
that: ". . . For some commodities like cotton, there has 
been a statutory ceiling on prices, and thouigh in reality 
the ceiling has never been operative, the office of the 
Economic Adviser which prepares the index series re- 
cords only the ceiling prices. Thus, for commodities like 
these, the index number under-estimates the rise in 
prices." 
108-Dantwala [341 then notes that "This would per- 
haps, explain why in January 1957, when the [new] ce- 
real price index stood at 95, the Government of India 
thought it fit to set up a high powered committee "to 
examiine the causes of the rise in prices and to suiggest 
remedial measures." 
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available and, where available, it does not 
indicate a high elasticity of response of 
agriculture as a sector to its terms of trade 
with respect to other sectors, proceeds to 
examine the available information for 
input/output prices for Assam, Panjab, 
Kerala, Orissa and West Bengal and finds 
conflicting evidence in relation to 1939, 
while noting the unusually unreliable 
character of these series. The information 
on the relative tax burdens, however, is 
sound and Dantwala quotes Ved Gandhi's 
[56] thorough work to show that sectorwise 
agriculture has received exceptionally fav- 
orable treatment. This is particularly be- 
cause of the direct agricultural taxes 
amounting on the average to no more than 
2 per cent of the value of agricultural pro- 
duction during the planning period.109 
Price Policy, Distribution and Imports 
Regardless, however, of the issue as to 
whether Indian agricultural production 
was discouraged by governmental failure 
to provide the optimal terms of trade, the 
question persists as to whether the entire 
set of governmental policies, designed to 
deal with a continuing situation where at 
constant prices foodgrains production was 
short of the demand fed by income and 
population growth, were optimal. This 
question, in turn, has provoked a consid- 
erable amount of controversy. 
The governmental policy package has 
essentially involved reliance on largescale 
P.L. 480 imports to supplement overall 
supplies of wheat and distribution thereof 
through a public sector system of fair price 
shops. Further for wheat, and more so for 
rice where there has been no equivalent 
P.L. 480 program, internal procurement of 
foodgrains from the producers has been 
attempted. Furthermore, since 1964, the 
country has been divided into several food 
zones which rule out interzonal free pri- 
vate trade: and the perpetuation of this 
system has been largely defended by refer- 
ence to the government's procurement and 
distributional policies. 
The policies just described have been 
severely criticized by Indian economists. 
However, while there is general agreement 
that the governmental procurement of 
internal foodgrains for public sector dis- 
tribution to the low income groups was 
totally inadequate and the reliance instead 
on P.L. 480 imports for this purpose was 
excessive, the critics have been divided on 
almost everything else. Thus, for example, 
Raj [137] has argued that the zonal system 
has accentuated the reliance on imports 
whereas Dantwala [34] and the Food- 
grains Policy Committee (which included 
D.R. Gadgil) [177] have contended that 
the zonal system facilitates greater pro- 
curement, implying that, ceteris paribus, it 
reduces reliance on imports. The zones 
have also attracted considerable contro- 
versy in relation to other issues such as 
their impact on economic efficiency and 
political integration: Raj Krishna [84] 
[176] and Raj have been among the prin- 
cipal critics. 
(1) The view that the reliance on food 
imports was excessive and that India could 
and should have managed without P.L. 
480 imports has been variously argued. 
Raj [137] has argued that imports could 
have been moderated, even eliminated, as 
there was enough foodgrain to go around 
"if distributed equitably."110 While this is 
109 Quite aside from the fact that politically it is diff- 
cult to tax the agricultural sector, when the bulk of the 
votes are in that sector, there may be another problem 
here. From an income distribuLtional point of view, the 
agricultural sector possibly has a relatively larger pro- 
portion of its income originating on the small farms be- 
longing to an income level which cannot be taxed on 
equity criteria. On the other hand, this implies that 
taxation (which is necessarily not lump-sum), and hence 
incentives on that account, will be biased against the 
non agricultural sector, ceteris paribus. 
110 Raj refers to nutritional standards to arrive at an 
average per capita consumption figure of 134 ounces as 
minimum cereal intake and finds that "except in two 
years (1951-52 and 1952-53), it would have been possi- 
ble to ensure this from domestic production alone." 
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a correct statement of fact, it does not rule 
out the existence of excess demand at a 
given price for foodgrains, and hence the 
important question as to whether imports 
should not after all have been permitted 
(or sought, under the aid program) to mod- 
erate a rise in the price. In assessing this 
question, it is necessary to remember at 
least two pertinent points: (1) if excess de- 
mand for cereals were to be diverted, 
thanks to rationed distribution for in- 
stance, this demand could spill over into 
other consumption (instead of turning, into 
involuntary savings) and, in turn, cut into 
exports, for example, and thereby affect 
the foreign exchange position much as im- 
ports of foodgrains would; and (ii) if ac- 
ceptance of P.L. 480 imports led, in the 
ultimate analysis, to a greater total inflow 
of foreign assistance, this in turn would be 
a positive factor in favor of such a policy, 
ceteris paribus. In short, whether self- 
sufficiency in foodgrains is an acceptable 
objective of short-term or long-term 
agricultural policy is itself an issue which 
must be assessed in the light of a general 
equilibrium analysis of the entire economic 
position, including aid flow sensitivity to 
alternative policies, instead of being re- 
garded as axiomatic."'1 
Raj Krishna's [841 indictment of the 
governmental failure to step up internal 
procurement, while imports under the 
P.L. 480 program continued, raises similar 
questions. It is indeed true that the facts 
on imports and local procurement of grains 
show a greater amount of procurement in 
the first Plan than in each of the subse- 
quent Plans (when P.L. 480 imports be- 
came available), despite the easier food 
situation during most of the first Plan. 
And it is also correct to maintain that such 
a policy violated the public pronounce- 
ments with respect to the achievement of 
self reliance in foodgrain availability. On 
the other hand, it does not follow that the 
policies actually followed were suboptimal 
if one assesses them in terms of economic 
efficiency rather than in relation to self- 
sufficiency as an objective. 
(2) We have already noted that the 
question of the effect of zonal arrange- 
ments on the food deficit and import 
levels has been raised, in this connection, 
by Raj. In fact, this issue leads us directly 
into the entire range of questions relating 
to the economic efficiency of zonal arrange- 
ments and their role in a national food- 
grains policy. 
The zonal arrangements in India sprang 
up largely thanks to the action of the so- 
called "surplus" States such as Andhra 
Pradesh, Panjab and Madras whose pri- 
mary motivation appears to have been to 
maintain artificially low prices (in a situa- 
tion of rising prices) within their boun- 
daries by curtailing the normal outflow of 
grain through private, interState trade. 
This phenomenon raises the natural, but 
unexplored question as to whether the 
rural interests in the "surplus' states, 
which are thus being denied the advan- 
tages of more favorable terms of trade, are 
really less influential politically than the 
urban consumer groups to whose interest 
the zonal policies appear to cater. Two 
possible explanations, however, may be 
worth exploring. (i) On the one hand, it is 
possible for the more influential, larger 
landlords to make greater profits under 
"I Dantwala [34] makes a similar point when he 
notes, with respect to the possible adverse effect of P. 
L. 480 wheat imports on wheat production, that: "The 
major component of P.L. 480 imports was wheat and it 
is reasonable to assume that these imports affected the 
prices of wheat or at best also of other substitutable 
cereals from the consumer point of view, but could not 
have had much impact on the prices of commercial 
crops. The expected consequence of this relative shift 
in prices in favour of commercial crops would be a shift 
in agricultural inputs for their production. Assuming 
that this is exactly what happened, would such a de- 
velopment be necessarily injurious to Indian agriculture 
or the Indian economy as a whole? It is, of course, true 
that higher foodgrains production is very vital to India's 
economy, but a stimulated growth of non-foodgrain 
crops is of no less importance for the overall national 
economy .... 
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zonal arrangements by getting access to 
scarce, State-distributed licenses to export 
their output of foodgrains to deficit States 
which have higher prices under these zonal 
arrangements than otherwise. Such a prac- 
tice also redounds to the benefit of the 
politicians who thus develop another area 
of patronage and possibly even direct 
profit to themselves. There is some evi- 
dence that this explanation might have 
relevance in Andhra Pradesh. (ii) An 
alternative explanation may be that the 
political situation is based in the States on 
a balance of urban and rural interests. 
Thus, while food prices are kept low by 
zonal restriction on the ouflow of grains, 
the not-so-poor farm groups are "com- 
pensated" by the provision of negligible 
tax rates on agricultural income."2 The 
danger in this kind of politico-economic 
pattern is that ultimately the whole op- 
eration would imply that the marginal tax 
effort, for investment and other purposes, 
would have to come to rely on the ex- 
tremely narrow base provided by non- 
agricultural, urban classes outside of the 
group sheltered by the Fair Price Shops. 
While, however, the zonal system has 
originated in the actions of the "surplus" 
States, it has found some distinguished 
supporters among the economists despite 
the severe criticism direct at it by several 
economists. The defence of the system is 
best summarized in the Foodgrains Policy 
Committee Report [177]. Arguing that 
the interState movement in foodgrains 
should be undertaken only through State 
operations, and that zonal restrictions on 
private movement should continue, the 
Committee have claimed the following 
advantages for such an arrangement: 
First, this is necessary for ensuring 
equitable distribution to different States; 
trade, if untrammelled, would tend to 
move the curpluses of one State to points 
of highest purchasing power in another 
and not to those of greatest need. Sec- 
ond, it would enable Government to 
keep prices at levels, which are reason- 
able for both consumer and producer; 
private trade, by catering for the well- 
to-do consumer, would be in a position 
to push up prices, if allowed to compete 
with Government. Third, if the trade is 
allowed to purchase within the State 
and sell outside it on its own account, it 
would not be possible to ensure maxi- 
mum procurement by Government and 
Government agencies. 
These arguments, however, are unten- 
able. While it is true that the market sys- 
tem will not in itself correct an undesirable 
income or consumption distribution, it is a 
nonsequitur to deduce that the optimal 
way of achieving a desired distribution is 
to eliminate the market system and sub- 
stitute governmental trade instead. The 
second argument is also a distributional 
one insofar as we can make any sense of it, 
and subject to the same criticism. 
The final argument, which constitutes 
really the central defense of the zonal ar- 
rangements, is incomplete, even if factu- 
ally correct,1"3 and must be dismissed if the 
zonal arrangements are looked upon from 
the viewpoint of economic efficiency. In 
order to appreciate this, it is necessary to 
examine the main features of the policy 
package advocated by the Foodgrains 
Policy Committee. 
They have recommended that procure- 
112 Similarly, the deficit States "compensate" their 
urban groups by distribution of Central supplies of im- 
ported foodgrains through Fair Price Shops at sub- 
sidized prices. 
113 The argument of the Committee that, thanks to 
the zonal arrangements, the governmental procurement 
of rice during the 1965-66 season has been higher than 
during the 1964b65 season, "in spite of a reduction of 17 
million tonnes in foodgrain production caused by 
drought," surely cannot be accepted at its face value. 
Indeed, the very fact that there was a drought and 
hence a great demand for fair priced cereals during 1965- 
66 might have prompted more procurement of rice (as 
distinct from wheat, where we may note that P.L. 480 
imports were undertaken instead); whether the pro- 
curement would (as also should) have been more or less 
if the zonal arrangements had not existed remains an 
open isstue. 
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ment of foodgrains must be undertaken, 
apart from buffer stock purchases, for dis- 
tribution at fair prices to certain classes of 
low income consumers in both rural and 
urban areas. Furthermore, they have 
argued that the procurement must be 
undertaken at prices below the market 
prices in order to prevent the government 
having to find the resources for financing 
the subsidy that would otherwise be en- 
tailed. Thus the Committee's recom- 
mendations effectively involve subsidizing 
the foodgrains consumption of certain 
low income groups and financing this sub- 
sidy by taxation of the farmers producing 
these cereals, this taxation being implicit 
in the fact that procurement would be at 
less-than-market prices. In this context, 
the restrictions on private interzonal trade 
are looked upon primarily as a means of 
making this procurement "easier," pre- 
sumably because the apparent element of 
taxation would be smaller, given the fair- 
price at which procured foodgrains are to 
be sold, if the open market price in the 
"surplus" States (where procurement will 
presumably be carried out) is kept lower 
by ruling out interzonal private trade. 
This view of the policy package, which 
seems to rationalize the zonal restrictions, 
is however open to serious objections. 
There are two particular aspects of this 
policy which are controversial: (i) the 
method of subsidising the low income 
groups; and (ii) the method of financing 
the subsidy. 
Concerning the former question, it is not 
clear that an outright financial subsidy to 
the specified low income groups, index- 
linked to the cereals price index, may not be 
a less expensive system than a distributive 
system based on Fair Price Shops, govern- 
mental trade and distribution.114 In assess- 
ing this question, we would have to con- 
sider (i) the relative efficiency of a public 
distribution system, from the viewpoint of 
waste in storage for example;"15 (ii) the 
administrative costs and feasibility of 
either system; and (iii) the possible, 
though not necessarily considerable, ad- 
vantage of having a State distributional 
system which can be readily exploited to 
handle sudden emergencies such as the 
Bihar Famine of 1967, when an enormous 
operation to shift foodgrains to this area 
had to be mounted. 
The question of the optimal method of 
financing the subsidy to the low income 
groups raises still more complex issues 
which have not received the attention they 
deserve. Before we discuss these alterna- 
tives, however, we may note the objections 
to the Foodgrains Policy Committee's 
assumption that, if one is to levy an im- 
plicit tax on the farmers to pay for the 
subsidy, zonal restrictions make this task 
"easier." Raj Krishna has argued, in a 
brilliant note of dissent to the Agricultural 
Prices Commission's 1965-66 Kharif Ce- 
reals Report's similar ideas, that this view 
focusses merely on the fact that procure- 
ment in the surplus States (by the Centre) 
would be cheaper but ignores the fact that 
more would have to be procured since, with 
interzonal private trade removed, "the 
responsibility of meeting the entire deficit 
of deficit States falls on the Central Gov- 
ernment." [176, 38]. Raj Krishna has in 
mind the possibility that politically the 
deficit States would have to be "compen- 
sated" for the eliminated, private inflow of 
foodgrains. But even if we rule out such a 
direct "compensation," the problem re- 
mains. For as open market prices in the 
deficit States rise to levels higher than 
what they would have been if zonal re- 
strictions were eliminated, demand for 
114 Identification of recipients eligible for the "dole" 
would be as difficult or easy as their identification for a 
ration card. 
115 Sundaram's [1681 careful analysis of the subopti- 
mality of the existing P.L. 480 landings at different 
Indian ports, given the ultimate destination points, is 
also of relevance in assessing this issue. 
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foodgrains would be diverted to the Fair 
Price Shops, thus raising the offtake from 
these shops and hence also the need for 
procurement. This would happen insofar 
as those entitled to access to these shops 
are not already utilizing it fully in the no- 
zonal-restrictions situation: as is indeed 
likely to be the case.116 Furthermore, even 
if this were not the case, the rise in the 
open market price level could certainly 
lead to politically effective demands to let 
more income groups have access to the 
Fair Price Shop system facilities. How- 
ever, against this, we must balance the 
fact that, in the surplus States, demand 
would be diverted away from the Fair 
Price Shop system; hence the overall need 
for procurement, to service the Fair Price 
Shop system, may reduce rather than in- 
crease-a possibility which is ignored by 
assuming unrealistically that the Fair 
Price Shops system applies only to the 
deficit States. The question as to whether 
procurement will be "easier" under the 
zonal restrictions system is thus a complex 
one and cannot be answered unless the 
analysis takes into account the strength of 
the low income groups and demand diver- 
sion to, and away from, Fair Price Shops 
as a result of the zonal restrictions in both 
surplus and deficit States: a priori, it is 
impossible to rule out the possibility that 
the quantities to be procured will increase 
under the zonal system. 
But, even leaving this question aside, 
the zonal arrangements conceived as an in- 
strument for securing procurement involv- 
ing a hidden tax element represent a 
method of levying taxation that is ethi- 
cally inequitable, economically inefficient 
and politically injurious to national in- 
tegration. Raj Krishna [176] has correctly 
pointed out that there are "surplus" 
farmers and not "surplus" States. A policy 
which aims at concentrating tax-element- 
inclusive procurement in surplus States, 
while ignoring the fact that prosperous or 
surplus farmers exist even in deficit States, 
is an inequitable one. Moreover, the tax- 
element-inclusive procurement of food- 
grains which are demanded by the low in- 
come groups is economically inefficient 
insofar as it discriminatorily taxes farmers 
who happen to be producers of these 
specific commodities and thereby pulls 
away resources, ceteris paribus, from the 
production of these commodities. Even if 
tax-element-inclusive procurement is con- 
sidered to be the only feasible method of 
taxation,"7 to finance the subsidies for the 
low-income groups, there is no reason why 
it should be confined to the commodities 
which happen to be demanded by the low 
income groups."8 
Finally, the zonal system, on which such 
a procurement system is grafted, must in- 
evitably lead to political disintegration. 
The cynical reluctance of the surplus 
States to let their grain be procured for 
transfer to Bihar during the 1967 famine 
is only an extreme example of the inward 
looking approach of these States to a 
national food policy. A condoning of the 
llB There seems to be evidence that only the extremely 
low income groups generally utilize the Fair Price 
Shops even though more groups have the right to do so. 
117 This is often asserted in the Indian policy debates. 
However, it is by no means clear that where procure- 
ment has succeeded, the price paid has always included 
a tax element or, when such tax element is present, an 
alternative form of agricultural taxation would not have 
been feasible (and possibly preferable on efficiency 
grounds). This is an important, neglected area of em- 
pirical research. We may also mention in this context, 
while we are essentially discussing alternative forms of 
agricultural taxation, that Dharm Narain [119J, Sen 
[1541 and Bhagwati [41 have discussed the Preobrazhen- 
sky-type problem of how the terms of trade between 
agriculture and industry could be adjusted in order to 
extract a "real" surplus from agriculture to "finance" 
capital formation in industry. 
118 We may also note the further point, made by 
Khusro [751, that, even if the zones were not accom- 
panied by tax-element-inclusive procurement, they 
would have adverse allocational effects by discouraging 
the production of foodgrains in the surplus States 
(which presumably have comparative advantage in 
such production) and encouraging it in the deficit 
States. 
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zonal system would only accentuate these 
fissiparous tendencies. In fact, as Raj 
Krishna had predicted, the zoning system 
has spread to within States, with districts 
turning into defacto zones in States such as 
Madras and Kerala. The argument of the 
Food Policy Committee [1771 in this con- 
nection is interesting: 
Another criticism of the restrictions 
on inter-State movement of foodgrains 
is that they undermine the unity of the 
Nation. We do not consider this to be a 
valid criticism. The system does not 
envisage a ban on the movement of the 
surplus from the surplus States to the 
deficit States. What the system implies 
is that the inter-State transfers will be 
effected on a regulated basis by a public 
agency which is amenable to social con- 
trol and discipline. In a situation of 
overall shortage, if inter-State move- 
ment of foodgrains is allowed to be un- 
dertaken in an unregulated and uncon- 
trolled manner, it would indeed create 
scarcity conditions in the relatively 
poorer regions of the country. Such a 
development can have a far more 
damanging influence on the unity of the 
Nation. 
This argument, however, has little practi- 
cal relevance. In practice, for the very rea- 
sons that the surplus States have pushed 
for zonal restrictions, they have frustrated 
the Central Government's attempts, via 
the Food Corporation of India, to procure 
foodgrains for shipment to deficit States 
and have generally forced the Central 
Government to resort instead to P.L. 480 
imports for such supplies (thus lending 
substance to Raj's argument that the 
zones have led to increased imports of 
foodgrains). To argue therefore for a 
zonal policy, knowing fully well that the 
chief supposed advantage from it contra- 
dicts the very purpose for which it is 
politically designed and adopted, is some- 
what naive and has inevitably, even if un- 
wittingly, strengthened the interests op- 
posed to a truly national food policy.1"9 
In fact, it is significant that the move to 
abolish, or at least enlarge, food zones to 
include both deficit and surplus States in 
single zones, has come from many surplus 
States themselves during the bumper crop 
of 1967-68. With prices sagging in these 
States, there has been a reversal of their 
attitudes: the producer pressure groups 
appear to have become more important 
and have sought freer access to the deficit 
State markets. At the same time, procure- 
ment has been permitted only at excep- 
tionally favorable prices, leading to an 
exasperated critique of politicians by the 
leading zone supporting economist, 
Dantwala [36]. Clearly, the political as- 
sumptions that the zonal system would 
permit procurement at tax-element-inclu- 
sive prices, in the interest of a national food 
policy, have been shown up to be, at best, 
tenuous. However, instead of taking this 
opportunity to eliminate the zonal re- 
strictions altogether, the Central Govern- 
ment is now in the role of zone supporter, 
opposing several surplus States' desire to 
let the zones widen or perish. 
Existence of Surplus Labor or Disguised 
Unemployment 
Prior to concluding our survey of the 
Indian literature on agricultural policy, we 
must examine the important issue as to 
whether there is surplus labor (or disguised 
unemployment) in the Indian economy. 
The assumption that this is indeed the case 
has formed the basis, as we have already 
seen, for much analytical thinking in India. 
119 In this connection, however, we may note (1) that 
the Central Government's ability to force the surplus 
States to fall into line and eliminate zonal restrictions 
might have been seriously inhibited by the fluid political 
situation within the Congress Party and the critical role 
played in Prime Ministerial successions, by the Chief 
Ministers of these States; and (2) the fact that, even if 
these zonal restrictions were abolished, we could not 
have ruled out altogether the imposition of numerous 
clandestine restrictions, on export of foodgrains, by the 
recalcitrant, surplus States. 
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Although the existence of surplus labor 
is regarded as almost self-evident by many 
Indian economists, and was discussed in 
early writings of economists such as 
Bhabatosha Datta, the unorthodox view of 
Schultz [151] who has used Indian data to 
argue that the phenomenon does not exist, 
has prompted renewed interest in the sub- 
ject. In reviewing this literature, we must 
begin by differentiating among the numer- 
ous alternative definitions of, and hence 
presumed evidence in support of, the 
presence of surplus labor which are to be 
found in the literature in this area. 
There are many alternative definitions, 
sometimes explicit but often implicit, of 
"disguised unemployment" in the liter- 
ature, which do not necessarily coincide in 
scope even within the context defined by 
the Indian economic and institutional 
structure. (1) We have the definition due 
to Arthur Lewis which defines disguised 
unemployment as a situation under which 
it is possible to get a supply of labor from 
agriculture to the industrial sector at a 
constant real wage. (2) We also have the 
definition of disguised unemployment as a 
situation under which the social marginal 
productivity of labor in a sector such as 
agriculture is less than the wage rate at 
which labor can be hired: the wage rate is 
inflexible downwards because of the bio- 
logical subsistence requirements. (3) Dis- 
guised unemployment has also been de- 
fined as a situation where the private mar- 
ginal productivity of labor is zero in agri- 
culture, so that the withdrawal of labor 
from agriculture would result in a fall in 
agricultural output. Even here, it is neces- 
sary to make a distinction between a 
ceteris paribus withdrawal and a mutatis 
mutandis withdrawal, as these two alterna- 
tive varieties of withdrawal would lead to 
different effects on agricultural output in 
general. (4) Finally, disguised unemploy- 
ment may be defined simply as a situation 
where, given the social objective of maxi- 
mizing the value of current income, the 
combination of techniques and resources is 
such that the shadow wage, and hence the 
social marginal productivity (SMP), of 
labor is zero. Our analysis will be con- 
cerned with this specific definition: we will 
review the Indian literature on surplus 
on the assumption that the objective of 
the analysts is to discuss and test the pro- 
position that, in the Indian context, the 
SMP of labor is zero. 
Note first that zero social marginal pro- 
duct (SMP) will not necessarily involve 
zero private marginal product (PMP). If 
we assume a single sector (e.g. agriculture), 
a peasant family system of farming and a 
system of allocation of labor time which 
involves maximization of family-group in- 
come (even if the division of product may 
be on different principles), zero social 
marginal product will naturally lead to 
zero private marginal product. On the 
other hand, if we were to assume a capi- 
talist system of farming, where landless 
labor is hired for a wage which institution- 
ally exceeds the zero shadow wage, we 
would observe a positive marginal product 
(which would equal the market wage). 
Similarly, zero SMP will not necessarily 
imply that, if the labour force were re- 
duced in a sector, that sector's output 
would fall. Thus in a model where the real 
wage of agricultural labor is institutionally 
fixed in terms of a constant utility level de- 
rived from consuming both agricultural 
and manufactured goods, factors are im- 
mobile between sectors, there is capitalist 
farming in agriculture, and the SMP of 
agricultural labor is zero (with income dis- 
tribution keeping the unemployed alive), 
a reduction (say, by influenza) in the agri- 
cultural labor force would have no primary 
impact on agricultural output. On the 
other hand, it would imply that the ex- 
penditure otherwise made by the deceased 
labor force would now be made by others. 
If, as a result of this implied income redis- 
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tribution, the demand for, and hence the 
relative price of, manufactures falls, we 
would then have a reduction in the bind- 
ing nature of the institutional wage con- 
straint and hence greater output of 
agriculture in the new equilibrium. Con- 
versely, it is possible to show that, even 
when there is positive SMP in agriculture, 
the effect of reduction in the labor force 
may well be to maintain agricultural out- 
put constant. 
Furthermore, zero SMP does not imply 
that the supply of labor from the sector 
where this is so will necessarily be per- 
fectly elastic at some real wage. Thus, for 
example, if zero SMP (and zero PMP) ob- 
tains in a peasant family agriculture, with 
individual rather than group income maxi- 
mization such that each individual will 
equate his average product on the farm 
with his marginal product in manufactures 
(a la Arthur Lewis), then successive sup- 
plies of labour to manufactures will raise 
the average product on the farm, consis- 
tent with zero PMP and SMP in agricul- 
ture continuing, and thus the marginal 
cost of labor supply from agriculture will 
continually rise (instead of being con- 
stant). 
Finally, we may note that the common 
assumption that surplus labor must be in 
the agricultural sector, leading to predic- 
tions such as the elastic supply of labor to 
the nonagricultural sector and the con- 
stancy of agricultural output as labor 
moves out of agriculture, is itself restric- 
tive. In essence, we can think of labor 
carrying a zero shadow wage for the 
economy in toto. If we look at the empiri- 
cal situations, it is not unrealistic to 
postulate an economy with a common, 
institutionally determined wage (which 
exceeds the zero shadow wage) at which 
employment is undertaken in capitalist 
agriculture and capitalist manufactures. 
In practice, it is also possible to find in fact 
the coexistence of "family" and "capi- 
talist" modes of production in both agri- 
cultural and urban areas: so that, in this 
instance as well, zero SMP may obtain 
with respect to all sectors. 
The institutional features of an econ- 
omy thus have a critical relevance to the 
manner in which zero SMP "accommo- 
dates" itself in the system. Hence, the 
"tests" and "measures" of surplus labor, 
which have been devised in the Indian and 
other contexts, have to be treated with 
great care. 
(1) Thus, for example, it has been ar- 
gued that there cannot be surplus labor in 
India because labor is hired at a positive 
wage in all farms, whether small or large. 
This argument presumes implicitly that 
the surplus labor is to be found on the 
peasant family farms and ignores the 
possibility that capitalist hiring of landless 
labor at an institutionally determined 
wage on all farms is compatible with zero 
SMP. 
(2) Schultz's [151] famous test, on the 
other hand, has proceeded along a differ- 
ent route. He takes the influenza epidemic 
in India during 1818-19, arguing that the 
sudden and significant reduction in the 
labor force that it entailed provides a 
laboratory type experiment to discover 
surplus labor in India. On finding that 
agricultural acreage (and output) declined 
in consequence, in the year 1919-20, 
Schultz concludes that labor was not in 
surplus in agriculture. 
Schultz, however, has another supple- 
mentary argument at this stage. He hy- 
pothesizes an agricultural production func- 
tion of the following type: 
(34) Q -4 (L)a 
where 
Q= output 
L = labor force 
A =technological constant 
a= "labor coefficient" 
Arguing that certain unpublished sample 
studies indicate the value of the "labor 
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coefficient" to be 0.4, Schultz further fits a 
regression equation on the data for the re- 
duction in acreage (taken as proxy for out- 
put) and in labor force during 1919-20 in 
ten different States to find that the indi- 
cated labor coefficient is 0.349, and the 
hypothesis of 0.4 lies well within the con- 
fidence interval based on twice the esti- 
mated standard error of this estimate. 
Schultz further seems to derive greater 
confidence in this coincidence (between the 
values of the labor coefficients in his re- 
gression and in the unpublished sample 
studies) because a study of the share of 
agricultural income going to labor in 
Panjab during 1947-48 yields the figure 
0.34 which happens to be consistent with 
the competitive implications of the hy- 
pothesised production function for agri- 
culture. How does this argument streng- 
then the first argument which depends ex- 
clusively on showing that agricultural 
acreage (output) declines with the decline 
in the labor force? Clearly, if Schultz can 
produce evidence that the data for the ten 
States are consistent with the hypothe- 
sized production function with coefficient 
a >0, then he can argue that surplus labor 
cannot exist at all since labor would always 
have a positive (social) marginal product 
in agriculture. Thus, the second arguiment 
is aimed at a stronger hypothesis (namely, 
that surplus labor cannot exist at all in 
India, with the given technology) than the 
first argument (which would only show 
that, for the range of variation in the labor 
force which the influenza epidemic en- 
tailed, there was a decline in output and 
hence there was presumably no surplus 
labor). 
At the empirical level, Schultz's argu- 
ment is tenuous on at least two grounds. 
(i) The coincidence of results at different 
points of time (such as 1919-20 and 1947- 
48) and for different parts of India (which 
are not exactly integrated in terms of their 
land or labor markets) does not necessarily 
reveal a regularity. (ii) Furthermore, Sen's 
[1591 recalculation of the Schultz regres- 
sion, adjusting for three omitted States 
and for errors in estimation of the labor 
force, yields a labor coefficient which does 
not coincide with the coefficient in the un- 
published sample studies and the estimate 
of labor share in agricultural income. On 
the other hand, if Schultz is willing to 
concede the irrelevance, to his 1919-20 
test, of the evidence produced for sample 
villages and different periods, it would be 
possible for him to contend that his evi- 
dence is consistent, as it stands, with the 
hypothesis of an agricultural production 
function of the type: Q=A * (L) > (a > 0), so 
that the Indian experience during the in- 
fluenza epidemic (even when corrected for 
statistical errors and omissions) is consis- 
tent with there being no surplus labour 
(for any labor-level altogether). In this 
connection, it is relevant to note Harwitz's 
result, cited in Schultz [152], that if these 
Indian data are examined for the null 
hypothesis of zero marginal product of 
labor, the null hypothesis is rejected be- 
cause "the observed data have one or two 
chances in a hundred of having come from 
an uncorrelated populatioln, under the 
rather conservative test of the null hy- 
pothesis"; and Schultz's conclusion is 
valid (only) up to a 5% level of signifi- 
cance on this test. 
Furthermore, there are serious objec- 
tions to Schultz's use of the influenza epi- 
demic as an experiment crucis. (1) The in- 
fluenza epidemic naturally raises doubts 
(considered to be unimportant by Schultz 
[152] in light of "medical judgments" ob- 
tained, but contested by Reports written 
at the time) about the debilitating effects 
on those who survived. This doubt is par- 
ticularly enforced when we recognize that 
the epidemic continued, in some degree, 
into 1919-20 itself. (2) It is also a matter of 
judgment, left unsettled by Schultz, whe- 
ther the lapse of just a year, with some 
continuation of epidemic conditions, was 
adequate to obtain an adequate test of 
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whether the "disorderly conditions" still 
continued and therefore a later year might 
not have provided a better guide to the 
required comparison. 
Quite aside from these two rather ob- 
vious objections (both anticipated by 
Schultz), which render the conclusions 
drawn from the experiment fairly tenuous, 
there are two major critiques which can be 
advanced against Schultz's conclusions. 
(3) Shakuntala Mehra [1121 has made the 
significant statistical finding that, if we 
break down the post-epidemic agricultural 
year into the two major Indian harvesting 
seasons, rabi and kharif, then there is 
ample evidence that the immediate har- 
vest (kharif) after the epidemic registered 
no significant decline in the output (acre- 
age) level, whereas the decline was con- 
centrated in the later, rabi harvest (which, 
in any case, fluctuates widely owing to 
seasonal factors). It would appear there- 
fore that Schultz's inference that Indian 
agricultural output declined with the in- 
fluenza epidemic is, at best, dubious. 
In any event, Schultz's failure to take the 
two seasons into account, and the absence 
of systematic quantitative analysis of the 
two harvests, make it impossible to attach 
any significance to Schultz's conclusion 
that the Indian agricultural output de- 
clined with the epidemic. (4) There is also 
an analytical difficulty with the argument 
that decline in the agricultural output with 
the decline in the labor force implies that 
surplus labor is zero: the argument is just a 
nonsequitur, as a general proposition (as 
we have already seen). Thus consider the 
case where there is peasant family farm- 
ing, co-existing with capitalist farming. 
Let the total labor supply be such that the 
shadow wage of labor is zero: so that we 
have "surplus" labor in its fundamental 
sense. Let further the peasant family work 
under the rule that the average product of 
an individual member is equated with the 
marginal product on the capitalist farms: 
and let the PMP on the peasant family 
farms be zero. If then the labor force de- 
clines on the peasant family farms, due to 
influenza, but the shadow wage of labor 
still continues to be zero, we would have a 
higher average product on the family 
farms, therefore a higher real wage at 
which labor will be employed on the 
capitalist farms, therefore a reduction in 
the agricultural output on the capitalist 
farms, and hence a reduction in the total 
agricultural output. Thus, we have again 
shown the compatibility of a zero shadow 
wage for labor and decline in the agricul- 
tural output as the population (labor 
force) declines.120 Nothing can be con- 
cluded, therefore, about the existence of 
"surplus" labor without a careful investi- 
gation of the institutional structure of the 
sector within which surplus labor is as- 
sumed to inhere. 
(3) There have also been direct measures 
of surplus labor in India, following the 
classic methods of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan 
120 Admittedly, this result depends on the twin as- 
sumptions (1) of the division of the given supplies of 
land (and other factors) into two grouips: peas tnt family 
farms and capitalist farms, and (2) that the individual, 
rather than the group, on the family farm maximizes 
income. If we were to relax the second assumption, for 
example, and assume that the group maximizes income, 
then the market would equalize the marginal products 
on both sets of farms and, with the supplementarv as- 
sumption that each peasant family has sufficient income 
for subsistence from own-farming, the wage could fall 
to zero with zero SMP. In such a case, the Schultz test 
would be perfectly adequate, of course: zero SMP would 
imply that a decline in the labor force would not affect 
agricultural outpuit. 
We might touch incidentally upon one particular 
critique of Schultz's test [1591 on the ground that the 
effect of influenza in causing a decline in the labor force 
is indiscriminate whereas, with a selective withdrawal of 
the labor force (from farms where there is surplus labor 
presumably), there might have been no effect on agri- 
cultural output. This argument does not seem to be 
valid. The assumption here is that the withdrawval of 
labor (in some fashion) with zero impact on agricultural 
output is necessary or suficient evidence that there is 
zero SMP to labor in the economy. But, in the particu- 
lar example that we have used in the text, labour with- 
drawal cannot but help reduce output even though there 
is zero shadow wage for labor: and it will make no dif- 
ference to this qualitative nroposition whether the re- 
duction in the population (labor) occurs in the capitalist 
or the peasant families. Conversely, the fact that labor 
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who ranks (with Arthur Lewis and Ragnar 
Nurkse) as the early proponent of the no- 
tion of surplus labor. The procedure in- 
volved is to take detailed surveys of agri- 
cultural output and occupations at the 
village level, with a view to finding out 
whether, with unchanged agricultural 
techniques, and taking full account of the 
seasonal peaks in demand for labor during 
harvesting seasons, there exists an excess 
of labor availability over labor require- 
ments. 
This kind of exercise, in essentially the 
fashion described here, has been deployed 
in the Indian context by Bhattacharjee 
[15] for the State of Bihar, during 1957-58 
in the course of comprehensive farm man- 
agement investigations. His estimate of 
"surplus" labor, fully allowing for the 
seasonal demand for labor at peak level, 
runs up to 8.6 per cent of the labor force 
for Nortlh Bihar and 19.8 percent for South 
Bihar, on application of the Rodan method 
to male labor alone. 
The advantage of this method over the 
others (insofar as it takes into consider- 
ation all opportunities for raising output) 
is that it goes directly to the relevant ques- 
tion: namely, whether there is too much 
labor in relation to existing availability of 
techniques (which is what zero SMP or 
shadow wage of labor means). The real 
difficulty with the method, on the other 
hand, is in identifying labor requirements 
and (in particular) labor availability. The 
determination of labor availability raises 
the tricky question of how many hours of 
work should be fed into the exercise: this 
is not an easily identifiable technological 
datum. And the problem could become 
empirically intractable if we introduced 
the notion of elastic supply of labor ser- 
vices with respect to rewards.12' In prac- 
tice, the estimates have involved adjusting 
for holidays, festivals, environmental con- 
straints (e.g. "in the month of May the 
extreme heat makes it physically impos- 
sible for any worker to work more than six 
hours per day in the field" [15]), and then 
estimating an approximate number of 
hours which may be expected to be "nor- 
mal" as far as work is concerned. Shakun- 
tala Mehra [112] has adopted essentially 
the same approach, in making her esti- 
mates of surplus labor in India (from data 
on labor utilization for 1956-57 and on 
labor availability for 1961): the only differ- 
ence consists in explicitly taking her 
"normal" hours from the "large, capital- 
ist" farms where such normalcy is assumed 
to obtain (on the ground that surplus 
labor, and resulting work-sharing, would 
arise only on the small farms without hired 
labor). Her estimates also point to the 
existence of significant amounts of surplus 
labor in different States (with the excep- 
tions of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh). We might note, however, that 
her actual method is likely to understate 
the amount of surplus labor, in relation to 
Bhattacharjee's [15] application of the 
can be reduced on some farms without affecting their 
output may merely reflect the fact that they are totally 
isolated from the rest of the economy with own factors 
of production which are not mobile, and the shadow 
wage of labor for the sector as a whole may be positive 
(implying "absence of surplus labor"). 
We may finally note, in reference to the Schultz test, 
that on examination of the labor force and agricultural 
output data for the period of the Second World War, for 
districts in Panjab where there was a significant mili- 
tary draft resulting in declincs in the labor force, there 
appears to have been (according to unpublished work 
of Manmohan Singh) no impact on the agricultural pro- 
duction in these districts. Clearly, a careful study of 
this experience (adjusting systematically for trend 
growtth of output resulting from mechanization and 
impact of possible improvements in the agricultural 
terms of trade during the War) would be more fruitful 
than of the influenza episode with its possible complica- 
tions from factors such as the impact of the epidemic on 
efficiency. 
"12 In this context, we may note that Rosenstein- 
Rodan and his followers have always noted explicitly 
that, if those "left behind" did not in fact work the 
number of hours postulated, in view of "preference for 
leisure" or on "status" grounds, the actual removal of 
the estimated surplus labor would reduce output. The 
recent explorations of the preference-for-leisure hy- 
pothesis [158] were thus clearly foreseen by these 
economists. 
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Rosenstein-Rodan method at village level, 
because she estimates the amount of sur- 
plus labor on the farms alone: insofar as 
the landless labor also work less than the 
postulated "normal" hours, their "sur- 
plus" labor would be missed out. 
Having thus reviewed the literature re- 
lating to the major issues in Indian agri- 
cultural policy, we now proceed to the 
final section of our Survey, addressing our- 
selves to the foreign trade sector. 
III. Foreign Trade 
The Indian policy literature with re- 
spect to the foreign sector has been con- 
cerned primarily with issues raised by 
foreign aid, private foreign investment, 
and trade and exchange rate policies. 
(A) Foreign Aid 
We have already discussed, in Part I, 
the major issues raised in the Indian liter- 
ature, relating to the implications of for- 
eign aid for planning investment alloca- 
tions. The use of "aid to end aid" by a 
specified time horizon has been the frame- 
work within which some important plan- 
ning exercises have been cast. The political 
counterpart to such economic analysis has 
been the appealing notion of ultimate 
"self reliance"; its conflict with the view 
that foreign aid must continue as long as 
the income gap between the affluent and 
the underdeveloped countries is not drasti- 
cally reduced has not been noticed. At the 
same time, economists such as Sengupta 
[160] have plausibly argued that there is 
little evidence that the Indian planners 
have taken seriously their continually re- 
ceding terminal dates for the net inflow of 
aid to cease. Both the savings and the 
trade implications of such a program have 
been shown by Sengupta to be unrealistic. 
The Indian literature has also been con- 
cerned with the question of aid tying, by 
project, by commodity and by source. The 
prevalence of excess industrial capacity 
since the Second Plan has been attributed 
by many economists, including Reddaway 
[145], to the fact that the foreign aid to 
India was excessively tied to projects and 
thus led to creation of more capacity even 
when the existing capacity was not fully 
utilized.'22 On the other hand, since the 
devaluation of June 1966, several Indian 
economists have felt that there has been 
too much nonproject, and too little pro- 
ject, aid: a viewpoint which emphasizes 
that the efficiency of the aid flow may be 
jeopardized as soon as the aid is tied, 
whether to projects or to "maintenance" 
imports. 
The source tying of aid has also been 
widely considered wasteful, although an- 
alytical work on this issue is only recent. 
While there are as yet no quantitative esti- 
mates for India, of the cost of source tying 
when switching possibilities have been ex- 
ploited, Lal [89] has recently shown, using 
data supplied by the Imperial Chemical 
Industries, that these costs may be quite 
significant in the chemicals sector. More- 
over, at an analytical level, Bhagwati [13] 
has argued that (i) measuring the costs of 
aid tying by source via estimation of the 
excess cost of the actual bundle purchased 
may under-or over-estimate the "true" 
cost in the Hicksian sense of compensating 
variation; and (ii) a sharp distinction 
needs to be drawn between the observed 
costs and the minimum costs that would 
have been incurred if the recipient country 
were to exploit fully its switching possi- 
bilities (as, in practice, it rarely does), 
Thus, for example, with reference to the 
latter point, Bhagwati has argued that 
India's import licensing system, which 
specifies items on licenses by source and 
then makes these licenses totally nontrans- 
ferable in all respects, results in double ty- 
ing (by source and specification) even 
122 On the other hand, other economists such as Bhag- 
wati and Padma Desai [141 have pointed to other, do- 
mestic policy induced factors which may have also ac- 
counted for such excess capacity. We discuss these 
factors later, when we survey the trade policy literature. 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.67 on Fri, 16 Nov 2012 15:35:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BHAGWATI AND CtAKRAVARTY: INDIAN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 61 
when the donor country does not itself in- 
sist on commodity specification; and that 
such double tying increases the possible 
monopolistic charging of prices on aid 
financed goods beyond what mere source 
tying might have brought about.'23 Fur- 
thermore, both Bhagwati and Honavar 
[69], who draws upon Indian experience, 
have highlighted important respects in 
which the costs of aid tying by source may 
be understated by such excess cost esti- 
mates: distortions of priorities owing to 
nonavailability of priority items from a 
tied source when all switching possibilities 
are exhausted; recurrent excess costs on 
maintenance, spares and inputs; social 
waste inherent in techniques unsuitable to 
local conditions, and other similar fac- 
tors.124 
The tying of aid by commodity, essen- 
tially P.L. 480 imports, has also attracted 
considerable controversy. We have already 
discussed the literature which is concerned 
with the impact of P.L. 480 wheat imports 
upon distribution, as also production. We 
may however observe at this stage (i) that 
while P.L. 480 imports certainly reduced 
wheat prices in particular, and foodgrain 
prices in general, below what they would 
otherwise have been, ceteris paribus, and 
(ii) that wheat production, being generally 
responsive to price change, must have been 
therefore below what it would otherwise 
have been, ceteris paribus, it would be a 
nonsequitur to argue that therefore im- 
ports of wheat under the P.L. 480 program 
were "undesirable." This question cannot 
be assessed unless a framework has been 
devised to examine the optimal prices and 
quantities of agricultural and foodgrains 
outputs, in the light of the international 
and domestic possibilities (including aid 
availability). In any case, the indictment 
levelled at P.L. 480 imports by many 
Indian economists appears to have been, 
not that aid was tied to these commodities 
beyond what Indians wanted (a possibility 
that has not been fully investigated in the 
literature'25), but that the Indian govern- 
ment itself was keen to get the P.L. 480 aid 
and that the availability of such aid was 
determental to the economic interest of the 
country.126 Aside from the depressing effect 
on the resource allocation to agriculture, 
which we have already touched upon, 
economists critical of the P.L. 480 pro- 
gram have alleged that the sheer avail- 
ability of such aid has prevented the 
government from pushing ahead on the 
agricultural front organizationally. Insofar 
as it can be shown that mere drive and 
organizational energy could have increased 
agricultural productivity, and that this 
opportunity-costless gain to the economy 
I" Bhagwati has shown how both priorities in respect 
of what commodity imports should be allowed and 
satisfaction of source constraints could be achieved, 
without the ill effects of double tying, merely by making 
the licenses swappable for imports of the specified items 
from different sources: $100 worth of U.K. lathes, for 
example, beinig turned into $100 worth of French lathes, 
and $100 worth of the French diesel engines into $100 
worth of IU.K. diesel engines. 
124 Honavar in particular has noted how, in conse- 
quence of source tYing by most donors, many Indian 
factories look like "iinternational exhibitions" of ma- 
chinery from different parts of the world. He emphasizes 
the fact that such a building up of plants will frequently 
add to maintenance and inventory costs by eliminating 
possible economies of scale which follow from plants 
put together more homogeneously. 
125 The fact that the Indian government was often 
keen to sign the P.L. 480 agreements does not rule out 
the possibility that one, and perhaps a principal, moti- 
vation (in some years at any rate) might have been 
a recognition of the possibility that it was easier to get 
PL. 480 aid rather than other forms of aid. 
128 Political objections to reliance on P.L. 480 aid 
have also been numerous. It is, for example, widely felt 
that the country must feed itself from domestic pro- 
duction. "Food and freedom" is the title of a reputable 
economist's work on the problem; and it has been 
argued, again by an acade-mic economist, that genuine 
independence is impossible if one eats foreign foodgrains! 
A more respectable political olbjection has been raised 
in relation to the use of counterpart rupee funds: it 
is felt that the availability of such ftunds, and the desire 
not to see them accumulate too rapidly, makes it possi- 
ble for the donor country to incuir expenditure within 
India which would be ruled out for other, ideologically- 
oriented donor countries. This is believed by some 
critics to be the case, for exanmple, with respect to ex- 
penditure on Indian education out of P.L. 480 rupee 
proceeds. 
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was lost, thanks to the P.L. 480 availabil- 
ity, this would be a valid criticism indeed 
of that aid program-or of any aid pro- 
gram which permitted, either directly or 
through switching, foodgrains to be im- 
ported readily. However, such a case is 
empirically difficult to establish and has 
not been persuasively made so far despite 
its plausibility for many economists in the 
country."27 
(B) Private Foreign Investment 
Although private foreign investment in 
India, whether gross or net of the outflow 
of (mainly) the pre-Independence British 
investments, has been relatively unimpor- 
tant in relation to the official capital trans- 
fers, it has attracted considerable atten- 
tion from the economists. There are basic- 
ally two types of questions that have been 
asked: (1) is private equity investment 
superior to official loan transfers; and (2) 
what restrictions must be placed on the 
inflow of private capital, from the view- 
point of social welfare? 
(1) The first question is somewhat aca- 
demic in view of the fact that private in- 
vestment and official transfers have hardly 
ever been substitutes in Indian planning: 
official tranisfers have nearly always been 
accepted to the full amount offered and 
private foreign investment has always 
fallen short of levels projected in the 
official documents. Any choice between 
them is therefore unreal. Nonetheless, Raj 
[135] has raised this question at an aca- 
demic level in the Indian context, 
prompted by the attempt of the Finance 
Ministry and private industrial interests 
to liberalize the rules on private foreign in- 
vestment on strength of the argument, 
among others, that private equity invest- 
ment is less expensive than official loan 
capital. The rather strange proposition 
which Raj has criticized involves asserting 
that "since in the case of loan capital ... 
both the principal and interest have to be 
paid over a defined period it is more 
economic, from the point of view of saving 
foreign exchange, to depend on foreign 
equity capital from private sources since 
only remittances of profits have to be met 
in foreign exchange and these too will be- 
come large only after the enterprises con- 
cerned have matured and begun to yield 
large profits." [135, pp. 21-221. Raj has 
countered this view by examining the 
actual rates of return on equity capital 
which are available for India and else- 
where, against the average terms of official 
aid. In any case, it does not seem sensible 
to argue that aid terms which conceal 
varying amounts of real transfers of re- 
sources should work out in general to be 
less attractive than commercial terms (or 
equity capital) if one evaluates the alter- 
natives in terms of an objective function 
other than the unacceptable one of reduc- 
ing the short-run outflows of interest and 
amortisation. 
(2) The question of the restrictions on 
private foreign investment has raised at 
least two issues of wider interest. 
(a) Should there be any restrictions on 
the areas which private investment could 
enter? While such restrictions have often 
been urged on political grounds, several 
economists have also sought them for 
economic reasons. The notion that private 
foreign investment should be confined to 
only the "priority" areas has been wide- 
spread in policy discussions. However, this 
view must be qualified in three ways. (i) 
Insofar as the investment consists in buy- 
ing up existing capital stock, even in non- 
priority areas, the inflow of foreign ex- 
change can always be utilized for "pri- 
ority" uses. (ii) If the investment involves 
fresh creation of capacity in "low-priority" 
sectors, again it must be remembered that 
if the overall Plan allows for the creation 
127 A notable sceptic of this arb,ument, and the general 
thesis against the advisability of P.L. 480 imports, is 
Dantwala [34]. On the other hand, a different, though 
not overly critical view, is presented by Streeten and 
Hill [1661. 
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of such capacity anyway, it does not 
matter whether foreign or domestic in- 
vestment goes into it. (iii) Xhere, how- 
ever, the foreign investment is being 
offered for areas which are "nonpriority" 
and hence ruled out from domestic produc- 
tion and availability, there is a real 
dilemma which cannot be resolved unless 
again the economist is prepared to esti- 
mate the cost (if any) of foregoing the act 
of foreign investment-assuming that the 
alternative is the loss of this capital in- 
flow-and ask the planner or the politician 
whether the presumed noneconomic ad- 
vantages from ruling out such commodi- 
ties from domestic production or avail- 
ability outweigh these economic costs.'28 
On the other hand, some important fac- 
tors in the Indian context have made 
governmental restrictions on the entry of 
foreign capital into specific areas neces- 
sary. (i) Since, as we shall presently see, 
the Indian trade regime has worked on the 
principle of automatic grant of protection 
to domestic industries, combined with re- 
strictions on domestic entry operated 
through industrial licensing, monopoly 
rents accrue to investments in several 
activities. Hence, there exists a second best 
case for regulating entry into areas where 
the monopoly rents are likely to make the 
returns to foreign capital exceed its social 
marginal product.'29 (ii) Furthermore, in a 
system reliant on foreign aid for mainte- 
nance imports, significant linkages can 
exist between the level of aid inflow and 
the level of inflow of private capital.130 
Foreign investors often become powerful 
pressure groups for increasing aid for 
maintenance imports to keep their capaci- 
ties better utilized and hence their invest- 
ments more profitable. In Indian experi- 
ence, aid loans have thus been secured 
from donor countries, with commodity 
specification combined with provisions for 
allocations to thefirmsfrom these donor coun- 
tries. In such a case, provided such pro- 
visions are effective despite switching pos- 
sibilities, there may exist again a case for 
ensuring that private foreign capital flows 
into "priority" areas so that the attendant, 
discriminatory aid allocation is biased to- 
wards, rather than against, the priority 
sectors. Thus, there are both domestic and 
foreign policy distortions which may make 
regulation of the sectoral composition of the 
private capital inflow desirable. (iii) Yet 
another argument which has come up in 
Indian discussions, for regulating the in- 
flow of capital into certain sectors, follows 
from the fact that the foreign investing, 
interests in some sectors are monopolistic, 
as in oil, and governmental intervention 
may help to increase the net payoff ac- 
cruing to the country from the proposed 
act of investment. This is a case where 
governmental intervention becomes nec- 
essary, not because of policy induced dis- 
tortions, but owing to the presence of en- 
dogenous distortions (such as the fortui- 
tous presence of monopoly power). How far 
such governmental regulation is likely to 
help is of course an issue on which one 
might be sceptical; this is part of the more 
general problem arising when, as Dudley 
Seers has shrewdly put it, "small coun- 
tries" face "big companies." 
I28 Cf. Bhagwati and Desai [14] on these and the 
other issues we review in the text. 
129 In relation to this question of domestically created 
monopoly, Bhagwati [11] has also argued that, where 
components are sold for assembly, the monopoly profits 
may be made by "overpricing" the components along 
with raising the product price to a monopolistically- 
profit-maximizing level. This has the dual advantage of 
making the latter price look "reasonable" (since the 
costs can be shown to be higher this way) and also 
masking the repatriation of profits (which otherwise 
attract hostile attention). Another aspect of such a 
phenomenon is that [12] [14] the economist may then 
observe "value subtracted" or negative value added at 
international prices, such an observation implying 
then, not that the process is not worthwhile in itself, 
but that its possible contribution to national income is 
outweighed by the monopolistic "exploitation" by the 
investor.- 
130 Hence, private capital inflow may have an external- 
ity effect in the form of additional aid flow, thus in- 
creasing the optimal level at which private capital 
would be useful to have. 
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(b) Another area in which governmental 
regulation has been proposed by several 
Indian economists relates to the occasional 
imposition by foreign investors, on their 
local counterparts, of a contractual pro- 
hibition of export to third markets. Kidron 
[77] has perceptively noted that the bulk of 
the new quantitative-restrictions-jump- 
ing foreign investment in India is by firms 
who wish to retain their Indian sales with- 
out jeopardising their third country exports. 
This is also the case with firms which are 
basically selling both technology and pro- 
duct, who while selling knowhow to India 
wish at the same time to safeguard their 
export of products to other markets. In 
either case, the effect is to interfere with 
India's export potential, particularly as 
India is increasingly relying at the margin 
on the exports of her newer manufactures. 
Economists such as Raj have therefore 
pressed for the prohibition of clauses re- 
stricting exports from India. 
(C) Trade and Exchange Rate Policies 
The literature on India's trade and ex- 
change rate policies, involving the entire 
effective exchange rate system, has also 
raised some issues of general interest. 
Among other things, it has cast additional 
light on the drawbacks of a regime involv- 
ing continued reliance on quantitative re- 
strictions (especially when operated so as 
to provide automatic protection) and a 
pattern of reluctant exchange rate adjust- 
ments. 
Import Controls: Beginning essentially 
with the 1956-57 foreign exchange crisis, 
India has been on a strict import and ex- 
change control system. Furthermore, this 
system has been administratively operated 
(at least until the June 1966 devaluation of 
the Indian rupee) such that (1) all indus- 
strial capacity creation has been regulated 
by industrial licensing, extending to the 
so-called CG licensing of imported capital 
goods and (2) most input and raw material 
allocations have been allocated via the so- 
called "actual user" (AU) licenses, di- 
rectly to producers.'3' 
The allocations under the AU category, 
to which in particular considerable atten- 
tion has been directed by economists [162] 
[14], have been worked on two basic prin- 
ciples: (i) "essentiality" and (ii) indige- 
nous nonavailability". For every AU im- 
port, some specified agencies of the govern- 
ment must certify that they are "essential" 
for production and that they are not avail- 
able from domestic sources. Since the lat- 
ter principle has been operated virtually 
without reference to the cost of domestic 
production, it has amounted to giving 
automatic and anticipatory" protection to 
domestic industries. Panchmukhi, Bhag- 
wati and Padma Desai [126], who have 
estimated the resulting effective rates of 
protection, for different Indian industrial 
processes for 1961 and 1962, have found 
these protective rates going up to levels as 
high as over 10,000 per cent, with others at 
almost as high negative values: the range 
thus being enormous. These results merely 
underline the totally unpredictable, ex- 
treme and often bizarre nature of protec- 
tion given by a QR-regime operated on the 
principle of automatic protection.132 In 
this connection, the devalued role of the 
Tariff Commission, whose work has been 
studied in depth by Padma Desai [44], and 
the critique of the new era of indiscrimi- 
nate protection through QR-policy in his 
Presidential Address to the Indian Eco- 
nomic Association by Lakdawala [87], are 
of some interest. 
Bhagwati and Desai [14] have further 
noted that the principle of automatic pro- 
tection issuing from QR's creates a bias in 
131 In addition, of course, there have been licenses for 
export promotion under the import entitlement schemes, 
and other minor categories. For detailed description, see 
Shourie [1621 as also Bhagwati and Desai [141. 
132 Panchmukhi, Bhagwati and Desai [126] also 
raise some conceptual questions of importance relating 
to the notion of effective protection when the calcula- 
tions are based on import-premia-determined implicit 
rates of tariff. 
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favor, ceteris paribus, of industries with 
imported, as distinct from domestically 
produced, inputs. Insofar as the quantity of 
import allocations tends to be inversely 
related to the availability of indigenously 
produced inputs, under such a system, 
there would result a bias in the effective 
incentive provided to the processes using 
relatively more imported inputs: they 
would be able to get relatively greater al- 
locations of imports under AU licenses and 
hence obtain these inputs at import- 
premium-exclusive prices (which would 
include only the explicit tariff duty) 
whereas the other industries would have to 
buy import substitute, indigenous items at 
premium inclusive prices (since these 
items would fetch a price equal to the c.i.f. 
price plus the import premium). The effec- 
tive incentive given to the former in- 
dustries or processes would thus be greater, 
ceteris paribus. 
Furthermore, aside from the traditional 
discussion of delays, lack of coordination 
among different licensing agencies and 
similar administrative deficiencies which 
reduce the efficiency of a QR-regime, the 
Indian import control policy has also been 
alleged to have operated, in the ultimate 
analysis, without any economic criteria 
[14] [162].133 Economists investigating these 
criteria have argued that these are rarely 
defined; that (in view of the multitude of 
activities which demand these import al- 
locations) they could hardly be defined; 
and that in practice rules of thumb have 
had to be used, these rules often (though 
not always) taking some notion of "equit- 
able" distribution as the operative guiding 
principle. This finding has its counterpart 
in the conclusions of the Raj Committee's 
Report of Steel Control [178], and indeed 
in nearly all the empirical studies relating 
to the working of the controls of scarce 
materials.'34 
Concerning the particularly widespread 
rule of thumb which related the AU allo- 
cations of materials to installed capacity, 
it has further been argued [14] that this 
procedure creates a bias towards the crea- 
tion of capacity despite the underutiliza- 
tion of existing capacity. This may be be- 
cause an entrepreneur who wishes to ex- 
tend capacity utilization may not be able 
to do so as legal access to more materials is 
virtually ruled out by the import licensing 
system (except since recently, on a limited 
account, through the import entitlement 
licenses marketed by exporter). However, 
even if access to such materials were freely 
available, the fact that additional capacity 
installation would result in pro rata grant 
of import-premium-exclusive imports un- 
der AU licenses whereas additional utiliza- 
tion of existing capacity must be through 
purchase of import-premium-inclusive ma- 
terials from the market, would bias the 
choice at the margin in favor of the former 
course. 
Moreover, the fact that the reliance on 
QR's also implies a loss of "revenue," in 
relation to an import rate change which 
would mop up the premium, has been 
among the principal motivating factors 
behind the Indian literature proposing an 
exchange auction system, which was sug- 
183 Whether even the Mahalanobis-type strategy has 
been consistently followed in this area has been a matter 
of some controversy. Hazari [681 has argued for instance 
that Indian luxury goods production (and henice con- 
sumption) has been allowed to absorb, directly and in- 
directly, a fraction of the available foreign exchange 
which is not negligible. Of course, whether the luxury 
expenditure would not otherwise have been diverted 
into other areas where it might have cut into exports, 
for example, needs to be investigated in order to arrive 
at a more adequate picture. 
134 In this general connection, the following quote 
from Raj Committee [1781 is particularly revealing: 
"As regards priorities, the Iron and Steel Controller 
gives different ratings of priority according to the na- 
ture of each case. Thus some indents receive 'over-rid- 
ing' priority and others 'top priority'; the categories of 
priority have further proliferated and we understand 
that there is now even a category of 'red hot priority'! 
As already pointed out, the Iron and Steel Controller's 
Office does not have with it data relating to outstanding 
orders with the producers classified according to priority 
and non-priority indents... there is no systematic 
checking as to whether the priorities are in fact being 
respected by the producers." 
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gested by Bhagwati [5] after examining its 
compatibility with Indian planning ob- 
jectives, and the alternative proposal to 
use tariffs more freely for this purpose, as 
indeed Indian budgets have recently been 
designed to do. 
Export Policy: However, these propo- 
sals will not directly moderate, or elimi- 
nate, the disincentive against exports that 
an over-valued exchange rate constitutes. 
The governmental measures aimed at 
eliminating this bias against exports have 
taken the form principally of import en- 
titlement schemes (under which premium 
earning import licenses are given to eligible 
exporters on a pro rata basis related to 
f.o.b. export values). These schemes have 
come in for scrutiny from economists such 
as Gulati [60] and Bhagwati [12]. The ad 
hoc manner in which the resulting export 
incentives were granted to a whole range of 
industries has been argued to have provi- 
ded a parallel to the "indiscriminate" 
protection from imports conferred on do- 
mestic productioin by the QR's. The allo- 
cative inefficiency of these schemes as 
export promotion measures has been un- 
derlined by pointing to the extreme phe- 
nomenon of negative value added (at in- 
ternational prices) which can and did arise 
in the Indian context, thanks to the differ- 
ence between the f.o.b. value of exports 
and the c.i.f. value of imports (and im- 
port substitutes) being inade up by export 
subsidies [12].135 
Exclhange Rate Policy: Anl appreciation 
of these and other inefficiencies underlying 
the governmental policies designed to 
simulate, but avoid, a formal devaluation 
via export subsidies and tariffs has 
prompted some Indian economists to press 
for formal parity changes. While the 
economists' attitudes towards devaluation 
have undergone a change on the Indian 
scene, simultaneously with a greater ap- 
preciation of the role of the price mech- 
anism even in a socialist framework,'36 
there has been a certain degree of scepti- 
cism about the timing of the devaluation 
in June 1966 and a much greater degree of 
political opposition in view of the fact that 
the pressure for it was brought largely by 
the donor countries through the I.B.R.D. 
Aid Consortium (even though all influen- 
tial economists within the country were by 
no means opposed to the measure). The 
second, severe agricultural drought which 
overlaid the devaluation must have led to a 
significant rise in the domestic prices of 
agricultural and agriculture-based items, 
which in turn impeded any significant im- 
provement in exports, thus creating the 
impression that the devaluation had 
caused the rise in prices and had failed be- 
cause exports continued to stagnate. In 
point of fact, it is arguable that many 
Indian exports would have been priced out 
internationally were it not for the devalua- 
tion, as the price rise was largely thanks to 
the second drought and thus autonomous 
of the exchange rate change.137 Unfortun- 
ately, no serious empirical analysis of this 
important policy decision has yet been 
forthcoming, the field having been left in 
the popular debate to economists whose 
analysis leaves much to be desired138 but 
135 An extended evaluation of the entitlement schemes 
from the viewpoint of their economic efficiency is con- 
tained in Bhagwati and Desai [14J. 
136 Raj's [1361 thoughtful piece on this general prob- 
lem makes interestiing reading. The controversy in 1962 
between Bhagwati [7], who argued for a freer use of 
exchange rate changes in the shape of a devaluation, 
and Bardhan [1] and Dasgupta [381 who argued the 
opposite case, is also of some interest in this general 
context. Bardhan's general position that a devaluation 
can be simulated by equivalent import duties and export 
subsidies, and hence is not necessary, has been later 
discussed in Bhagwati [12]. 
137 Further, the reduction of overinvoicing of exports 
of the newer manufactures, whose export subsidies were 
withdrawn with the devaluation (as part of the general 
rationalization, the net devaluation being therefore 
much less than the apparent one), must also be con- 
sidered. The devaluation must also be judged as a mea- 
sure of rationalization, the older methods of de facto 
devaluation having been largely scrapped with its in- 
troduction. 
138 Thus, for example. it is not uncommoni to compare 
the twvelve-monthly returns impnediately after the June 
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whose critical views have been expressed 
with considerable conviction. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, it is perhaps worth em- 
phasizing the selective nature of our Sur- 
vey. We expect, however, to have re- 
viewed much of the policy literature with 
an analytical base and related literature 
that has developed against the backdrop 
of policy issues.139 
It is clear that the Survey highlights 
both the similarity of the Indian analyses 
of policy issues with that in many other 
developing countries, as also some striking 
differences endemic to the Indian economy 
and scene. On the one hand, we have noted 
the concern of Indian economists with 
familiar issues such as trade and exchange 
rate policies, foreign aid and private for- 
eign capital, and response of agricultural 
production to price change. On the other 
hand, the structural planning models, the 
analysis of choice-of-technique problems 
on the assumption of a labor surplus 
economy and the debate on foodgrains 
policy in terms of zonal restrictions (em- 
phasizing India's federal setup) underline 
the somewhat uncommon character of 
India's economy and political structure. 
devaluation with the preceding twelve months, with no 
awareness of lags. Nor is any notice taken of the factors 
mentioned in the text and in the previouis footnote. Nor 
is there any awareness of the fact that, at least for 
three months subsequent to the devaluation and the 
attendant elimination of the import entitlement 
schemes for exporters, the Minister for International 
Trade was keen to restore these schemes and went 
around saying that he would succeed in doing so: the 
effect of this on the export performance in the period 
after the devaluation should not be ignored. 
139 Among the issues which have been prominent, but 
which we have decided to omit fromn the Survey, are 
(1) whether income and wealth inequalities have been 
accentuated during the three Plans, with related ques- 
tions about the trends in the real income of agricdlutral 
landless labor and in the concentration of industrial 
capacity and invested capital in the hands of a few top 
"industrial houses," and (2) whether decentralization 
in rural administration and planning, via the so-called 
Panclzayati Raj system, has been beneficial for agri- 
cutlural planning and growth [62]. 
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